Tuesday, July 07, 2026

Sudan Signs Infrastructure Deal with China Harbour to Upgrade Ports

7 July 2026

An oil tanker docked at the Port Sudan terminal, Britannica photo

July 6, 2026 (PORT SUDAN) – The Sudanese Sea Ports Corporation (SPC) signed a memorandum of understanding on Monday with China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) to develop its port infrastructure and boost regional competitiveness, the state corporation said.

The Port of Port Sudan has faced operational challenges in recent years that have restricted its ability to receive large vessels and slowed down transhipment activities.

SPC Director General Jeelani Mohamed Jeelani signed the agreement in Beijing under the auspices of Sudan’s Ambassador to China, Omer Issa, according to an SPC statement.

Jeelani said the deal covers strategic infrastructure projects, the modernization of mechanical equipment, including gantry cranes, and the upgrade of software and computing systems. The agreement also includes plans to develop new seaports.

The projects are expected to improve operational efficiency, increase the competitiveness of Sudanese ports, and support the national economy by stimulating transit trade, Jeelani added.

The move comes amid recent improvements at the gateway. Last Sunday, the container terminal at the Southern Port in Port Sudan welcomed massive container ships for the first time, which officials said increased global shipping lines’ confidence.

The Port of Port Sudan requires expansion and deeper berths to handle modern shipping demands. Its current berths total 1,478 meters in length with storage areas spanning 1.48 million square meters, capacities that remain limited compared to major global hubs.

UN Rights Council Orders Urgent Inquiry into Sudan’s El Obeid Atrocities

6 July 2026

July 6, 2026 (GENEVA) – The United Nations Human Rights Council on Monday adopted a resolution ordering an urgent inquiry into alleged human rights violations and war crimes committed in and around the Sudanese city of El Obeid.

The resolution explicitly tasks the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan with investigating the crisis in the North Kordofan capital, where civilians have endured 18 months of siege-like conditions.

Sudanese government rejected the move during the session, with its permanent representative to Geneva, Hassan Hamid, opposing the mission’s mandate. Hamid stated that Sudan’s objection stems from the mission equating the Sudanese army with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Sudan has consistently refused to cooperate with the fact-finding body since its creation in October 2023.

Despite Sudan’s opposition, the text was adopted by consensus in a session chaired by the United Kingdom. Hamid welcomed other aspects of the resolution, including its condemnation of RSF actions and its rejection of any parallel governing structures in RSF-controlled territory.

However, Hamid criticized the text’s language regarding foreign interference, arguing it resorted to generalizations. He accused the resolution of failing to name the United Arab Emirates, which Sudan alleges provides political and military support to the RSF—a claim Abu Dhabi denies.

Sponsored by a coalition of 28 nations, the adopted resolution strongly condemns the escalating violence, widespread use of sexual violence, and starvation as methods of warfare in the region. The text notes that dozens of recent drone strikes have targeted civilian infrastructure, including hospitals and water networks.

The council also expressed alarm over attacks on humanitarian personnel, highlighting a February drone strike on a World Food Programme convoy and the killing of a Sudanese Red Crescent volunteer in June.

Meanwhile, Ahmed Tugod Lisan, spokesperson for the RSF-led Tasis coalition, rejected international demands for a unilateral halt to military operations. Lisan argued that international humanitarian law does not prohibit attacking cities and claimed El Obeid houses legitimate military targets, such as bases and ammunition depots, which do not lose their status due to the presence of civilians.

The planned escalation threatens the lives of over 560,000 civilians and 105,000 internally displaced persons in El Obeid. The city serves as a vital commercial and humanitarian hub, and a ground assault risks completely cutting off aid to South and West Kordofan, as well as parts of Darfur.

The fact-finding mission is mandated to provide updates on its urgent inquiry into the El Obeid crisis to both the Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly during their upcoming sessions.

