The Ethiopian-Eritrean Escalation: Motives, Scenarios, and Regional Implications

November 7, 2026

Addis Ababa Standard

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (L) and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki (R) celebrate the reopening of the Embassy of Eritrea in Ethiopia in Addis Ababa on July 16, 2018. Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki reopened his country’s embassy in Ethiopia on July 16, the latest in a series of dizzying peace moves after two decades of war between the neighbours. (Photo by MICHAEL TEWELDE / AFP)

Key Takeaways

The current escalation between Ethiopia and Eritrea is driven by the legacy of previous wars, the failure of post-conflict reconciliation efforts to foster mutual trust, the resurgence of internal conflicts, and competing regional interests.

Ethiopia’s pursuit of access to the sea conflicts with Eritrea’s concerns over sovereignty and territorial integrity, making the question of maritime access a central driver of the ongoing crisis.

A pattern of controlled escalation between the two countries is likely to persist, accompanied by the constant risk that military buildups and limited confrontations could trigger a full-scale war as a result of miscalculation.

Should war erupt, it would place significant strain on both countries, deepen their existing economic and humanitarian challenges, and pose a particularly serious threat to Eritrea’s territorial integrity.

The conflict could also generate broader repercussions for regional security, maritime navigation, and trade. Containing such an escalation would require sustained external mediation, diplomatic pressure, and credible guarantees. However, any de-escalation is likely to remain fragile unless the underlying sources of tension are effectively addressed.

Escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea – which culminated in the complete severance of diplomatic relations on October 1, 2026 – point to a growing risk of direct military confrontation. This deterioration coincides with a significant military buildup, a resurgence of hostilities in northern Ethiopia, mutual accusations concerning alleged Eritrean support for opponents of the Ethiopian government, and reports of Eritrean troop movements into the Tigray region. Asmara has rejected these allegations, portraying them as a pretext for threatening its sovereignty and territorial integrity, with the ultimate aim of securing Ethiopian access to the sea through Eritrean territory by force.

These developments are unfolding within a regional environment already marked by increasing fragility and uncertainty. Ongoing conflicts in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia continue to intensify, while the repercussions of the Iranian crisis and the growing competition among regional and international powers in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea are further contributing to regional instability.

This paper examines the drivers and strategic dimensions of the Ethiopian-Eritrean escalation, explores potential scenarios, and assesses their implications for both countries and the broader region.

Motives and Strategic Dimensions of the Conflict

The escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea are rooted in intensifying mutual threat perceptions driven by a complex interplay of historical, domestic, regional, and geopolitical factors. These drivers can be outlined as follows:

The Historical Dimension: The Legacy of Wars and Fragile Reconciliation

Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have long been characterized by volatility, suspicion, and a profound lack of trust. Brief periods of rapprochement have repeatedly given way to bitter hostility, manifested through both direct confrontation and proxy warfare.

The first period of rapprochement began when the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), led by Isaias Afwerki, joined forces with a broad coalition of Ethiopian ethnic groups to topple the military regime that ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991 under the leadership of Mengistu Haile Mariam from 1977 onward. This political transition brought the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), led by Meles Zenawi, to power at the helm of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which formally recognized Eritrea’s independence in 1993. However, relations rapidly deteriorated thereafter, culminating in the 1998–2000 border war that entrenched animosity between the two countries for nearly two decades. 

The second phase began with the historic rapprochement launched by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on July 9, 2018. This ushered in a period of strategic cooperation and eventually a military alliance between the two countries, driven by distinct strategic calculations but united by a common adversary at the time: the TPLF. However, the manner in which the two-year conflict in northern Ethiopia (2020–2022) was concluded, particularly through the Pretoria Peace Agreement signed in November 2022 between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF under the auspices of the African Union, was viewed by the Eritrean president as a “political and strategic betrayal” of his country. As a result, the alliance gradually unraveled, giving way to deep-seated, albeit latent, tensions.

Consequently, this temporary improvement in bilateral relations proved to be largely the product of understandings between the political leaderships of the two states rather than the result of durable institutional arrangements. The commitments announced during the rapprochement period never evolved into effective mechanisms for managing disputes, building confidence, or promoting long-term good-neighborly relations. As a result, the legacy of historical grievances and mutual suspicion continued to shape bilateral interactions and fuel a heightened sensitivity to perceived threats.

The Internal and Security Dimension: The Resurgence of Conflict in Northern Ethiopia

Internal security dynamics are a key determinant of bilateral relations, as questions of sovereignty and borders have become increasingly intertwined with recurring internal conflicts, particularly in northern Ethiopia. Eritrea has historically exercised considerable influence over Ethiopia’s internal dynamics, including the formation of political and military alliances, by leveraging its ties with Ethiopian factions opposed to Addis Abeba. Against this backdrop, some observers argue that Asmara played a pivotal role in facilitating the formation of the “Alliance for Survival,” announced on September 20, 2026, which brought together the TPLF and six other opposition groups. The coalition’s stated objective is to overthrow the government of Abiy Ahmed, drawing parallels with the armed struggle that led to the downfall of the Mengistu regime.

More recently, Eritrea may have felt compelled to intervene directly in support of its allies within the TPLF while complicating Ethiopian military efforts to suppress the insurgency. From Asmara’s perspective, a successful Ethiopian campaign against the TPLF could free Addis Ababa to redirect its military capabilities toward Eritrea in pursuit of its maritime ambitions. This could help explain reports of Eritrean military incursions deep into the Tigray region during the first 10 days of October. Although the operation reportedly ended with a withdrawal following strikes by the Ethiopian Air Force, such developments provide Addis Ababa with additional justification for adopting a more assertive posture toward its northern neighbor. On October 19, 2026, Abiy Ahmed warned that Eritrea would face “extremely severe consequences” if it continued to support his opponents and allow its territory to serve as a base for groups hostile to Ethiopia.

The Regional and Geopolitical Dimension: Geography and Ethiopia’s Maritime Ambitions

Since October 2023, Abiy Ahmed has framed Ethiopia’s quest for access to the Red Sea as an “existential” national priority and a prerequisite for the country’s resurgence, placing it alongside landmark strategic projects such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. As a result, the issue has moved to the center of both government policy and the broader Ethiopian political discourse. What was once largely considered an economic and commercial concern has increasingly acquired security, military, and geopolitical dimensions, reflecting Ethiopia’s ambition to establish maritime influence and strengthen its regional standing.

Perhaps the most consequential shift in Addis Ababa’s approach has been the increasingly assertive rhetoric directed at neighboring states, particularly Eritrea. Statements by the Ethiopian prime minister and senior officials have included explicit references to “correcting past mistakes” that left Ethiopia landlocked, a characterization widely understood as referring to Eritrea’s independence. In Asmara, such statements are interpreted as signaling a potential intention to alter the existing territorial and political status quo, whether through renewed attempts at political reintegration or the seizure of strategic assets, including the port of Assab.

At the same time, regional and external dynamics have become increasingly important drivers of the widening rift between Addis Abeba and Asmara. The two capitals now hold divergent positions on several major regional issues, including the conflict in Sudan. Their alignment patterns have also begun to diverge, most notably through Eritrea’s growing cooperation with Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia, contrasted with Ethiopia’s expanding ties with Israel and Somaliland. Beyond regional rivalries, the calculations of external powers continue to shape the strategic environment in which both governments operate. Perceptions regarding potential gains, risks, deterrence thresholds, and opportunities for strategic maneuvering influence decision-making in both capitals. These factors may either encourage or restrain direct military confrontation and proxy conflicts, depending on the evolving dynamics of regional competition.

The Diplomatic Dimension: The Rupture of Bilateral Relations and the Erosion of Conflict-Management Tools

In recent years, political discourse between Ethiopia and Eritrea has increasingly been dominated by narratives of conspiracy and mutual accusations. Rather than serving as channels for confidence-building, dispute management, or constructive engagement, diplomatic channels and mechanisms have been used to exert political pressure, mobilize domestic and international public opinion, and reinforce hardline negotiating positions. This has further deepened the trust deficit between the two countries, ultimately culminating in a complete rupture of diplomatic relations, officially announced on October 1, 2026.

This rupture does not necessarily indicate that either side – or both – has decided to go to war. Rather, it suggests that the crisis has reached an advanced stage and that many of the mechanisms traditionally used to prevent confrontation and manage escalation have effectively collapsed. This erosion of diplomatic channels could narrow the scope for political compromise, raise the domestic and political costs of concessions, and increase the risk of miscalculation or disproportionate responses to actions perceived as existential threats within an increasingly hostile regional environment.

