French Dropped Surveillance of Brothers Killed in Paris Raids
Intelligence Services Had Brothers Under Watch After Yemen Trip But Lacked Resources to Continue
Before he was killed by French police on Friday, alleged Charlie Hebdo assailant Chérif Kouachi said he had been funded by American-born Anwar al-Awlaki, who was killed by a U.S. drone strike in Yemen in 2011
By STACY MEICHTRY and MARGARET COKER
Updated Jan. 9, 2015 7:41 p.m. ET
Wall Street Journal
The terror attacks in Paris that have killed 17 people over three days this week represent one of the worst fears—and failures—of counterterrorist officials: a successful plot coordinated by people who had once been under surveillance but who were later dropped as a top priority.
The U.S. provided France with intelligence showing that the gunmen in the Charlie Hebdo massacre received training in Yemen in 2011, prompting French authorities to begin monitoring the two brothers, according to U.S. officials.
But that surveillance of Said and Chérif Kouachi came to an end last spring, U.S. officials said, after several years of monitoring turned up nothing suspicious.
“These guys were laying low for an extended period of time so they could pull off something,” said a U.S. official.
The brothers fell through the surveillance net because of a lack of resources, current and former French officials said.
“We have to make choices,” said Christian Prouteau, the founder and former head of the GIGN, an elite counterterrorism force that reports to the French Defense Ministry. “It’s the people coming from Syria that worried us.”
France boasts vast intelligence-gathering operations, which excel at recruiting operatives across North Africa and the Middle East. The tentacles of French intelligence also reach deep into the impoverished suburbs of French cities home to Europe’s biggest Muslim population.
But for Yemen, France relies on partner spy agencies, particularly those of the U.S., Britain, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, to collect and pass on on-the-ground intelligence.
That’s what Washington did after the Kouachis went to the Arab country notorious as an al Qaeda safe haven and as the home of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the affiliate with the best track record at launching sophisticated and aggressive terror plots against Western targets.
American spies told the French that both brothers, 34-year-old Said and 32-year-old Chérif, had traveled to Yemen in 2011 to receive weapons training from AQAP.
French officials had already been aware of Chérif’s terror connections. He had served a terrorism sentence in France in 2008, and French law enforcement had suspected him in an additional terrorist-related incident in 2011 but never charged him. It is unclear whether Said had a profile with French law enforcement before traveling to Yemen.
When the two returned to France, U.S. and French officials said, French intelligence eventually ran out of resources to keep their eye on them.
By 2013, France was struggling to monitor a flood of citizens suspected of traveling—or planning to travel—to Syria and Iraq. That number has now surpassed 1,000, officials said.
Additionally, much of the French reconnaissance drone fleet was ordered to North Africa, where French troops are helping to fight Islamist insurgencies in Mali and other countries.
Meanwhile, the Kouachis had gone quiet, raising no red flags, these officials said.
“You can’t monitor everything with the same quality and that’s why we exchange information,” said a French official. The U.S., in turn, relies heavily on France for intelligence from Francophone countries in Africa, the official said.
Western intelligence officials said the sheer number of French nationals under surveillance for possible ties with terrorist groups is making it harder for officials to determine who poses an authentic threat.
“One of the big problems with counterterrorism policy is that the haystack is getting bigger and bigger, and we still need to find that one needle,” said Benoit Gomis, a terrorism analyst with the London-based think tank Chatham House who formerly worked at the French Defense Ministry.
Part of the lessons learned in the aftermath of the attack depends on the intelligence estimate of whether AQAP inspired or more directly controlled the Paris terror attacks.
On a recruitment level, the Kouachis’ relationship with AQAP promises to bring a resurgence of acclaim among Islamic extremists for al Qaeda, which many Western terrorism analysts said has been scrambling to restore its image as the pre-eminent global jihadist organization in the midst of competition with Islamic State.
The group’s affiliation with the attacks, however, is also likely to stoke fears among Western intelligence agencies about the possibility of sleeper cells in other countries.
The Paris attacks on Charlie Hebdo have put new focus on recent terrorist propaganda, which features no shortage of jihadists claiming to be from France.
Before his death Friday, Chérif Kouachi claimed in a telephone interview with BFM TV that he had been to Yemen and had received funding for his terror operation from Anwar al-Awlaki, the charismatic AQAP preacher and recruiter tied to a dozen other terror plots in America and Britain.
U.S. officials were not able to immediately verify that claim. AQAP, meanwhile, has not released a statement claiming responsibility for the Paris attacks or clarifying its association with the two brothers.
Since 2006, U.S. and U.K. investigators have found AQAP fingerprints on more than a dozen terror plots, only some of which had been disrupted. Although geographically diverse, these plots had a common denominator: Terrorism suspects were either inspired or directed by Mr. Awlaki, who was killed by a U.S. drone strike in September 2011.
The Paris attacks also raise questions about Washington’s assertions that its sustained drone strikes in Yemen—along with the Yemeni government’s operations against al Qaeda-linked tribal groups—have degraded AQAP’s capabilities.
For several years, U.S. and U.K. intelligence officials have said AQAP posed the most severe national threat among the global jihadi organizations because of its track record in recruiting foreign-born attackers and launching sophisticated attacks in the West.
The failure by French intelligence to foil the Kouachi brothers has thrust the government on the defensive and searching for answers. “It is legitimate for us to ask questions about our arsenal,” Prime Minister Manuel Valls said Friday. “We can’t start with the idea that nothing can change, but above all we mustn’t improvise.”
Late last year, the French government scrambled to shore up its intelligence-gathering capabilities, passing new laws that allow prosecutors to detain and prosecute people for the mere act of traveling to Iraq or Syria. The measures also gave investigators more latitude to collect data in real time about individuals’ phone and Internet traffic.