Sudan Timeline April-June 2026: Struggles Toward Ceasefire Fail Amid El Obeid Violence

03/07/2026 18:28 

DABANGA SUDAN

Tobla camp for displaced peeople in North Darfur (Photo: ICRC) Africans& Diaspora

The second quarter of 2026 comes to a close with the United Nations and other international bodies warning of another human rights catastrophe in Sudan. This time, it is unfolding in the capital of North Kordofan, which has endured “siege-like conditions” for 18 months. El Obeid residents face relentless drone strikes, critical water shortages, and widespread reports of summary executions, abductions, torture, and conflict-related sexual  violence. Similar violations, alongside continued displacement and deteriorating humanitarian conditions, feature heavily in Radio Dabanga’s reporting throughout the quarter.

This timeline is dominated by the disruption of operations at Khartoum Airport following drone attacks, reflections marking the third anniversary of the Sudan war, the Berlin Conference and subsequent international efforts to advance a civilian-led  political process, and the increasing use of drone warfare across strategic locations. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Commander Lt Gen Mohammed Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagalo, continues to formalise the institutions of the Tasees government in areas under its control while seeking greater legitimacy. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), led by Abdelaziz El Hilu, remains a key ally of the RSF, particularly in the Blue Nile region. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), under the leadership of commander-in-chief Lt Gen Abdelfattah El Burhan, continues military operations while consolidating control in parts of central Sudan. Africans& Diaspora

Accurate figures for the war’s death toll remain impossible to verify, with estimates ranging from 61,000 to hundreds of thousands. More than 33 million Sudanese continue to face what has been described as the world’s largest hunger crisis, while cholera, measles, dengue, malaria, meningitis, and hepatitis spread across several regions. Although some people have begun returning to devastated neighbourhoods described as “ghost towns”, millions more remain displaced, awaiting an end to the conflict.

APRIL

Conflict intensifies across Sudan in April, with repeated drone strikes in Darfur killing dozens of civilians, including 58 people at a wedding in Kutum. New displacement is reported in Blue Nile as fighting continued between the SAF, RSF, and SPLM-N. Humanitarian conditions worsen, with more than 21 million people facing acute hunger and measles outbreaks spreading. Donors pledge €1.5 billion at the Berlin conference, but no ceasefire agreement is reached. 

April 1: The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) reports a new wave of displacement in Blue Nile region as fighting intensifies between the SAF, RSF, and SPLM-N.

April 2: Prime Minister Kamil Idris is urged to lift constraints on aviation revenues as Khartoum airport reopens. The SAF appoints Yasser El Atta, member ‌of the Sovereignty Council and assistant to El Burhan, as chief of ​staff.

April 4: The Health Minister holds a meeting about eliminating trachoma in Red Sea, El Gedaref, and White Nile states, as medical sources warn of a measles outbreak in North and East Darfur. UN Coordinator Denise Brown calls for urgent mine action: “In Sudan, the urgency is stark.”

April 5: Women have been driven “hundreds of years backwards” after three years of war in Sudan, says Hala Al-Karib, regional director of the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA).

April 6: As political parties and civilian forces mark the seventh anniversary of the mass sit-in that culminated in the overthrow of former president Omar al Bashir in 2019, the Feminist Justice campaign, which stems from the No to Oppression of Women Initiative, launches. The Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker (STPT) analyses how the ongoing US–Israeli war on Iran is shaping political debates in Sudan. Birthdays& Name Days

April 7: Human Rights Watch (HRW) accuses the SAF of detaining and torturing civilians in areas under their control. United Arab Emirates trade restrictions and regional tensions are deepening the economic crisis and pushing more activity into informal networks, warns STPT.

April 8: An SAF drone attack on a wedding party in Kutum, North Darfur, kills 58 civilians, including 17 children.

April 9: Photos of the Sudan war reap laurels in the 2026 World Press Photo Contest. As the Committee for Removing Empowerment and Dismantling the 1989 Regime (ERC) announces a renewed focus on targeting financial networks abroad, a report reveals the continued appearance of conflict-related Sudanese gold in global supply chains.

April 10: The Sudanese government in Khartoum “might reconsider” dealings with countries organising and sponsoring the upcoming Berlin conference. Birthdays& Name Days

April 13: According to the Sudan Constituent Alliance, SAF drones target three localities in East and North Darfur, killing 15 civilians and injuring 17 others; in West Darfur, drone strikes on a customs market in El Geneina kill dozens of civilians. Millions of people are reportedly surviving on one meal a day.