Between Fragile Containment and Confrontation: Likely Scenarios for the Crisis

In light of the complexities outlined above and the prevailing realities on the ground, three broad scenarios can be envisaged for the future trajectory of the crisis between Ethiopia and Eritrea:

1. Calculated Escalation

This scenario assumes the continuation of the diplomatic rupture, persistent tensions, and ongoing military mobilization between Eritrea and Ethiopia. It involves a carefully managed intensification of mutual pressure, potentially including limited military operations and sporadic border clashes intended to reinforce deterrence, while avoiding a full-scale, direct confrontation.

Several factors could sustain this scenario:

First, the worsening internal situation in Ethiopia, particularly the escalating conflict in the north, risks drawing the Ethiopian military into a prolonged war of attrition on multiple fronts. This would constrain Addis Ababa’s ability to exert sustained pressure on Eritrea and increase the costs and risks associated with opening an additional front against Asmara.

Second, mounting security concerns in Eritrea may encourage its leadership to calibrate support for allied Ethiopian factions more carefully, keeping such involvement within limits that preserve plausible deniability.

Third, regional and international actors might intensify diplomatic efforts to discourage both sides from moving toward open confrontation.

Nevertheless, this scenario remains fraught with uncertainty and risk. Miscalculations or a cycle of escalating actions and retaliatory responses could ultimately trigger an all-out military confrontation.

2. Open War

This scenario envisions the gradual, or potentially sudden, transition from heightened tensions into a large-scale direct military confrontation between the two countries.

Several potential triggers could contribute to such an outcome:

First, the success of Abiy Ahmed’s government in weakening its opponents, containing internal rebellion, and consolidating domestic security could strengthen confidence in its military capabilities and reinforce its ambition to reshape the strategic environment of the Red Sea through military action against Eritrea.

Second, a growing sense of existential threat within the Eritrean leadership could encourage preemptive action aimed at disrupting Ethiopian plans before they fully materialize.

Third, external factors could play a decisive role. Political guarantees, military assistance, logistical support, or diplomatic backing provided by regional and international partners may increase the confidence of both sides in their ability to impose their preferences through force.

3. Temporary Calm

This scenario remains possible despite several obstacles, including deep-rooted mistrust, mutual security concerns, widening divergences in interests and strategic visions, and intensifying regional polarization.

The likelihood of this scenario could increase if regional and international actors, particularly African institutions, move beyond calls for restraint and undertake a more active mediation effort supported by meaningful pressure, incentives, and guarantees. Such an initiative would also require both Addis Ababa and Asmara to recognize that the costs and uncertainties of war outweigh its potential benefits.

Under these conditions, the two sides could gradually resume dialogue and explore mechanisms for managing tensions, potentially reaching interim understandings that would help reduce escalation and polarization.

However, such de-escalation would likely remain fragile. It is unlikely to resolve the fundamental disputes that lie at the heart of the crisis, particularly those relating to borders, sovereignty, and Ethiopia’s pursuit of access to the Red Sea. More realistically, it would amount to a temporary freeze of hostilities rather than a comprehensive settlement. Consequently, the possibility of renewed confrontation would remain contingent on changes in the regional balance of power and the broader strategic environment.

Implications for the Two Countries and the Regional Environment

The escalating tensions between Addis Ababa and Asmara carry implications that extend far beyond the domestic arenas of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Their repercussions are likely to affect regional security dynamics and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.

1. Ethiopia and Its Internal Conflict

Should the current escalation persist under either of the first two scenarios, Ethiopia could find itself confronting a complex predicament, balancing the risks of prolonged military attrition against opportunities to strengthen national mobilization and consolidate its political standing at both the domestic and regional levels.

On the one hand, continued or intensifying tensions with neighboring Eritrea may enhance Addis Abeba’s capacity to mobilize domestic support in response to what it perceives as an external threat. This could reinforce the government’s narrative and strengthen its motivation to reshape the strategic environment surrounding its internal conflict, potentially leading to military action against Asmara. If successful, such a strategy could yield significant gains, most notably securing access to the sea, which would constitute a major achievement for landlocked Ethiopia.

On the other hand, such a confrontation could significantly intensify the political, military, economic, and humanitarian pressures facing the Ethiopian government and military. This would be particularly true if a conflict with Eritrea evolved into a prolonged and costly war without producing rapid and meaningful gains on either the domestic or external fronts. Such an outcome would provide the government’s opponents, including the TPLF and other groups associated with the Alliance for survival, with greater opportunities to reorganize and coordinate their activities. Furthermore, the need to allocate military capabilities between domestic security challenges and external deterrence requirements could strain Addis Ababa’s ability to suppress insurgencies while simultaneously pursuing strategic objectives against Eritrea.

The decisive factor in this equation will therefore be the capacity of Abiy Ahmed’s government to effectively manage multiple challenges over an extended period while preserving political cohesion and military effectiveness. Conversely, a de-escalation scenario could allow Addis Abeba to temporarily neutralize the Eritrean challenge, enabling it to focus its efforts on containing domestic opponents and reducing their capacity to threaten federal authority.

The most likely near-term trajectory remains one of calculated escalation between Addis Ababa and Asmara, despite the risk of further escalation (Shutterstock)

2. Eritrea

The calculated escalation scenario may provide Asmara with several opportunities. These would include strengthening domestic cohesion; reinforcing defensive capabilities; expanding its influence within Ethiopia; and strengthening regional partnerships to secure support and deter an adversary with superior demographic, economic, and military resources.

However, a transition to direct war would expose Eritrea to far more severe risks. Such threats could extend beyond the survival of the current Eritrean regime to encompass broader challenges affecting the country’s territorial integrity, political geography, and strategic position within the Red Sea region. A prolonged conflict would also exhaust its military capabilities, destroy critical infrastructure, disrupt commercial activity, and severely worsen economic and living conditions. The burdens associated with military mobilization and large-scale displacement would further compound these challenges.

Conversely, a de-escalation scenario could provide Eritrea with an opportunity to mitigate these risks, although it would not necessarily lead to a sustainable settlement. Moreover, Eritrea’s persistent sense of vulnerability could prompt a more assertive response and deeper involvement in regional proxy conflicts, including the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between Addis Ababa and Cairo over the Nile Basin and the Red Sea. This could further internationalize the Ethiopian-Eritrean dispute and complicate efforts to achieve a durable political settlement between the two countries.

3. The Regional Environment

Within an already tense regional context, the consequences of a confrontation between Eritrea and Ethiopia would extend well beyond the scope of a bilateral military conflict. Continued estrangement and instability could reinforce existing regional tensions, particularly in the absence of effective communication channels, preventive diplomacy, and conflict-management mechanisms.

First, the crisis could deepen political and security fragility across the Horn of Africa. The intertwining of conflict theaters and the potential spillover of hostilities into highly sensitive border areas could accelerate the militarization of both domestic and regional politics. Such developments may influence the trajectory of ongoing conflicts, particularly the war in Sudan, affecting local balances of power and shaping the calculations of the parties involved. The resulting environment could exacerbate governance challenges, create greater opportunities for armed groups and illicit actors, strengthen transnational arms-trafficking networks, and increase humanitarian burdens on the region’s governments and communities.

Second, the crisis could intensify regional polarization and realignment. Regional states and external powers would likely be compelled to reassess their policies and relationships with both Ethiopia and Eritrea. Countries such as Djibouti and Somalia may find it increasingly difficult to maintain neutrality or balance competing partnerships should tensions continue to escalate. At the same time, powers outside the region might seek to exploit emerging tensions and shifting alignments to expand their influence and advance their strategic interests, without necessarily committing themselves to either side or a particular regional bloc.

Third, the confrontation could contribute to a broader reconfiguration of the geopolitical landscape of the Red Sea and its littoral regions. Ethiopia’s ambition to establish maritime influence has become one of the principal drivers of friction with Eritrea, transforming a bilateral dispute into a matter with wider regional and international implications. This dynamic is likely to further internationalize the crisis, adding complexity to the regional and maritime security structure stretching from East Africa to the Arabian Peninsula and from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean.

The resulting shifts could significantly affect regional patterns of competition and cooperation, balances of power, and bilateral and collective security arrangements. They could also have repercussions for maritime navigation, international trade, energy flows, shipping routes, and global supply chains.

The magnitude of these repercussions will depend largely on the trajectory and duration of any Ethiopian-Eritrean confrontation, as well as on the policies adopted by regional and international actors, particularly whether they seek to contain the crisis or exploit it to advance their own strategic interests and geopolitical influence.