—Adam Entous and Devlin Barrett in Washington contributed to this article.
Before he was killed by French police on Friday, alleged Charlie Hebdo assailant Chérif Kouachi said he had been funded by American-born Anwar al-Awlaki, who was killed by a U.S. drone strike in Yemen in 2011
By STACY MEICHTRY and MARGARET COKER
Updated Jan. 9, 2015 7:41 p.m. ET
Wall Street Journal
The terror attacks in Paris that have killed 17 people over three days this week represent one of the worst fears—and failures—of counterterrorist officials: a successful plot coordinated by people who had once been under surveillance but who were later dropped as a top priority.
The U.S. provided France with intelligence showing that the gunmen in the Charlie Hebdo massacre received training in Yemen in 2011, prompting French authorities to begin monitoring the two brothers, according to U.S. officials.
But that surveillance of Said and Chérif Kouachi came to an end last spring, U.S. officials said, after several years of monitoring turned up nothing suspicious.
“These guys were laying low for an extended period of time so they could pull off something,” said a U.S. official.
The brothers fell through the surveillance net because of a lack of resources, current and former French officials said.
“We have to make choices,” said Christian Prouteau, the founder and former head of the GIGN, an elite counterterrorism force that reports to the French Defense Ministry. “It’s the people coming from Syria that worried us.”
France boasts vast intelligence-gathering operations, which excel at recruiting operatives across North Africa and the Middle East. The tentacles of French intelligence also reach deep into the impoverished suburbs of French cities home to Europe’s biggest Muslim population.
But for Yemen, France relies on partner spy agencies, particularly those of the U.S., Britain, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, to collect and pass on on-the-ground intelligence.
That’s what Washington did after the Kouachis went to the Arab country notorious as an al Qaeda safe haven and as the home of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the affiliate with the best track record at launching sophisticated and aggressive terror plots against Western targets.
American spies told the French that both brothers, 34-year-old Said and 32-year-old Chérif, had traveled to Yemen in 2011 to receive weapons training from AQAP.
French officials had already been aware of Chérif’s terror connections. He had served a terrorism sentence in France in 2008, and French law enforcement had suspected him in an additional terrorist-related incident in 2011 but never charged him. It is unclear whether Said had a profile with French law enforcement before traveling to Yemen.
When the two returned to France, U.S. and French officials said, French intelligence eventually ran out of resources to keep their eye on them.
By 2013, France was struggling to monitor a flood of citizens suspected of traveling—or planning to travel—to Syria and Iraq. That number has now surpassed 1,000, officials said.
Additionally, much of the French reconnaissance drone fleet was ordered to North Africa, where French troops are helping to fight Islamist insurgencies in Mali and other countries.
Meanwhile, the Kouachis had gone quiet, raising no red flags, these officials said.
“You can’t monitor everything with the same quality and that’s why we exchange information,” said a French official. The U.S., in turn, relies heavily on France for intelligence from Francophone countries in Africa, the official said.
Western intelligence officials said the sheer number of French nationals under surveillance for possible ties with terrorist groups is making it harder for officials to determine who poses an authentic threat.
“One of the big problems with counterterrorism policy is that the haystack is getting bigger and bigger, and we still need to find that one needle,” said Benoit Gomis, a terrorism analyst with the London-based think tank Chatham House who formerly worked at the French Defense Ministry.
Part of the lessons learned in the aftermath of the attack depends on the intelligence estimate of whether AQAP inspired or more directly controlled the Paris terror attacks.
On a recruitment level, the Kouachis’ relationship with AQAP promises to bring a resurgence of acclaim among Islamic extremists for al Qaeda, which many Western terrorism analysts said has been scrambling to restore its image as the pre-eminent global jihadist organization in the midst of competition with Islamic State.
The group’s affiliation with the attacks, however, is also likely to stoke fears among Western intelligence agencies about the possibility of sleeper cells in other countries.
The Paris attacks on Charlie Hebdo have put new focus on recent terrorist propaganda, which features no shortage of jihadists claiming to be from France.
Before his death Friday, Chérif Kouachi claimed in a telephone interview with BFM TV that he had been to Yemen and had received funding for his terror operation from Anwar al-Awlaki, the charismatic AQAP preacher and recruiter tied to a dozen other terror plots in America and Britain.
U.S. officials were not able to immediately verify that claim. AQAP, meanwhile, has not released a statement claiming responsibility for the Paris attacks or clarifying its association with the two brothers.
Since 2006, U.S. and U.K. investigators have found AQAP fingerprints on more than a dozen terror plots, only some of which had been disrupted. Although geographically diverse, these plots had a common denominator: Terrorism suspects were either inspired or directed by Mr. Awlaki, who was killed by a U.S. drone strike in September 2011.
The Paris attacks also raise questions about Washington’s assertions that its sustained drone strikes in Yemen—along with the Yemeni government’s operations against al Qaeda-linked tribal groups—have degraded AQAP’s capabilities.
For several years, U.S. and U.K. intelligence officials have said AQAP posed the most severe national threat among the global jihadi organizations because of its track record in recruiting foreign-born attackers and launching sophisticated attacks in the West.
The failure by French intelligence to foil the Kouachi brothers has thrust the government on the defensive and searching for answers. “It is legitimate for us to ask questions about our arsenal,” Prime Minister Manuel Valls said Friday. “We can’t start with the idea that nothing can change, but above all we mustn’t improvise.”
Late last year, the French government scrambled to shore up its intelligence-gathering capabilities, passing new laws that allow prosecutors to detain and prosecute people for the mere act of traveling to Iraq or Syria. The measures also gave investigators more latitude to collect data in real time about individuals’ phone and Internet traffic.
—Adam Entous and Devlin Barrett in Washington contributed to this article.
No comments:
Post a Comment