April 14: Whilst Sovereignty Council advisor Amgad Eltayeb holds meetings in Washington to discuss the Sudan war, a drone strikes a market in El Sarif, North Darfur, causing civilian casualties. “Full civilian participation is essential for peace in Sudan,” civil society leaders tell Berlin Conference delegates, as the Sudan Media Forum calls for media independence. “Three years of war in Sudan is three years too many,” laments the UN World Food Program (WFP). 

April 15: On the third anniversary of the outbreak of the Sudan conflict, the German government hosts the third international conference on Sudan with France, the UK, US, EU, and AU. The Sudan Quintet says it “remains committed to facilitating an inclusive Sudanese-owned inter-Sudanese  political dialogue,” despite the absence of the leaders of the Khartoum and Nyala governments. Co-hosts pledge €1.5 billion in aid for Sudan, but no ceasefire deal is made. In Central Darfur and West Kordofan, over 33 people are killed by drone strikes.

April 16: The Sudanese Journalists Syndicate (SJS) reports a sharp rise in digital harassment and  violence against women journalists; meanwhile, a report by Selma El Obeid explores the online propaganda battlefield in Sudan.

April 17: The US imposes sanctions on parties “​involved in recruiting former Colombian military personnel to fight on ‌behalf of a paramilitary group in Sudan.” 

April 18: The Quintet will organise meetings with those absent from the Berlin conference, says Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) envoy to Sudan in an interview with  Radio Dabanga.

April 19: In West Darfur’s capital of El Geneina, a drone strike hits the Sultan Medical Complex, killing three people and injuring at least one.

April 20: Pakistan puts a weapons deal to the SAF on hold, reportedly following Saudi Arabian intervention. At least 100 civilians have been killed in Delling, South Kordofan, since February, due to increased fighting between the SAF, RSF, and SPLM-N.

April 21: Human rights organisations condemn the “forced deportation” of Sudanese writer Idris Babiker from Egypt, and a rapidly spreading measles outbreak in Darfur and Kordofan regions prompts emergency vaccination campaigns. The IOM warns that the return of over 4 million Sudanese people is a risk amid fragile conditions across the country, as the EU urges a ceasefire and an end to violations. 

April 22: 228 inmates and detainees are held in prisons, police stations, and military and security detention centres in Kadugli locality, South Kordofan, according to the Nuba Mountains Observatory for Human Rights.

April 23: The SAF claims that precision military strikes across the Blue Nile, Kordofan, and Darfur over the past three days have inflicted “heavy losses” on the RSF. “Sudanese cannot wait for another conference,” says Chair of the Sudan and South Sudan Forum Marina Peter.

April 24: An aid vehicle transporting emergency shelter kits for the UN Refugee Agency UNHCR to North Darfur is destroyed in a drone strike.

April 25: Sudan’s Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) begin their second two-day conference in Port Sudan, welcoming calls for national dialogue and free elections, stressing the bloc’s openness to all. 

April 26: Over 20 organisations and components of the FFC sign the statute of the Democratic Bloc in Port Sudan. South Darfur reports 125 new measles cases, with 9,025 infections and 105 deaths recorded overall, as children face “breaking point”.

April 27: A report by The Sentry alleges that an “RSF-linked network is tied to a $24 million UAE property portfolio,” and the Port Sudan government bans “luxurious and unnecessary imports.” Four people are killed after a fire breaks out in a Central Darfur camp, as wildfire blazes sweep the region.

April 28: “Twenty years ago, the world united to condemn the suffering of children in Darfur. Today, a new generation of children faces the same horrors,” says UNICEF. Cases of dengue, malaria, meningitis, and hepatitis continue to be reported across Sudan, with perceived successes in one region offset by setbacks in others. Sudanese refugees sustain injuries following an armed attack on Aftit camp in Ethiopia. Toxic gold mining waste “kills camels” in Red Sea state. 