Conclusions

Ethiopian-Eritrean relations have reached one of their most complex, tense, and dangerous junctures in more than two decades. The current crisis extends well beyond bilateral disagreements, reflecting the intersection of unresolved historical grievances, recurring internal conflicts, and competing strategic calculations related to deterrence, regional competition, and security in the Red Sea and its surrounding region. The course of events will depend largely on Ethiopia’s ability to effectively manage its domestic challenges, the nature and extent of Eritrea’s involvement in Ethiopia’s internal dynamics, and the policies adopted by regional and international actors. External powers, through a combination of pressure, incentives, and security guarantees, will continue to influence the strategic calculations of both Addis Ababa and Asmara and shape their assessment of the costs and benefits of confrontation. Consequently, these factors may either contribute to containing the crisis or accelerate its progression toward an open conflict that could threaten the stability of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.

Based on current indicators, the scenario of “calculated escalation” between Addis Abeba and Asmara is likely to persist in the foreseeable future, given the deep mutual mistrust and domestic challenges facing both countries. However, this trajectory carries the risk of a gradual or sudden shift toward “open war” as a result of miscalculation and mounting friction. These risks are compounded by the absence of effective mediation mechanisms, fragile domestic and regional conditions, and divergent interests and priorities among the actors involved in the crisis.

Dozens Killed in Second Attack in as Many Weeks in Oromia’s Arsi Area

November 6, 2026 

Addis Ababa Standard

Militia Training in Diida’a Locality, Robe District, Arsi Oromia that was held in January this year. The local administration said the purpose was to “empower the militia to ensure peace for national growth”

Addis Ababa – At least 35 people were killed in an armed attack in Endeto Kebele, Robe Woreda, in Ethiopia’s Oromia Region, on Thursday, November 5, residents told Addis Standard. The attack marks the second major assault in as many weeks in the wider Arsi area, targeting communities that include Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church members.

Two residents interviewed separately by Addis Standard described an assault involving simultaneous gunfire at several locations in Endeto, including security posts and areas around the town’s St. Mary Church. They said dozens of people were killed, with local militia members and civilians among the victims.

The casualty figures provided by the two interviewees differed. One resident said 35 people had been buried at Endeto Debre Mitmaq Kidist Mariam (St. Mary) Church on Thursday afternoon. The other reported that 36 “Orthodox Christians and three Muslims” had been buried at separate locations, adding that another person had died after being referred for medical treatment, bringing the death toll to 40. 

According to the resident who attended the burial, approximately 25 to 26 of those killed were members of the local kebele militia, while the remainder were civilians. The resident said the victims included an elderly woman aged between 75 and 80 and two adolescents estimated to be between 15 and 18 years old.

The second interviewee also described an elderly woman and a child estimated to be between 10 and 12 years old among the victims. The resident said the child was killed after gunmen apparently targeted his father.

The accounts suggest that the violence involved exchanges of gunfire between armed assailants and local security personnel, alongside attacks affecting residents. However, neither interviewee could identify those responsible.

One of the interviewees said the gunfire began at approximately 5:30 a.m., with attacks launched simultaneously at three locations: a camp towards the Bale direction, another in the center of Endeto town, and a militia post near the exit towards Sedika. The resident said the positions were equipped with “Bren machine guns.”

Describing the assault around the church, the resident said gunmen approached its main entrance and shouted, “Surrender!” before opening fire from at least three directions.

“I couldn’t even step out onto my doorstep; I was in my house. They even opened gunfire right at the door, the main door of the church,” the resident told Addis Standard, adding that the intensity of the shooting prevented people from leaving their homes.

The other interviewee said gunfire was directed at both government security positions and civilian areas, leaving residents caught in the violence.

“Sometimes they shoot at civilian areas; at another time, they shoot at government security positions,” the resident said, describing the attack as affecting the wider community. The interviewee added that some residents survived by fleeing or hiding, while others were killed.

The aftermath was further complicated by blocked roads, which reportedly delayed security reinforcements and prevented residents from accessing assistance. One interviewee said roads connecting Endeto with neighboring areas, including the route towards Robe, were obstructed, making it difficult for additional forces to reach the area.

Although security personnel subsequently entered Endeto, residents said their presence had not restored confidence. One interviewee identified the arriving personnel as Oromia police or regional special forces, rather than federal forces.

“Tomorrow, when they leave, the problem will just cycle back. When they come, they control it, but when they leave, those others…” the resident said, expressing concern over the sustainability of the security response.

Another resident described widespread anxiety following the burials, saying people remained uncertain about their safety and ability to move freely.

The second interviewee said the community’s sense of insecurity had reached a point where residents were considering leaving the area.

“In this place, the Christians are practically at the stage of displacement. If you asked me right now, I have no hope of staying here because I would choose to flee for long-term survival,” the resident said.

The November 5 killings follow a series of deadly attacks against communities in the former Arsi Zone, now part of the Southeast Oromia Zone, in October.

On October 20, 14 Orthodox Christians were killed in Merti Woreda, while another 46 were killed in Shirka Woreda on October 24, according to the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church’s Holy Synod. The two attacks prompted widespread condemnation and renewed calls for government action to protect civilians.

In a November 3 statement following an investigation into the October 24 attack in Birbona Chole Kebele, Shirka Woreda, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) confirmed that 48 people had been killed, including 23 members of kebele-level security forces, five militia members and 13 civilians killed by an armed group it identified as the Oromo Liberation Army, commonly known as “OLF-Shane”. The Commission also documented seven additional civilian deaths attributed to “informally armed individuals”.

The EHRC said the attack left 20 people injured, destroyed 21 homes and displaced 247 households. It called on the government to strengthen civilian protection, reform local security structures, improve early-warning systems and ensure prompt responses to emerging threats.

The findings corroborate Addis Standard’s earlier reporting on the scale of the killings. On October 26, residents who attended the mass burial told Addis Standard that at least 48 people had been killed and more than 31 others injured in attacks on Chole and Birbo kebeles. Witnesses described door-to-door killings, looting and the use of heavy weapons, reporting that the victims included women, elderly people and at least six children under the age of 15.

On October 28, Addis Standard reported that more than 50 people had reportedly been detained in Shirka Woreda after participating in the burial of victims, attending funerals or helping transport and provide medical assistance to the wounded.

However, on November 2, the Oromia regional government announced the detention of 73 individuals in connection with the attacks, describing the arrests as part of security operations targeting OLF-Shane and other groups it considers security threats. The regional government also said security had been restored in six kebeles and that assistance was being provided to displaced residents to facilitate their return.

Against this backdrop, US Ambassador to Ethiopia Ervin Massinga met EHRC Chief Commissioner Berhanu Adello on November 5, reiterating Washington’s support for the Commission’s work.

In a statement shared by the US Embassy, Massinga expressed “U.S. support for Ethiopian Human Rights Commission’s detailed, transparent reporting on recent killings in Arsi and its efforts to facilitate prisoner releases earlier this year.”

The identities of those responsible for the November 5 assault and the circumstances surrounding the killings remain independently unverified.

More Than 65 Killed in Armed Attack in Benishangul-Gumuz’s Assosa Zone, Residents Say

November 9, 2026 

Addis Ababa Standard

Addis Ababa – More than 65 people, including members of regional security forces and at least 27 civilians, were killed in a heavily armed attack in Dalati locality of Buldiglu Woreda, Assosa Zone, Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State, residents told Addis Standard.

The attacks, which reportedly took place on Thursday and Friday, 5 and 6 November, targeted members of the regional anti-riot police, local militias, and special forces, as well as civilians, including women and children. Residents said approximately 45 of those killed were members of the region´s various security forces.

However, several local reports have put the death toll at more than 100, including dozens of civilians. Addis Standard could not independently verify the higher figures.

“The attackers were heavily armed men. Some of them were wearing the former security uniform of the region,” one eyewitness told Addis Standard by phone.

Another witness said the attacks continued for nearly two days, with no intervention from federal forces during the fighting.

“The attacks lasted almost two days, and there was no intervention from federal forces. The local security forces were unable to contain the fighting until the following day,” the witness said.

A 65-year-old farmer who lost his younger brother in the attack described how his brother was caught in the crossfire while searching for medication for his ailing wife.

His brother had been trying to obtain prescription medicine for his wife, who had been bedridden for eight months due to high blood pressure and was receiving treatment at Assosa Hospital. She was discharged on Monday, and he had spent the following three days searching for her medication at different local pharmacies, the farmer said.

“That day, he never came home,” he told Addis Standard.

The farmer said he did not personally witness the attackers but recalled that it took several hours before families could begin collecting the victims’ bodies because of the intensity of the fighting.

Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State Police Commission Commissioner Mohammed Idriss confirmed the attack in an interview with BBC Amharic, saying it occurred in the early hours of Thursday, around 5 a.m. He attributed the assault to the armed group known as OLF-Shene.

According to Idriss, the attack took place in Dalati locality, which borders neighboring Oromia Region. He reported that 21 civilians, 18 anti-riot police officers, and 13 local militia members were among the casualties. His breakdown accounts for 52 deaths, although residents have reported a higher toll.

