No, the Horn Cannot Afford Another Conflict

Monday September 02 2024

Somali people march against the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal at the Yarisow stadium in Mogadishu, Somalia on January 3, 2024. 

The EastAfrican

Africa’s longtime rivals Ethiopia and Egypt are flexing muscles and Somalia is willing to be the canvas on which this huge ego clash plays out. This past week, Egypt, which has committed troops to the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (Aussom), the successor mission to Atmis, delivered arms to Mogadishu, eliciting a fiery response from Addis.

The arms deliveries and impending troop deployment by Egypt are the inevitable outcome of the long-standing rivalry between Addis and Mogadishu.

But, in all probability, it would not have come to this if Ethiopia had not miscalculated in its assessment of its strength and if Somalia had not reacted emotively to the “provocation.”

As it is, Africa and the international community must now scramble to defuse a likely conflict, whose consequences would be devastating for a part of the world that is already embroiled in intractable wars.

Looked at from a safe distance, this conflict is unnecessary, and all parties are to blame. It can be argued that Ethiopia was wrong to negotiate sea access with Somaliland to the exclusion of the federal government in Mogadishu. This move betrayed a willingness to abuse its dominant position in the region, which makes it no different from Egypt.

Mogadishu’s is a high-stakes gamble for a country that is trying to pick up the pieces after decades of a destructive internal conflict. To allow itself to be the frontline between two rival powers, it risks unwinding all recent progress and trapping itself in a costly conflict, should a stalemate emerge.

Egypt should be faulted for escalating its differences with Addis Ababa over the Grand Renaissance Dam to a point where war might be inevitable.

If chaos and anarchy were to occur, ultimately, Mogadishu would be the biggest loser. All recent gains in re-establishing the Somali state would be rolled back, as al Shabaab and other non-state actors take advantage of the confusion to regenerate.

For the African Union, the writing is clear. Conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt would light a conflagration stretching from the Indian Ocean, with dire implications for ongoing efforts to pacify Sudan and its environs. Also, all the investment in the Somalia peace process would be lost.

To douse this fire, Addis might have to renounce its deal with Somaliland and renegotiate the deal with Mogadishu.

That might remove any justification for Egypt’s intervention and set the stage for a reasoned engagement. It should also be impressed upon Ethiopia that its interests can only be considered legitimate if they are pursued within the principles of international law.