April 29: The WFP says that more than 21 million people face acute hunger after 1,000 days of war, with aid at risk of being cut within weeks. In an interview with Radio Dabanga, Sudanese economist Haitham Fathi comments on the ban of “luxurious” imports.

April 30: 17 Sudanese refugees drown in the Mediterranean off the Libyan coast from Tobruk, as Berlin conference co-hosts reaffirm their “guiding principles for a peaceful and durable resolution of this conflict”. As the country continues to slide to the bottom of global press freedom rankings, Sudanese media organisations condemn a directive issued to all media outlets to obtain official operating licences or “face legal action”. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) takes the SAF to court over an ammunition shipment.

MAY

In May, intensified drone attacks strike Khartoum, Darfur, Kordofan, Blue Nile, and White Nile, causing heavy civilian casualties and disrupting Khartoum Airport. The UN reports at least 880 civilians killed in drone strikes between January and April. Cholera and measles outbreaks worsen, while inflation reaches 45.84 per cent. The RSF-backed Tasees government expands its institutions, as international and Sudanese actors renew calls for an inclusive civilian-led  political process amid continuing violence. Africans& Diaspora

May 2: 30 people are killed and injured in an alleged SAF drone strike on the Balila area in Blue Nile. 

May 3: Sudan’s media mark World Press Freedom Day by sounding the alarm over horrific violations against journalists. Health facilities are attacked in Delling, South Kordofan, pushing the city’s healthcare system to the brink of collapse. The RSF launches fresh strikes on Kenana, White Nile state, and Omdurman, Khartoum state.

May 4: The RSF is accused of launching a drone attack on the newly reopened Khartoum Airport. Other locations in Khartoum, Omdurman, and White Nile are also targeted. Journalists gather to celebrate the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate (SJS) winning the UNESCO Press Freedom Prize.

May 5: The SAF accuses the UAE and Ethiopia of involvement in the drone attack on Khartoum Airport, prompting a dangerous turning point for Sudan-Ethiopia relations. Ethiopia denies the accusations, amid widespread condemnation of the attack.

May 6: Flights to and from Khartoum Airport remain suspended for the third day. WFP aid operations to the airport are unaffected.

May 7: The Forum on the Participation of NGOs in the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), held in Banjul, Gambia, begins.

May 10: Senior RSF leaders survive a drone attack in Nyala, South Darfur. Renewed drone attacks in Blue Nile and Khartoum states pose an exponential threat to children, says UNICEF in an interview with Radio Dabanga.

May 11: RSF commander ‘El Savanna’ announces his defection “to the Sudanese people,” denying reports that he has joined the SAF. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, says at least 880 civilians were killed in drone strikes across Sudan between January and April.

May 12: Following the ACHPR forum, a joint declaration calls for an inclusive civilian-led political process to resolve the war. The Sudanese delegation rejects the document. The MSF warns of a surge in drone attacks on civilian areas across Sudan, as French President Emmanuel Macron describes the situation as “mass crimes, war crimes, and a catastrophic humanitarian situation,” while avoiding the term “genocide”.

May 13: The Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasees) government, founded by the RSF, continues to formalise institutions in areas under its control to seek legitimacy and international recognition. 

May 14: Drone attacks continue in Nyala for the fourth day. The RSF claims control of the Mogja area in Blue Nile state.

May 16: Three people are killed in an armed ambush on the Gireida–Buram road in South Darfur.

Wreckage following the blast in Kassala on May 18 (Photo: Supplied to RD)

May 18: Inflation surges to 45.84 per cent as the Sudanese pound weakens further. At least five people are killed in an explosion caused by an unidentified weapon that struck a sheep truck near Abu Talha, Kassala state. Africans& Diaspora

May 19: SAF drones strike Kauda in South Kordofan, El Daein in East Darfur, and Babanusa in West Kordofan, resulting in deaths and injuries. Sudan’s former energy minister calls for a national energy charter to rebuild the state and prevent fragmentation.

May 20: In an interview with Radio Dabanga, ICRC spokesperson for Sudan, Adnan Hazam, responds to measures introduced by the Tasees government. A youth leader is detained for refuting the “false and misleading” narrative on the deadly Abu Talha blast.