The regional government had not issued an official statement on the attack at the time of publication.

Renewed violence amid regional security operations

The latest attack comes amid continuing security tensions in Benishangul-Gumuz, a region that has experienced recurrent armed violence, counterinsurgency operations, civilian displacement, and multiple attempts at negotiated settlements.

Although Metekel and Kamashi zones have historically been among the principal areas affected by armed conflict, insecurity has also affected other parts of the region, including Assosa Zone.

The region’s conflict landscape has involved several armed and political actors, including the Gumuz People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM), the Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM), local armed factions, which the Ethiopian government refers to as “OLF-Shene”. The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) has repeatedly denied military involvement the conflicts in Metekel and Kamashi. The motivations, alliances, and operational presence of these groups have varied over time.

Regional authorities have pursued peace agreements and reconciliation initiatives with some armed groups. In October 2022, the regional government signed an agreement with GPDM, followed by a December 2022 peace accord with BPLM in Khartoum, Sudan. Subsequent rehabilitation, amnesty, and reintegration measures were also announced.

In June 2024, regional authorities declared the successful conclusion of peace agreements with remaining elements of the two groups.

Nevertheless, sporadic attacks and clashes have continued. More recently, the regional police commission announced on 22 October that it had conducted a “coordinated security operation” against what it described as “anti-peace forces” operating in Benishangul-Gumuz.

In a statement disseminated through Benishangul-Gumuz Media, the commission said its riot control unit, working alongside the 404th Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) Corps of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) Western Command, had taken action against an armed faction identified as “Army 13, Corps 2, Battalion 3.”

Commander Qurish Ibrahim, head of Riot Control and Special Protection Operations at the regional police commission, alleged that the group was operating under what he described as “the destructive agenda of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), with support from Sudan, Egypt, and Eritrea”, which he referred to as “Shaebia”.

Lieutenant Colonel Wondwosen Birhanu, operations head of the 404th GERD Corps, said the operation had resulted in deaths, injuries, and the “capture of several fighters”. He alleged that the group had entered from Debazin, Sudan, using three vehicles and was “seeking to destabilize the region and control its resources.”

The regional authorities also released statements attributed to captured fighters, who allegedly said they had joined the fighting after receiving missions from Sudan, Egypt, and Eritrea under the pretext of liberating their country. These allegations were presented by the regional authorities and could not be independently verified.

The 22 October announcement also urged residents in border areas to report suspicious movements to security bodies and called on individuals involved in armed activities to return to their communities and resolve their grievances through dialogue.

The latest attack in Dalati comes less than three weeks after that announcement.

The circumstances surrounding the attack, the identities and affiliations of the perpetrators, and the discrepancy between the casualty figures provided by the police commissioner and those reported by residents remain unclear. Addis Standard could not independently establish whether the latest incident was connected to the armed faction cited in the regional government’s October security announcement.

Drone Strike Kills 12 Civilians Collecting Grain in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region

Andrew Wasike

Anadolu Agency (Anadolu Ajansı)

October 31, 2026

NAIROBI, Kenya

At least 12 civilians were killed and several others injured in a drone strike in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region Friday while collecting grain spilled from a truck damaged in an earlier attack, local authorities and hospital sources confirmed Saturday.

The attack took place in the town of Rama, where residents had gathered to collect sorghum scattered across the road after a privately owned truck transporting grain for local traders was struck Thursday night.

Local sources told Ethiopian news outlet Addis Standard that 12 people died at the scene, while several others sustained injuries, some of them serious.

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), which monitors violence worldwide, also documented the Friday attack, recording 12 deaths plus injuries and property damage.

The latest incident comes amid renewed fighting in Tigray, where drone operations have raised concerns over civilian safety.

Earlier in October, separate drone strikes in Medebay Terer killed seven civilians, including an 8-year-old girl, and injured six others. Other attacks in the Hintalo district also caused civilian deaths, including a 2-year-old child.

The escalation extends beyond Tigray, with drone strikes causing casualties in the neighboring Amhara region and western Oromia.

On Thursday, a strike at the Hayiq Jari 2 Turk displacement camp in Amhara killed at least 16 civilians and injured 22 others.

Ethiopia’s northern conflict has also heightened tensions with neighboring Eritrea, which Addis Ababa has accused of supporting armed groups and sending troops into Tigray.

Eritrea has rejected the accusations, as concerns grow over the risk of another regional confrontation.

More Than 50,000 Displaced by Deadly Ethiopia Border Clashes

Families arrive in Kenya with little food or shelter as host communities struggle to cope.

Kenyan officials and humanitarian workers visit a temporary displacement site in Moyale, northern Kenya, as thousands of people fleeing clashes in neighbouring Ethiopia seek shelter [Hafsa Abdiwahab Sheikh/Al Jazeera]

By Hafsa Abdiwahab Sheikh

9 Nov 2026

Moyale, Kenya – When Hawa Hassan fled her home in Ethiopia’s Moyale area, she left almost everything behind. Her house was burned during the violence, she said. But one memory has stayed with her: a 13-year-old girl shot while sitting near a wall.

Hassan said the girl had not touched a flag, a detail she raised while describing tensions over flag displays in the disputed border area. Her account of the killing could not be independently verified.

Hundreds of Ethiopians cross into Kenya to flee regional fighting

The journey into Kenya was brutal. Hassan told Al Jazeera that some women gave birth while fleeing, and that families arrived without food, cooking utensils or bedding. Newborn babies were sleeping on bare floors. Diarrhoea was spreading, while families feared malaria as mosquitoes multiplied.

For many, crossing the border has meant escaping gunfire only to face another struggle: finding food and shelter. The arrivals are also stretching Kenyan communities. Families that opened their homes are sharing scarce supplies, even as some worry the violence could reach their own neighbourhoods.

A crisis growing by the day

A government-led assessment conducted on October 29 and 30 estimated that 35,950 people had been displaced as of October 24. About 25,000 were staying with host families and nearly 11,000 in temporary displacement sites.

The number has since risen. During a meeting, Kenya Red Cross regional head Malik Adan said the number of people displaced by the conflict had increased from an estimated 36,000 to more than 50,000. The figure includes people living in temporary settlements as well as those staying with relatives and host families.

Ethiopians displaced by deadly border clashes seek refuge in Kenya, where many families face shortages of food, shelter and basic necessities.

The overall number of displaced people has yet to be independently established, and no final figure has been confirmed.

The assessment covered 758 households and involved government authorities, United Nations agencies, the Kenya Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations. The figures reflect different reporting periods.

The fighting is rooted in a long-standing dispute over land and administrative control between Ethiopia’s Oromia and Somali regional administrations. Tensions escalated around October 18 over the raising of the Somali regional flag in the disputed Moyale area, reflecting competing claims over territory and authority.

For those arriving in Kenya, the politics are secondary to the immediate question of where they will sleep and what they will feed their children.

Aid stretched on both sides

Mwasaru Mercy, Kenya’s acting commissioner for refugee affairs, told Al Jazeera that a multi-agency government team had been deployed to Moyale. The Department of Refugee Services is coordinating with local authorities and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

But gunfire could still be heard, Mercy said, raising fears of further displacement. Many arrivals need food, shelter, bedding and mosquito nets.

“There are no contingency food stocks specifically for this incident because it happened abruptly,” Mercy said.

Authorities are trying to mobilise humanitarian organisations and donors. A refugee camp has not been established because the security situation must improve first. The government is working with UNHCR to register arrivals and assess their needs.

Those affected include Ethiopians fleeing violence, traders, and Kenyans forced from their homes by stray ammunition, Mercy said.

Officials and humanitarian representatives meet to discuss the response to the growing displacement crisis in Moyale, following deadly clashes in neighbouring Ethiopia.

Fatima Mohammed Cole, UNHCR’s representative in Kenya, said many arrivals were women and children. Families are spread across several locations, including six sites hosting Ethiopians. They need shelter, food and healthcare, while crowded conditions raise concerns about the spread of disease.

Cole said gunfire was still being heard in Moyale and appealed for a ceasefire that would allow families to return home.

The response is also under way inside Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Red Cross Society said it had provided emergency shelter and household items worth about 30 million Ethiopian birr ($182,970) to 1,000 households displaced from Moyale town and surrounding areas.

The supplies included 2,000 tarpaulins, blankets and sleeping mats, as well as dignity kits, jerrycans, kitchen sets, soap and solar lamps. Distribution was under way, the organisation said. The operation is separate from assistance in Kenya.

Host communities under pressure

In Kenya, residents who initially opened their doors are finding it harder to keep going.

