Closing Statement of the Transitional Period Evaluation Workshops

Co-organized by the Democrat Newspaper and the Forces for Freedom and Change

The Transitional Period Evaluation Workshop, The Lawyers House, Amarat, Khartoum, Sudan; from the 20th   to the 24th of July, 2022

The Closing Statement

Taking into consideration the significance of the present Sudanese moment in the midst of a pioneering revolution, that did not stop presenting the clearest examples and evidence of the determination that drove the peaceful unarmed people facing a vicious inhumane killing machine, people that have the will and desire to achieve freedom and democracy,

Acknowledging the importance of the transitional period that followed the first fall of Omer El-Bashir’s regime and his comrades as well as the importance of extensive and comprehensive evaluation for the transitional period to highlight the lessons learnt as to be able to forge ahead confidently into the future supported by solid knowledge and ethical platform that can match the aspirations of our people,

Affirming the roles played by the Forces to Freedom and Change within the journey of this revolution as well as the transitional period, whether positive or negative, in addition to the importance of highlighting the lessons learnt from the experiences of such roles,

Emphasising the importance of honest and sincere evaluation aimed at enhancing performance across all levels as well as the role of self-criticism in reassuring reform and building trust among political and social actors,

Realising the need to popularise constructive criticism as a way of making use of human experience throughout different times and seeking redemption through owning to ones’ shortcomings,

Being aware of the heavily hostile and ill-informed environment created by the coup advocates through the help of their militias brought from a wide range of locations and used to disinform the masses, in addition to targeting democracy and democrats, with the will to distort the truth; despite that, better yet, because of that, we will continue to strongly adhere to the light of transparency in the dark face of the coup in order to rebuild trust among the components of our peoples and unify them with regard to the revolution objectives regardless of the differences in visions, position, and conflicts over the past,

Preparing for the coming inevitable revolutionary victory, thanks to the contributions of women and men revolutionaries from our courageous people, which were fuelled by their blood, we will forge ahead more aware of the gravity of the challenges before us; ultimately aiming to open a new page in our national path in which we put an end to the darkness of totalitarianism, tyranny, autocracy, and corruption once and forever,

The Democrat Newspaper and the Forces of Freedom and Change organised the (Transitional Period Evaluation Workshop) which took place between the 20th and the 24th of July, 2022 in the Lawyers House in Al-Amarat, Khartoum, Sudan. During the Workshop, discussions over the course of the working sessions were conducted by twelve political leaders from the Forces of Freedom and Change — who served constitutional position in the first or second transitional governments — in addition to an independent female expert. They presented papers in which they reviewed and evaluated the performance according to important (10) main themes. More than (30) male and female experts including civil society actors, activists from the resistance committees, and a wide range of other attendees engaged in free and open exchange broadcasted through social media. Significant attention was dedicated to the public from inside and outside Sudan. The workshop adopted detailed recommendations that will be published soon in a book containing all the said papers in addition to the deliberations of the Workshop sessions. Meanwhile, the Workshop announces the following:

(1)

During the Transitional Period, mistakes were committed, some of which were the responsibility of the Forces of Freedom and Change. Therefore, it must acknowledge its mistakes, apologise for them, and put in place guarantees and mechanisms that ensure the mistakes are not repeated.

Here, we note specifically that it did not consider security-military reform as a top priority and it accepted the Military Council’s control over the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior.

The lack of sufficient pressure against carrying out radical reforms to achieve disempowerment in the army, police and security sectors; in addition to errors in appointments and lack of openness towards a huge amount of Sudanese non-partisan experts, which weakened institutional reform in the public service; leaving the prosecution and the judiciary authorities the same way as inherited from the former regime, which helped facilitate the coup plots.

The lack of sufficient interest in the media and in communicating with the public/the street created an enabling environment for the disinformation campaigns led by the anti-revolutionary forces in collusion with professional Sudanese and foreign security agencies that worked to demonise and target the transitional period, its leaders, and symbols, with the aim of driving a wedge between the various components of the revolution.