May 21: RSF advisor, El Basha Tebeig, describes the Sudan army’s drone attacks as “systematic”. The Sudanese embassy in Kampala issues an Ebola warning as Uganda is on high alert.

May 22: A key Kordofan region aid route reopens, as the UN warns over rising civilian deaths as violence escalates across the region.

May 23: On International Day to End Obstetric Fistula, hundreds of women in the Tina area on the Chad-Sudan border wait for surgery.

May 24: “Sudan’s civil war is no longer merely dividing territory; it is steadily partitioning the country’s monetary system,” says STPT, as livestock markets across the western regions bustle ahead of Eid El Adha. Political and civil society groups launch a new campaign against racism and hate speech.

May 25: Cholera kills 40 people in West Kordofan, and measles spreads in East Darfur, as recent moves by the UN Special Envoy to Sudan, Pekka Haavisto, spark widespread political debate and media analysis. A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) study finds $3 billion worth of damage to the country’s electrical grid since the war broke out, and the Iran war poses a threat to harvests. Africans& Diaspora

May 26: Sudan’s rival leaders use Eid El Adha to promote sharply competing visions for the country’s future, as  political forces react to a new call for dialogue amid the continuing war. The Tasees government announces an extension of the registration and accreditation period for international and national organisations until June 13.

May 27: The Sudanese Declaration of Principles Forces coalition signs a new political charter under the slogan ‘Towards Building a New Nation’. An RSF attack on villages west of Bara in North Kordofan’s Azhaf area leaves at least 58 people dead.

May 28: At least 175 farmers in Northern State face imprisonment for defaulting on bank loans following a failed winter harvest. Tribal clashes erupt between the Salamat and Bani Halba in Kubum, South Darfur.

May 30: Meetings due to take place at the start of June, aimed at bringing together all Sudanese parties in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, who did not take part in the Berlin conference in May, are in jeopardy. A drone strike on two civilian vehicles travelling on the Abu Zabad-El Fula road in West Kordofan kills 10 civilians.

JUNE

June is also marked by intensified drone attacks and shifting frontlines across the Kordofan and Darfur regions, along with Blue Nile state, with repeated strikes on El Obeid raising fears of mass atrocities. The RSF expands territorial claims and the Tasees government consolidates its institutions. Humanitarian conditions worsen through displacement, conflict-related sexual violence, and infrastructure damage. International actors renew calls for civilian-led dialogue, while new US sanctions and debt relief from China highlight Sudan’s growing diplomatic and economic challenges. Time& Calendars

Hemedti rings the bell for secondary school certificate exams in Nyala on June 7 (Photo: South Darfur State Government)

June 1: Hemedti issues a decree to form a Security and Defence Council of the Tasees government in Nyala, as fighting between the Salamat and Bani Halba tribes continues for a fourth day, including a drone strike which kills 20.

June 2:  Radio Dabanga is nominated for the 2026 IPI-IMS Free Media Pioneer Award. Divisions emerge within the Democratic Bloc ahead of Sudanese-Sudanese talks in Addis Ababa, as the Tasees government condemns a drone attack on the market in Kubum, South Darfur.

June 3: UN Population Fund (UNFPA) describes parts of the capital Khartoum as a “ghost town”. The SJS says it has provided social support to more than 1,000 journalists since the start of the war.

June 4: At least nine civilians are killed in a drone attack on the town of Kubum.

June 5: On World Environment Day, Sudan ranks 4th among 186 countries most affected by climate change.

June 6: 11,630 people were displaced between June 4 and 6 alone following clashes in Kubum, says IOM.

June 7: At least 15 civilians are killed and dozens more injured in a series of drone attacks in and around El Obeid over the weekend.

June 8: A Darfur advocacy group says air strikes and drone attacks killed at least 470 people between March 2024 and January 2026. A group of international and regional powers endorses a civilian-led political dialogue aimed at restoring civilian rule within six months.

June 10: The Sudanese embassy in London condemns a knife attack in Belfast that left a man seriously injured and sparked unrest across parts of Northern Ireland. An alleged joint RSF and SPLM-N drone strike on Delling kills at least five SAF soldiers, as an SAF drone strike in Sudri locality, North Kordofan, kills four civilians. 