Abdi Maalim, a member of the Moyale Cross-Border Peace Committee, told Al Jazeera that some Kenyan families had moved further inland after bullets and heavy weapons landed close to their homes. He called for more border patrols to prevent armed groups from crossing into Kenya.

Families that once cooked for five or six people are now feeding 20 or 30.

Moyale’s role as a trading point between Kenya and Ethiopia has added to the strain. Maalim said trucks carrying goods between Mombasa and Addis Ababa had been stranded near the border for almost two weeks. Kenyan trucks were also stuck in Ethiopia, and businesses in Moyale had slowed sharply.

Bank closures have disrupted the circulation of the Ethiopian birr. Traders reported price rises of about 20 percent as supplies became harder to move.

Fears of wider instability

Security analyst Dr Abdiwahab Sheikh Abdisamad told Al Jazeera that the clashes had grown beyond a local dispute over territory, exposing deeper ethnic divisions and political competition between Ethiopia’s regional administrations.

He said perceptions of Oromo expansionism and allegations of federal government support for Oromia’s regional leadership risked deepening mistrust. He warned that armed fighters crossing the border, stray bullets and further displacement made this a Kenyan security concern as well as a refugee emergency.

A military official greets people during a visit to Moyale, Kenya, as authorities assess the impact of deadly border clashes in neighbouring Ethiopia.

Kenya’s Inspector General of Police, Douglas Kanja, said additional officers would be deployed along the border to strengthen security. During a visit to Moyale on November 5, he said Kenya was engaging Ethiopia’s federal government to help end the conflict.

Kanja said about 10,000 people were staying in temporary shelters and public institutions, while others had been taken in by host families. He said one Kenyan had died after being hit by a stray bullet, while a police report indicated that an Ethiopian man had also died from gunshot wounds sustained in Kenya.

The 10,000 figure refers to people in temporary shelters and public institutions, not the total number displaced. It is not directly comparable with the Red Cross estimate of more than 50,000, which includes people staying with host families.

Hassan wants to return home, but only when it is safe. Until then, she and thousands of others depend on host communities and humanitarian agencies. The longer the fighting continues, the harder it will be for those communities to keep absorbing the cost.

Maalim said residents had already stretched their resources to accommodate the new arrivals.

“Previously, we were supplying this town alone. Now we are literally taking care of two towns together,” he told Al Jazeera.

Sudan Fuel Shortages Damage Crops in El Gezira as Food Prices Soar, Bakeries Strike in North Kordofan

08/11/2026 19:13

Cartoon: Omar Dafallah / RD

Fuel shortages and soaring production costs are damaging agricultural crops in Sudan’s El Gezira state, while rising food and transport prices are placing further pressure on household budgets. Reports of a general strike by bakeries in El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, has disrupted bread supplies amid a dispute over production costs and bread prices.

A farmer in the El Gezira agricultural scheme, identified as Mohammed, told Radio Dabanga that large areas of the maize crop had been damaged because of a shortage of petrol needed to operate irrigation pumps.

He said the price of a four-gallon container of petrol had reached SDG600,000, forcing him to search for fuel outside the state to save the remainder of his crop. He warned that declining agricultural production could further deepen food insecurity and hunger.

‘Food and transport costs soar’

Food prices have also risen sharply across markets in El Gezira, including those in El Maseed, El Ma’aliq and El Kamlin.

Ahmed Mohammed El Khair, a resident of the state, told Radio Dabanga that the prices of essential commodities, particularly maize, lentils, sesame and wheat, had witnessed sharp increases.

He said a sack of maize now costs between SDG800,000 and SDG820,000, while a sack of wheat has reached around SDG780,000. Lentils sell for SDG850,000 per sack, while Kabkabiya (type of legume) costs between SDG300,000 and SDG450,000.

A sack of sesame has reached SDG860,000, while Egyptian beans cost between SDG1.1 million and SDG1.2 million, depending on the size and quality of the beans.

El Khair said the price increases had severely affected residents’ purchasing power and reduced market activity, as most people had low or no incomes. He described the situation as a serious concern for residents and called on government authorities to intervene.

Transport costs have also surged, with the cost of transporting goods in Omdurman exceeding SDG2 million. In Kassala, taxi fares have reached SDG20,000 per passenger, adding to the growing cost of living.

‘Bakeries strike in El Obeid’

All bakeries in El Obeid have closed in a general strike over a dispute with local authorities concerning bread prices and rising production costs.

Journalist Omar Mohammed Omar told Radio Dabanga that the complete shutdown had disrupted bread supplies across the city, leaving residents struggling to access a basic food staple.

He criticised the size and quality of the bread being sold, saying the loaves did not meet the expected standards. He said bread prices had previously reached SDG2,000 and, in some cases, SDG3,000, amid demands for prices to reflect the actual weight, size and nutritional value of each loaf.

The strike has disrupted daily life in El Obeid, particularly for families and schoolchildren who depend on bread for breakfast.

Australia Sanctions El Burhan and Hemedti Over Sudan War and Human Rights Abuses

06/11/2026 16:41 

CANBERRA

Australia has imposed targeted sanctions, and travel bans on four Sudanese individuals, including Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Commander and Transitional Sovereignty Council President Lt Gen Abdelfattah El Burhan and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as ‘Hemedti’, over the ongoing war in Sudan. Sudanwar analysis

Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong announced the measures in a statement published by the ministry on Thursday, saying the government had also imposed financial sanctions on the El Bara Bin Malik Brigade.

Among those on the sanctions list are Al-Tijani Al-Tahir Karshoum, the RSF-aligned de facto governor of West Darfur, and RSF field commander Hussein Barsham. Both face financial sanctions and travel bans.

“The RSF and the SAF have committed serious  human rights violations and abuses, including attacks on civilians, torture, sexual and gender-based violence, and extrajudicial killings,” Wong said.

“Those responsible for serious human rights violations and abuses must be held to account.”

The sanctions build on measures Australia previously imposed on 13 individuals under the United Nations Security Council’s Sudan sanctions framework. Sudanwar analysis

Under the new measures, dealing with the assets of listed individuals or the El Baraa Bin Malik Brigade without ministerial authorisation is a criminal offence. The four individuals are also barred from entering or remaining in Australia.

Australia said hundreds of thousands of people had been killed and more than 14 million displaced since the war began on 15 April 2023. Almost 34 million people, more than 70 per cent of Sudan’s population, need humanitarian assistance. Warconflict resolution

Canberra has provided more than $67 million in humanitarian aid to Sudan, supporting food, clean water, shelter, healthcare and protection services.

To ensure sanctions do not obstruct relief efforts, Wong also issued a humanitarian permit allowing specified aid activities that would otherwise be restricted under the sanctions framework.

Sudan’s Military Again Detains International Criminal Court Fugitive Haroun, Lawyers Say

This is a locator map for Sudan with its capital, Khartoum. (AP Photo) License this photo

By  YASSIR ABDALLA and SAMY MAGDY

2:24 PM EST, November 8, 2026

SHENDI, Sudan (AP) — Sudan’s military authorities on Sunday once again detained a former senior Islamist official who is wanted by the International Criminal Court over atrocities related to the Darfur conflict in the early 2000s, two defense lawyers said.

Ahmed Haroun, a senior security official during the rule of longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir, and later chairman of the former ruling National Congress Party, was detained in Omdurman, the sister city of the capital, Khartoum, according to two lawyers on his defense team. The lawyers had said earlier he was detained in the eastern province of Kassala.

The lawyers, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to brief the media, said Haroun’s whereabouts were unknown.

Haroun was detained in April 2019 when a monthslong uprising forced the military ouster of al-Bashir and his government.

He had been detained along with the former president and other senior officials, including those who are wanted by the ICC, in a Khartoum prison. The military declined to hand them over to the international court.

The conflict in Darfur broke out when rebels from the territory’s ethnic central and sub-Saharan African community launched an insurgency in 2003, complaining of oppression by the Arab-dominated government in Khartoum.

Haroun was accused by the ICC of crimes against humanity and war crimes including murder, rape, persecution, forced transfer of the population and torture in Darfur at least between 2003 and 2004.

Haroun has denied the charges. He walked away from the prison after the facility was attacked in April 2024 during the war between the army and the notorious paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.

The lawyers said no reasons were given for Haroun’s re-detention, but they linked it to his recent comment in a podcast in which he said his party and the military might not be aligned, but are united in the fight against the RSF in the war that broke out in April 2023 in Khartoum and elsewhere across the country.

The National Congress Party called for the immediate release of Haroun, saying in a statement that he was detained merely for expressing his opinion. The party didn’t address that Haroun is wanted by the ICC.

The latest war has also been marked by atrocities such as mass rape and ethnically motivated killings. The United Nations and international rights groups say these acts also amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, especially in Darfur, which has been facing a bitter onslaught by the RSF. The RSF’s multiday attack on el-Fasher in Darfur last year bore “hallmarks of genocide,” according to U.N. experts.