The failure to defeat the plans of the military component and the anti-revolutionary forces which were aimed at disrupting the formation of the Transitional Legislative Council, the Commissions, the Constitutional Court, as well as the commencement of the justice process.

Focusing mainly on the state of Khartoum while neglecting communication and reflection with the other states in the required manner, which excluded the states that initiated the spark of the revolution and rendered them out of pace with regard to the expected progress in the Transitional Government.

Neglecting the tracing of funds of the National Congress party and its leaders that were smuggled and hidden abroad, which should have been done sooner by employing international experts and institutions specialised in tracing looted corrupt funds.

(2)

The necessity of starting again based on the past experience as well as the review conducted by the Transitional Council of Ministers in June 2021, which was aimed at developing an adequate strategy for the upcoming transitional period, to set clear, reasonable, and correctly arranged priorities for the upcoming transition while not overburdening it with tasks beyond its capacity — at the top of said priorities is security and military reform.

(3)

The necessity of firmly defining the transition as a political task, therefore, requires those who lead the transition in all positions to have, in the first place, a commitment to the revolution and civil democratic transition, as well as leadership competence and capabilities.

(4)

One of the lessons learnt and observations from the past Transitional Period is that the civilians dedicated their attention to minor side conflicts instead of their main battle against the anti-revolutionary forces and allowed such forces to exploit their contradictions to weaken them all as to adjust the balance of power in their favour; this confirms that any disruption to the unity of the revolutionary forces with any slogans or calls ultimately serves the interest of the enemies of the revolution. This does not mean suppressing the differences, but rather managing such differences by committing to respect and cooperation in fighting the main battle.

(5)

The Forces of Freedom and Change must start active and open consultations with all the civil democratic forces, particularly the new actors from the revolutionary forces such as resistance committees, professionals, feminists, and demands bodies to form a new resistance front that achieves the unity of the revolutionary forces around a new political charter that will make it possible to avoid previous mistakes,  achieve openness, institutionalisation, transparency, and accountability.

(6)

Military and security reform requires disempowerment within these [military and security] institutions with the purpose of transforming them from partisan to nationalist institutions; in addition to keeping military institutions away from the political process as well as trade and competition with the private sector; committing to a single army with a national, professional, and democratic military doctrine in accordance with its mandate stipulated in the constitution and the law; and ensuring the military respect for human rights and international humanitarian law as well as a decisive commitment to international legality and the ending of support for terrorism and cross-border criminal organisations.

(7)

Commitment to institutional reform of the civil service, the judiciary, and the public prosecution in order to enhance their institutional capacities; creating a database of Sudanese experts in addition to establishing major partnerships with United Nations organisations and the international community to fill the gap caused by the brain-drain that was due to the notorious ‘public interest’ expelling practices over thirty years. This is to ensure addressing and avoiding structural weaknesses in the civil service that occurred due to the  [El-Bashir regime]   policy of empowerment which was accompanied by the appointment of incompetent loyalists — resulting in raging wars, genocide, and looting instead of discharging the works of government. Without this basic and urgent reform of state institutions, it will not be possible to carry out the tasks required for the success of the transitional. In preparation for the upcoming transition, the Forces of Freedom and Change and its partners from the forces of the revolution must build on past experience, lessons, and available information in order to plan institutional reform in every ministry.

(8)

The Forces of Freedom and Change and all the forces of the revolution should be extensively keen to paying deep attention to addressing the issues of the rural marginalised areas. In preparation for the upcoming transition, they should plan for institutional reform of local level sub-national state governments and develop plans to support them institutionally, upgrade their capabilities, and escape the stifling grip of [El-Bashir regime] empowerment.