June 11: The death toll in El Obeid rises to 23 amid ongoing RSF drone strikes.

A drone attack targeting a gas station in El Obeid on June 6 (Photo: Social Media)

June 14: The Attorney General calls on the UN Human Rights Council (OHCHR) to support the government’s initiative to end the war. Time& Calendars

June 15: A large-scale demolition campaign across Khartoum state has displaced hundreds of thousands of people, according to a new Sudan Knowledge Centre (SKC) report. Meanwhile, the fire season has displaced 24,171 people between January and May this year, says the IOM.

June 16: The MSF sacks 18 staff in eastern Chad for sexual exploitation of Sudanese women and underage girls in 2024. The UK denies Sudanese journalist Mohamed Amin a visa to attend the One World Media Journalist of the Year award ceremony, for which he had been shortlisted.

June 17: Multiple sources confirm the defection of Fares El Nour from the RSF, a senior figure within the paramilitary group and a “virtual Wali of Khartoum”. Meanwhile, African human rights advocates urge the OHCHR to extend the mandate of its independent fact-finding mission, as a new US bill prohibits loans or aid to Sudan.

June 18: The Tasees government suspends MSF operations over 2024 abuse allegations in Chad, whilst an EU delegation visit prompts pundits to discuss whether the bloc is forming a new  political engagement or attempting to exert pressure from within. The SJS calls for the swift resettlement of Sudanese journalists under threat in Libya.

June 19: The RSF claims control of the Orshi Reservoir area in Ambro locality, North Darfur.

June 20: The RSF announces that it has seized the Surkum area in the Blue Nile region amid escalating clashes with the SAF. International bodies warn that El Obeid could become another El Fasher.

June 22: El Burhan promises to investigate reports that Egyptian forces attacked Sudanese miners near the border, as Human Rights Watch (HRW) calls on the SAF to hold RSF defectors to account for alleged war crimes.

June 23: A new UN Human Rights (OHCHR) report lays bare the brutality and magnitude of conflict-related sexual violence in the country. The SAF claims to have seized a strategic area in Blue Nile state. In North Darfur, the RSF claims to have seized Ambro town, and a drone strike in Mellit kills at least 14 people.

June 24: International concern over a possible RSF assault on El Obeid builds, as opposition grows to proposed Chinese copper mining in Red Sea state. The RSF announces that its forces took control of Furuawiya, east of Ambro town.

June 26: A new round of US sanctions bars Sudanese airlines and those “fuelling the war,” leading to potential complications in finance and commerce.

June 27: Repeated drone strikes on El Obeid kill and injure civilians throughout the week, damaging key infrastructure and deepening shortages of fuel, water and bread.

June 28: “Monetary and admin measures will not halt Sudanese Pound decline,” says economist Wael Fahmi in an interview with  Radio Dabanga. The Joint Forces announce the recapture of Abu Gamra in Karnoi locality, North Darfur, following clashes with the RSF.

June 29: China forgives $50 million of debt, writing off four interest-free loans owed by Sudan. The SAF claims control of a strategic Chadian border town in West Darfur after clashes with the RSF, as the SAF gets closer to securing the route towards El Kurmuk, Blue Nile. Time& Calendars

June 30: The OHCHR announces an urgent debate on the situation ​in El Obeid later this week, with Britain’s ⁠envoy warning of large-scale atrocities. 500 families are reported to be displaced to Karnoi as the fighting in North Darfur intensifies, with reports of ethnic cleansing.

Amnesty International: ‘RSF Committing Crimes Against Humanity, Ethnic Cleansing in North Darfur’

01/07/2026 20:14 

AMSTERDAM / EL FASHER

A child in Darfur (Photo: © UNICEF-UNI17054-Noorani) Africans& Diaspora

Amnesty International has accused the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of committing  crimes against humanity and carrying out acts of ethnic cleansing during military operations in El Fasher, North Darfur, and calls for an immediate ceasefire in Sudan and the deployment of an independent international force to protect civilians. ‘What has happened in El Fasher is a stain on the conscience of humanity,” says Agnès Callamard, Secretary-General of Amnesty International.