In the interview on Sudan Podcast, Haroun addressed a wide range of topics, including the ouster of al-Bashir, ties with the military and RSF leaders, a proposal for the future governance of Sudan, ties with the U.S. and the United Arab Emirates, and the origins of the RSF.

The RSF grew out of the notorious Arab Janjaweed militias, which were mobilized two decades ago by al-Bashir against populations that identify as Central or East African in Darfur.

The interview stirred up outrage among rights and activist groups that were behind the uprising against al-Bashir. The Emergency Lawyers group condemned the interview as a “legal scandal and a direct challenge to international justice.”

The group called for the army to detain Haroun and hand him over to the ICC along with al-Bashir and former Defense Minister Abdel-Rahim Muhammad Hussein.

“Justice for victims of crimes committed in Sudan cannot be held hostage to political or military balances, and ending impunity requires subjecting all accused and wanted persons to judicial accountability, without exception or immunity,” it said.

___

Magdy reported from Washington.

Tanzania Opposition Leader Lissu Sentenced to 4 Years for Incitement, Acquitted of Treason

By ASSOCIATED PRESS

2:55 PM EST, November 6, 2026

DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania (AP) — A court in Tanzania convicted the country’s main opposition leader Tundu Lissu of incitement Friday and sentenced him to four years in prison, but acquitted him of the more serious charge of treason.

Lissu, the chairman of the Chadema party, was found guilty of inciting people to disrupt last year’s election. The three-judge panel in Dar es Salaam ruled, however, that prosecutors had failed to prove he intended to intimidate the government. The treason charge carried a possible death sentence.

Lissu was arrested on April 9, 2025, after addressing a rally calling for electoral reforms and was charged with treason the following day.

Lissu, who has spent more than 18 months in detention, denied wrongdoing, saying his speech was part of a legitimate campaign.

“Those who are innocent, like me, do not apologize,” Lissu told the court. “You have sought out an offense that did not exist, and you have done so following political directives,” he said.

Lissu’s lead lawyer, Rugemeleza Nshala, said the defense planned to appeal and seek bail pending the appeal.

Amnesty International called for Lissu’s conviction and sentence to be quashed and for his immediate and unconditional release. “The conviction and sentence cannot be considered the outcome of a fair trial,” said Tigere Chagutah, Amnesty’s regional director for East and Southern Africa.

Supporters chanted “Viva!” as Lissu arrived at court amid tight security and raised a clenched fist. His hair had grown longer during his detention, and he wore it in dreadlocks. His elder sister and several Chadema leaders attended the proceedings.

Lissu remained in custody during last year’s general election, in which presidential candidates from the two main opposition parties were barred from competing.

His detention has been marked by disputes over access to his lawyers. After prison authorities allowed him to meet privately with his younger brother, he ended a brief hunger strike on Oct. 27, his lead lawyer, Rugemeleza Nshala, told The Associated Press.

The election triggered protests and deadly violence. An inquiry reported in April that at least 518 people had died. Its chairman, Mohamed Chande Othman, said the toll was likely higher because some families buried relatives without taking their bodies to morgues.

The United Nations has called for an investigation into the killings and reports that police removed bodies from mortuaries to undisclosed locations. Chadema estimated that about 2,000 people were killed, a figure the U.N. said it could not verify amid insecurity and an internet shutdown.

The judgment came days after Lissu’s elder brother, Alute Mughwai Lissu, died on Sunday. Lissu appealed to the court to release him so he could attend the burial.

“Please, let me go and lay Mzee Alute to rest,” he said.

Lissu was taken back to prison after sentencing.

He survived being shot 16 times in a 2017 assassination attempt and has spent periods in exile, citing threats to his life.

_____

Associated Press writer Khaled Kazziha in Nairobi, Kenya, contributed to this report.

Leader of Kenyan Doomsday Cult Sentenced to 200 Years in Prison

By EVELYNE MUSAMBI

5:42 AM EST, November 7, 2026

MOMBASA, Kenya (AP) — The leader of a Kenyan doomsday cult linked to the deaths of more than 400 people was sentenced on Friday to 200 years in prison for the murders of 191 people.

The High Court in Kenya’s coastal city of Mombasa issued the sentence for Pastor Paul Mackenzie. He was convicted of murdering 190 children and one adult after he ordered his followers to starve themselves to death in order to meet Jesus.

Mackenzie is also facing terrorism and manslaughter charges for the more than 200 other victims, as well as child abuse and torture charges in two other courts.

Justice Diana Kavedza said that Mackenzie, leader of the Good News International Church, bore the “primary criminal culpability” for relocating his followers to a remote location and ordering them to fast to death.

Mackenzie was charged with the murders alongside 28 of his followers, including guards who enforced his fasting directives and gravediggers who helped conceal the mass graves. All denied the charges, except for one person who confessed and pleaded for leniency.

On Oct. 19, the court found all 29 of them guilty of the murder of 191 people.

In 2023, more than 400 bodies were exhumed from shallow graves on the 800-acre (320-hectare) Chakama Ranch in coastal Kilifi County, where Mackenzie’s followers lived in mud huts, away from the scrutiny of local communities and authorities.

More than 60 bodies were positively identified and reburied by their relatives, while many others remain unidentified and unclaimed.

During the sentencing, Kavedza said that 183 victims died of starvation, defined as a complete lack of food, and the deaths of the other eight were classified as murder by direct homicide.

Kavedza said the killings were “cold and calculated” and dismissed claims by some of the accused that the loss of their own children altered the fact that they had participated in the killings of many other children.

The justice said that the perpetrators didn’t show remorse and declared they were ready to fast to death as well. During the sentencing, Mackenzie often smiled and chatted with his assistant pastor, Smart Mwakalama, who was sentenced to 160 years in prison.

All of those who were convicted have been granted 14 days to file an appeal.

The prosecution had argued for the death penalty for Mackenzie and life imprisonment for his accomplices.

Defense lawyer Lawrence Obonyo, who represents Mackenzie and several others who were convicted, told The Associated Press that he had already launched an appeal. He said that the decision was “circling around the constitution to give a sentence that is unattainable” since the sentences of between 160 and 200 years amount to life sentences.

A father of seven, Suleiman Ziro, who traveled 120 kilometers (75 miles) for the sentencing, lost six of his children and his wife to the cult in 2023. He said that the sentence wasn’t enough especially because he has yet to recover the bodies of his loved ones, calling for the death penalty in the case.

Mackenzie’s son, Dan Mackenzie, said that he felt sorry for his father over the conviction, but it was “justice served to the victims.” He said that he escaped by “rebelling” against his father’s teachings and was often punished for it, but was glad he survived. Two of his younger brothers and three sisters were rescued and are currently at a children’s home.

Those sentenced to death in Kenyan courts serve a life sentence. Kenya’s last execution was in 1987.

Education Strike and Student Protest This Tuesday, November 10

November 8, 2026 at 08:21 a.m.

The national education strike resumes this Tuesday, November 10, 2026, with demonstrations by students, high school students and staff in Paris and across France, in an effort to influence talks with the government.

The National Education strike and the student demonstration return this Tuesday, November 10, 2026. Teachers, high school students, university students and researchers have been called on to stop work and take to the streets in Paris and across the Île-de-France region. Schools, middle schools, high schools and universities in the capital, as well as those in the Créteil and Versailles education districts, could be affected.

The call was taken up this Saturday, November 7, by the Snes-FSU, the leading union for middle and high schools. It comes five days after the November 5 strike and the day after a busy day at Matignon.

Who is calling for a strike on November 10?

Fifteen organizations have signed the joint statement, according to Dijon Actualités, which details its contents. On the youth side, the signatories include the Union syndicale lycéenne (USL), Union étudiante, UNEF, FAGE, FSE and Solidaires étudiant-e-s. On the staff side, FSU, FERC-CGT, FO, SUD éducation and Sup'Recherche-UNSA are among the signatories.

The tone is combative. According to the inter-union coalition, quoted by L'Express, the movement is “in a position of strength” and the government is “starting to back down.” CGT Éduc'action is even urging staff to hold general assemblies from this Monday to discuss an ongoing, renewable strike.

Why another day on Tuesday?

The timing explains everything. This Monday, November 9, Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu is bringing together unions and employers at 9:30 a.m. for a social conference on wages and purchasing power. He will then meet representatives of high school and university students from 3:30 to 5 p.m., according to franceinfo.

Tuesday is therefore a full-scale test. If Monday’s announcements disappoint, people must make their voices heard in the streets the very next day. The unions are particularly concerned that the public sector will be left out of pay talks. They are meeting on Tuesday evening to take stock and decide what to do next, in coordination with the cross-industry union coalition.