(9)

The necessity of completing the formation of all the institutions of the upcoming transitional authority and insisting on the formation of the Legislative Council, the Constitutional Court, the High Judicial Council, and the commissions due to the importance of mentioned institutions with regard to ensuring broadening the base of participation, accountability, control and balance, and providing institutional mechanisms for settling disputes.

(10)

The workshop recommends the Forces of Freedom and Change to hold consultations with all the forces of the revolution to reach a constitutional declaration based on the charters of the resistance committees, expressing the widest sector of democratic forces and overcoming the shortcomings in the constitutional document; this is in addition to the essential tasks including the disempowerment of the National Congress party and the inclusion of human rights charters as part of the overall quest to achieve the main tasks of the glorious December revolution.

(11)

Paying attention to addressing justice issues, reforming the justice and legal system, ensuring accountability for violations, and repelling laws restricting freedoms; such actions within the context of justice must be prioritised since achieving justice is one of the revolution’s basic demands; in addition to cooperate with the International Criminal Court to hand over wanted persons to justice.

(12)

Building consensus on defining gender, region/sector, and age diversity to ensure justice in representation; focusing on empowering women and youth economically and politically by building their capacities as they represent the spearhead of the revolution, and ensuring regional balance in support of equality in citizenship.

(13)

The foreign policy is to be formulated based on the national interests of the Sudanese people, thus it should adhere to international legitimacy and foster good relations with neighbouring countries; rely on the balanced exchange of benefits; break with the legacy of the Inqaz [El-Bashir regime] in destabilisation and interference aimed at sponsoring terrorism. The foreign policy is also concerned with the resolution of water security issues with due consideration to the basin countries. The Red Sea security should be the sole responsibility of the coastal countries, therefore, no other country should be allowed to establish military bases or a  security and military presence in the region. Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must assume leadership of external action to prevent multiple centres of leadership within the settings of foreign affairs; also, it is important to provide the necessary capabilities for it to carry out the necessary institutional and legal reforms in order to raise professional efficiency by building capacity.

(14)

The economic policy should be based on social democracy that favours the poor, the workers and producers, and the promotion of cooperatives while ensuring competitiveness, freedom of initiative, innovation and entrepreneurship, and strengthening partnerships between the private and public sectors. The Transitional Period economic policy should be anchored upon a clear consensus and agreement with regard to the economic recovery among the revolution forces so as to not allow their differences to cause quarrels or side battles that will waste their energy.

(15)

The necessity of completing peace with the Sudan Peoples Liberation  Movement under the leadership of Abdelaziz El-Hilu and the Sudan Liberation Movement under the leadership of Abdel-Wahed El-Nur, in addition to reviewing the Juba Peace Agreement with its parties, especially with regard to peace tracks in areas that did not witness an armed conflict. This is along with the need to follow a sound approach to peace affairs that allows the civil government to be the first and foremost entity accountable for the peace that should be guided by addressing the roots of the crises — so as to not produce elite agreements far from the real stakeholders in order to ensure peace sustainability. Additionally, the agreements should not waive the principles of the rule of law and accountability.

(16)

The disempowerment of the June 30th [El-Bashir regime] is an essential process for the democratic system. It must be based on a review of past experience in order to enhance it, address its shortcomings, and achieve standards of effectiveness and justice.  In this regard,  the  Appeals  Committee should accompany the disempowerment work in an immediate manner. Priority should be given to the pursuit of funds smuggled abroad and located in Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and a number of European countries with the help of investigative companies specialised in monitoring funds and ways to recover them.

(17)

The organisers are working on holding additional sessions to evaluate the transitional performance in the following themes:  the regions/states/sub-national conditions, culture and media, education, health, and electricity at a time to be announced soon in Allah’s willing.

In this announcement, the organisers would like to extend their sincere appreciation to the resistance committees’ coordination bodies that responded to the call as well as their delegates’ valuable contributions to the deliberations of the workshop; we also like to thank the ‘Harisat’ organisation and the Lawyers Union for the contributions to the workshops in terms of providing assistance and the venue.