In a comprehensive report entitled A City Under Siege, Children in the Line of Fire, the organisation says its findings are based on 247 field interviews with 208 survivors of alleged violations – 169 adults and 39 children – as well as eyewitnesses and other sources, providing what it describes as a broad evidential basis for its conclusions.

The report also draws on an analysis of open-source material, including 89 verified videos, satellite imagery and other field evidence covering the period from the beginning of 2024 to October 2025.

Siege deepens humanitarian crisis

According to Amnesty International, the RSF launches repeated attacks on villages and displacement camps around El Fasher while imposing what it describes as a suffocating siege by restricting the entry of food, medicines and humanitarian aid. Charity& Philanthropy

The organisation says the blockade worsens an already severe humanitarian crisis and pushes large parts of the area towards famine.

It says that, in some cases, civilians are forced to rely on ambaz as a staple food because supply chains have collapsed, while thousands of children are deprived of adequate nutrition and basic healthcare.

Report documents widespread abuses

The report documents what Amnesty says are multiple patterns of abuse, including deliberate killings, torture, rape, sexual slavery, arbitrary detention, forced displacement and the recruitment of children.

Agnès Callamard, Amnesty International’s secretary-general, says the war in Sudan has become “a war on civilians”.

Survivors describe killings and attacks on hospitals

According to the report, Amnesty interviews dozens of survivors who describe summary executions, torture and detention in harsh conditions.

The organisation also documents indiscriminate shooting as civilians attempt to flee the city, as well as casualties inside hospitals and other medical facilities.

Among the incidents highlighted are attacks near the earthen embankment north-west of El Fasher, where civilians trying to escape are reportedly killed.

Sexual violence and child recruitment

The report says sexual violence is used extensively, documenting cases of individual and gang rape, as well as the abduction of girls who are allegedly held in what it describes as degrading and cruel conditions.

Amnesty also documents the recruitment of children into the RSF, saying some are abducted during attacks while others are forced to perform support or combat roles, in what it describes as a clear violation of international humanitarian law.

The organisation further reports attacks on medical facilities, including hospitals in El Fasher, killings inside health facilities and the detention of civilians in conditions characterised by inadequate food and water, poor ventilation and severe overcrowding.

It also documents cases in which civilians are allegedly held for extended periods while ransoms are demanded, describing the practice as systematic and recurring.

Accountability

Amnesty International urges the international community to halt the flow of weapons to all parties to the conflict, extend the existing arms embargo to the whole of Sudan rather than limiting it to Darfur, and strengthen support for the International Criminal Court and other international investigative mechanisms. Charity& Philanthropy

Callamard says the international response remains inadequate and warns that continued impunity will lead to further abuses against civilians, particularly children and displaced people.

The report concludes by calling for the deployment of a neutral, well-equipped international force to protect civilians, the opening of safe humanitarian corridors and the prosecution of those responsible for the violations documented in its findings.

UN Condemns RSF Escalation Around El Obeid as Tasees Backs Ceasefire

07/07/2026 13:50 

EL OBEID / EL FASHER / GENEVA / CHAD

Sudanese refugees in Chad set up makeshift shelters (File photo: © UNHCR / Colin Delfosse)

The UN Human Rights Council has unanimously condemned the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) for escalating violence in and around El Obeid, warning that the North Kordofan capital faces a growing risk of mass atrocities, while the RSF-aligned Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasees) called for an immediate ceasefire and renewed political negotiations.

Speaking to Radio Dabanga, Tasees spokesperson Ahmed Tagad Lisan said lasting peace would require both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF to agree to an immediate ceasefire, a humanitarian truce and a political process.

He said humanitarian access must come first, adding that international resolutions alone would not end the conflict.

The Human Rights Council adopted the resolution by consensus on Monday amid growing concern that El Obeid could suffer atrocities like those committed in North Darfur’s capital of El Fasher.

The resolution condemns the RSF and allied forces for escalating attacks around the city and warns of an imminent risk of mass atrocities, including conflict-related sexual violence.