The momentum from November 5 is a factor. That day, the Snes-FSU said 52% of staff at middle and high schools were on strike, with nearly 1,000 high schools blocked or closed, according to Entrevue. Authorities counted nearly 600,000 demonstrators across France, while the CGT put the figure at 1.6 million.

What are teachers, high school students and university students demanding?

It all started in mid-September at a high school in Créteil (94), where teachers and students denounced vacant positions and classes that were not being held. Since then, the demands have broadened. For schools, the signatories are calling for the public-sector pay index to be unfrozen and for more teachers, senior education advisers, support staff for students with disabilities, nurses and psychologists to be hired, as well as a building renovation plan.

For universities, they are calling for funding for 150,000 places they say are lacking, the creation of 15,000 permanent positions, and an end to the barriers they attribute to Parcoursup and Mon Master. The research sector is calling for the planned job cuts in the 2027 budget to be scrapped.

The best things to do this week, November 9–15, 2026, in Paris and Île-de-France

The government has already taken action. At the end of October, it promised a two-phase reform of Parcoursup, a €5 billion plan for high schools and universities, and smaller classes, as we reported in our article on student protests. The organizations say this is not enough, and are particularly disappointed by the lack of concrete measures for universities.

What route will the student demonstration take in Paris?

This Sunday, no route has yet been made public for the November 10 demonstration in Paris, either by the organizers or by the Paris police headquarters. The most recent events nevertheless offer some idea of what may be taking shape.

On November 3, the prefecture had refused to allow students from Interfac Île-de-France to march from the Panthéon to Medef headquarters, authorizing only a procession between Porte de Charenton and Porte de Montreuil. Around 300 students had ultimately gathered outside Jussieu University (5th arrondissement), according to ICI Paris Île-de-France. On November 5 and 7, by contrast, union marches were allowed to travel from Place de la République to Place de la Nation along Boulevard Voltaire (11th arrondissement), as detailed in our article on the November 5 march route.

Schools and cafeterias: what to expect on Tuesday?

In nursery and elementary schools, teachers must give at least 48 hours’ notice of their intention to go on strike. If at least a quarter of them are on strike, the local authority must provide a minimum childcare service, managed in Paris by the arrondissement town halls. The simplest option is to ask the school on Monday whether it will be open.

At middle and high schools, classes may be canceled, and further blockades cannot be ruled out outside some schools. At universities, lecture halls could also remain empty. The organizations have also filed strike notices covering the coming weeks, leaving the door open to further days of action.

Metro, RER: Are disruptions expected?

No strike has been called at RATP or SNCF for Tuesday so far. However, metro stations along the route may still be closed at the police prefecture’s request, as they are during every major demonstration in the autumn. Our metro, RER and train traffic update is updated daily, as are the RATP and Île-de-France Mobilités websites. This week’s engineering work is listed in our metro and RER disruptions this week.

Rebellions Break Out in France as Cost-of-Living Increases

November 8, 2026 

The State Times 

International Institute for Environment and Development

Grace Diviny, Staff Writer

For about a month, France has been rocked by a series of protests and riots by working class  people enraged at higher costs of living. 

The situation started in late September, where French high school students in Southeast Paris  went on strike over a lack of school resources, such as teacher shortages and poor school conditions. These protests eventually turned its focus onto the recent rise of living costs in  Europe. Rioting had been occurring in certain areas as far as early October, the worst of the violence eventually broke out in various cities across the country around October 17th, where rioters targeted a variety of public buildings alongside committing lootings and attacking police  officers. 

One of the buildings set ablaze by rioters was the 19th-century City Hall in Limoges, which was nearly destroyed alongside its roof collapsing. At least 2,400 to 2,700 people were arrested in the aftermath. 

In response to the riots, President Emmanuel Macron held an emergency meeting with government officials immediately in the aftermath on the 18th, where he then made a televised  statement towards rioters. 

“Those who looted will have to pay for the damage, and those who sought to bring down the Republic will be held accountable,” Macron said in his speech to French citizens. He also made a written statement on X, where he threatened to punish the rioters. “We will all stand united against the sowers of chaos, who ⁠only seek to undermine our institutions and prevent those who peacefully express their demands from doing so,”  

Macron and other officials blamed the riots on far-left activists in the midst of the upcoming French  election. They have also imposed a ‘ban’ on illegitimate protests as of Thursday to protect the interests of businesses. Night curfews in various towns have also been implemented. 

In the midst of the protests throughout France, other countries have joined in on the protests over the same economic struggles. Italy, Portugal, and Belgium also joined in on the protests, where guards and police have been sent out to watch over stores in towns. The protests also caught the attention of  activists such as Greta Thunberg, who joined French students last week to protest in solidarity with them. 

Despite the bans and curfews, protests in cities such as Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Lille, and Nantes have continued to occur as of this weekend, with things seeming to escalate yet again as riot police squads have reportedly fired tear gas at protestors alongside two people facing severe injuries in the process. As of now, 1,300 people have been arrested as of this weekend alone as at least nearly millions continue to protest in favor of more affordable living and available resources throughout Europe.

Another Day of Protests Unfurls in France’s Autumn of Discontent

The crowds were smaller on Saturday than in previous weeks’ demonstrations, but the animating sense of grievance remained.

By Mark Landler and Ségolène Le Stradic

Reporting from Paris

Nov. 7, 2026

French students and workers rallied for a fourth consecutive Saturday in Paris and other cities, drawing smaller but still spirited crowds, two days after a general strike brought more than half a million people into the streets.

The government estimated that 146,000 people turned out, about half the size of the crowds the previous Saturday. But the protests, which evolved last month from a student-focused movement into a national one, have shown no signs of petering out, suggesting the depth and breadth of grievances in the country.

The students are protesting the disrepair of their high schools, a shortage of teachers and an unpopular university admissions process; workers are demanding higher wages and improved public services.

“I came to support the youth; I find their claims to be legitimate,” said France Lucat, 44, who traveled 25 miles to join the demonstration in Paris. “And I am also very shocked by the police violence.”

It was the first time she had joined since the protests began, she said. Ms. Lucat said she had feared it could be unsafe, having seen coverage of the unrest, but chose to come see for herself. Next week, she will bring her children, she said. “That’s also why I came,” she said, “because I am afraid, and I shouldn’t be afraid.”

Her sister, Alice Courtieux, 52, held a sign saying “Macron You Trumped Us!” to protest what she called “the drift toward the right and the far right by this authoritarian government.” Both women expressed frustration with the lack of response to the demands of students and workers. But, Ms. Courtieux said, “It’s by joining demonstrations that you find hope again.”

“Generation Z is waking up and rousing the whole of France,” said Sandrine Rousseau, a lawmaker with the Green Party who joined protesters in Paris, wearing the tricolor sash of elected officials.

Brushing aside the idea that the movement was dwindling, Ms. Rousseau said the smaller crowd was no surprise, two days after huge, carefully orchestrated demonstrations. “I don’t know how it will all end,” she said, “but to me, it feels a bit like a revolution, a surge of civic spirit, an infinite sense of hope.”

The demonstrations were largely peaceful, though protesters clashed with the police in some cities, including Paris, Bordeaux, Marseille and Lyon, and unauthorized gatherings took place in cities like Rennes, in western France.

Some protesters tried to “disrupt the marches and enter restricted areas,” according to the Interior Ministry, but they were “systematically contained and hampered.”

In Paris, a small group affiliated with the Yellow Vests — a movement that protested against high gas prices between 2018 and 2020 — tried to hold a renegade demonstration at Place de la Concorde, close to the Élysée Palace, where President Emmanuel Macron has his residence and office.

The authorities arrested 360 people nationwide and conducted nearly 40,000 spot checks to prevent people from taking weapons to protest areas. Some 70,000 police officers were marshaled on Saturday, matching the deployment for the last three major protests.

The prime minister’s office plans to hold a “social conference” on Monday with organizations representing business leaders and workers to discuss wages and the cost of living.

Separate meetings with civil servants unions and with representatives of high school students are also planned. There will also be a session with students, parents, teachers and lawmakers dedicated to the overhaul of the college admission platform, which students have harshly criticized.

“It is time for the government to finally acknowledge that there is a real issue regarding purchasing power,” Marylise Léon, the head of the C.F.D.T., one of the country’s main workers’ unions, said on Friday in a broadcast interview. “So we need to sit down at the table, keeping in mind that it is also, ultimately, the responsibility of employers to provide decent wages.”

Since the protests on Oct. 17, which degenerated into arson and looting, the government has labored to prevent disorder. While there have been no fatalities caused by the violence — one person died of cardiac arrest during the Oct. 17 rally — the strain on France’s police and security services appeared to be spilling into other areas.

The foreign ministry announced it would move a high-level diplomatic meeting to Paris from Marseille next week, citing “logistical and operational” reasons. The meeting of foreign ministers from the Group of 7 advanced industrial nations had been planned for Monday and Tuesday in the Pharo Palace, a 19th-century building, less than a mile from streets looted on Oct. 17, that overlooks Marseille’s harbor.

But the government opted to move the meeting at the last minute because, officials said, it fell just before the Paris Peace Forum, a conference that gathers world leaders to discuss war, peace and conflict resolution.

In addition to the unrest, the authorities have also been dealing with a number of fake bomb threats against commercial flights in Europe, several of which were crossing French territory.

“It was a combination of logistical and operational considerations that led us to decide, as the deadline approached, to relocate the event to Paris,” Pascal Confavreux, a spokesman for the ministry, said on Thursday.

Mr. Confavreux did not address the protests or bomb threats specifically. But he said there were “operational issues for the teams, involving protocols and logistics, with two extremely important events taking place back-to-back. And that’s why it was important that we not overburden the teams.”

Giulia Imbert contributed reporting.

Mark Landler is the Paris bureau chief of The Times, covering France, as well as American foreign policy in Europe and the Middle East. He has been a journalist for more than three decades.

Ségolène Le Stradic a reporter and researcher for The Times, based in Paris.

Mapping How France’s Protest Wave Spread Across Europe

More than 1,700 cost-of-living demonstrations have taken place in 31 European countries since mid-September, with France leading the way.

By Hanna Duggal

8 Nov 2026

France’s protest movement is showing little sign of easing, nearly two months after high school students first walked out over crumbling classrooms.

On Saturday, 146,000 people rallied across the country, including 46,000 in Paris, according to the Ministry of the Interior, while unions put the figures at 250,000 and 75,000.

Turnout was down from previous weeks, but police used tear gas and batons on protesters in Paris and fired tear gas canisters at hundreds of people blocking a road in central Lyon, France’s third-largest city. About 70,000 security personnel were deployed, days after an estimated 575,000 people joined a union-organised rally.

The protests have expanded to cover a range of issues, from high fuel prices to wages and social housing, and in some cases, the demonstrations have been marred by looting and violence. Police have been accused of using excessive force, with officers using barricades, tear gas and batons against protesters.

Al Jazeera maps where demonstrations, including riots, have taken place across Europe.

Demonstrations began in France

An analysis of data from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) found that between September 15 and October 30, more than 1,200 protests and riots of 100 or more people took place across France over education, public services and the cost of living.

The movement began in mid-September in high schools, where students complained of overcrowded classrooms, a lack of teachers and crumbling buildings. It soon broadened into protests against the rising cost of living, drawing in trade unions and the “yellow vests” movement, with rioting and looting on the sidelines.

On October 17 alone, more than 500,000 people protested nationwide, according to government estimates.

ACLED CEO Clionadh Raleigh said on October 19 that ACLED had recorded an average of 20.5 demonstrations a day in France over the past five years. “During the current protest cycle, that has jumped to almost 66 a day, more than three times the usual rate,” she said.

Protest cycles typically last about 20 days, or 36 for major movements, Raleigh said. By ACLED’s count, this one had reached 45 days and was still going.

“But the most striking difference is the level of confrontation,” she said. “Almost a quarter of events, 24.2 percent, have been classified as riots, compared to a median of just 1.9 percent in previous cycles. Only the unrest following the death of Nahel Merzouk in 2023 recorded a higher proportion.”

The police response has also drawn criticism. On October 28, four United Nations experts mandated by the Human Rights Council expressed alarm at the “excessive use of force” by French authorities in dispersing the student protests.

“The scale of the arrests and detention, affecting several thousand people, mainly minors, appears disproportionate and deters demonstrators from exercising their freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly,” they said in a statement.

In the northern city of Lille, a teenager lost a hand when a grenade exploded as school protesters clashed with police.

Protests across Europe

France is not protesting alone. Since mid-September, demonstrations over rising living costs, low wages and a lack of public services have broken out in 30 other European countries, from Portugal to Poland.

Between September 15 and October 30, more than 1,700 protests and riots of 100 or more people took place across Europe, according to an analysis of ACLED data.

Although protests in other countries did not reach the same scale as the rallies in France, they may be a sign of discontent spilling over, Alberto Alemanno, professor of European Union law and policy at HEC Paris Business School, told Al Jazeera last month.

“France is the epicentre of this movement … and there are signs now that this is spreading beyond France,” Alemanno said.

Which country has had the most protests?

France has led the demonstrations, but protests have also broken out across Europe at the same time, driven by a common thread of underfunded education, rising living costs and unaffordable housing.

Demonstrators clash with police during an antigovernment protest organised by the Italia in Piazza movement, in Milan, October 17, 2026. Inspired by protests in France and Spain, demonstrators protested against the rising cost of living, low wages, high rents and public service shortcomings, demanding better living and working conditions [Piero Cruciatti/AFP]

In Spain, tens of thousands of people rallied in early October after parliament rejected two emergency housing decrees on October 2, dealing a blow to Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez’s minority government.

In Italy, demonstrations over the cost-of-living crisis and unaffordable housing have led to clashes with police.

In Portugal, tens of thousands of protesters marched against the cost-of-living crisis, low wages and an inability to access housing in major cities.

1.6 Million Join General Strike in France Against Austerity

November 8, 2026

Around 1.6 million people took to streets across France during Thursday’s general strike, protesting Emmanuel Macron’s austerity policies.

Ana Vračar | November 6, 2026

Following weeks of major mobilizations led by high school and university students, hundreds of thousands of people responded to a general strike call by French trade unions. On Thursday, November 5, over 200 events and at least 1,500 industrial action appeals brought the country to a standstill again.

According to the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), roughly 1.6 million people took to the streets. The organization reported 350,000 people in Paris, 150,000 in Marseille, 120,000 in Bordeaux, and 100,000 in Lille, among others – despite authorities’ attempts to obstruct the day.

Approximately 1.6 million people took part in protests across France on November 5, 2026. Author: Jaylen Strong

Participants at strikes and rallies demanded concrete measures to address the cost-of-living crisis and an end to the repressive measures increasingly adopted by the government and law enforcement since early October.

“The demands are well known: price freezes, the repeal of the Parcoursup system, more university places, wage increases, and €10 billion in the budget to address the demands of high school and university students,” wrote left media outlet L’insoumission.

Refusal of social injustice is driving the mobilization

There was little doubt the new day of mobilization would be successful, given the outpouring of support student demands have gathered since the start of the academic year. “What we are witnessing is the summary of ten years of Macronism and anger against that policy,” said Sophie Binet, general secretary of the CGT, in an interview with Mediapart.

According to Binet, the convergence of different movements – students, workers, gilets jaunes (Yellow Vests) – is driven in part by a shared refusal of the social injustice that defines President Emmanuel Macron’s legacy. “For ten years, Macronist policy has varied in many respects, but with one constant: its economic choices, which serve the powerful, the business community, and the wealthiest.”

This neoliberal agenda is facing resistance not only from students and workers but also from progressive forces in parliament. On Wednesday, November 4, an overwhelming majority – over 450 – of representatives in the National Assembly rejected a budget proposal aiming to cut over €40 billion as concerns over the public deficit in the mainstream mount.

While both left- and right-wing representatives rejected the proposal, only the left has outlined a substantial alternative – and has brought that vision along while marching with students over the past weeks. The National Rally, by contrast, has promised no break with the status quo as the 2027 presidential election approaches.

Protests to continue on Saturday

Preparations for Thursday’s actions were once again marked by a high level of repression, with national authorities announcing the deployment of approximately 70,000 law enforcement agents. At the local level, several demonstrations were rerouted at the last minute, and police continued to use tear gas against demonstrators.

Administrative maneuvers, arrests, and violence against students have only added to protesters’ frustration, Binet emphasized, shaping additional demands to uphold and protect the right to protest.

The persistent protests have also produced the first – albeit minimal – breakthroughs. “These past few weeks gave the government space to announce a series of initial measures aimed at young people, in the hope of calming our mobilization,” wrote student unions Union Syndicale Lycéenne (USL) and Union Étudiante. “These announcements represent a first symbolic retreat by a power that had until now appeared unshakeable.”

“The balance of power we have built over more than a month is exposing a government – a government incapable of taking responsibility for 10 years of social and racist war policies against young people, and incapable of imagining any response to our demands other than unbridled repression – tremble.”

On Thursday, as actions were coming to a close, the government announced it would organize a social dialogue session including trade unions and employers’ representatives next week.

Meanwhile, a new general demonstration has been announced for Saturday, November 7.

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