It also denounces attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, including reported drone strikes on hospitals, and condemns the use of starvation as a weapon of war through restrictions on aid, fuel and water.

The council called for an immediate ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian access, independent monitoring and investigations into alleged violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.

The United Kingdom sponsored the resolution alongside Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway after warning that RSF troop build-ups around El Obeid had sharply increased the risk of atrocities.

‘Sudan objects, analyst rejects RSF claims’

Sudan’s delegation objected to provisions allowing the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission to investigate alleged violations in El Obeid, arguing that the resolution placed the SAF and the RSF on an equal footing. The resolution nevertheless passed without opposition.

Tagad Lisan defended recent RSF drone strikes, claiming they targeted military sites rather than civilians. However, journalist and political analyst Qurashi Awad rejected that account, saying repeated RSF attacks had struck residential areas and caused heavy civilian casualties. He said the Human Rights Council’s intervention reflected the scale of suffering, particularly in El Fasher.

ICC pursues Darfur investigations

The International Criminal Court (ICC) Deputy Prosecutor Nazhat Shameem Khan is due to brief the UN Security Council on Darfur on Tuesday from Chad.

After visiting Farchana refugee camp, Khan said investigators had made significant progress in gathering evidence of crimes committed in El Fasher and El Geneina.

She said the ICC was building cases against both direct perpetrators and senior officials suspected of orchestrating atrocities, while continuing efforts to execute outstanding arrest warrants for former president Omar Al Bashir, Abdel Rahim Hussein and Ahmed Haroun.

New Report: RSF Training Camps, Supply Routes in Libya Fueling Sudan’s War — ‘What We’ve Uncovered is Really Just the Tip of the Iceberg’

 04/07/2026 01:32 

AMSTERDAM

An RSF militiaman poses in front of a vehicle in El Fasher (Photo: supplied) War& Conflict

Andrew Bergman interviews Klaas van Dijken, Director of Lighthouse Reports for  Radio Dabanga

The United Arab Emirates is widely accused of playing a key role in sustaining Sudan’s civil  war. But until now, little has been known about how that support is channelled through neighbouring countries. Lighthouse Reports director Klaas van Dijken explains how a months-long investigation uncovered evidence of a network of RSF  training camps in eastern Libya, the role of the UAE in sustaining the war in Sudan, and why he believes international pressure is urgently needed.

For a new investigation co-published last week by Lighthouse Reports, Evident and Sudan War Monitor Inside the Secret Network Fueling Sudan’s War, reporters travelled to eastern Libya to investigate the routes, facilities and infrastructure they say are being used to back the RSF in its nearly four-year conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces, that is leaving what is widely termed the world’s most dire humanitarian crisis in its wake: thousands of Sudanese civilians dead from violence, disease, or starvation, millions of Sudanese displaced, or as refugees in neighbouring countries, and vast swaths of complete destruction. War& Conflict

Watch the complete interview here

Combining open-source analysis with reporting on the ground, the investigation presents new evidence about what it says is one of the UAE’s most significant operations supporting the RSF.

Speaking to Radio Dabanga, the director of Lighthouse Reports, Klaas van Dijken, fears the network documented by his team is “only the tip of the iceberg”. He says that UAE support routed through Libya is crucial to the RSF military campaign, which he believes would quickly collapse without.

The investigators say that they discovered five military training camps and staging sites, four of them were previously unknown. The camps, which span Northern and Southern Libya, are used to train RSF-members on heavy weaponry and new weapons which soldiers then transport back to Sudan.

RSF defectors and current soldiers along with Libyan National Army sources told the team these sites also provide the RSF with logistical support including fuel and pickup trucks, which are often modified for battle before being driven back to Sudan. War& Conflict

‘Long investigation’

Lighthouse Reports director Klaas van Dijken explains how a months-long investigation uncovered evidence of a network of RSF training camps in eastern Libya, the role of the UAE in sustaining the war in Sudan, and why he believes international pressure is urgently needed.

“It has been known for quite some time that the Rapid Support Forces were receiving support from the UAE, but the evidence was fairly limited. People knew weapons were moving through Chad and that aircraft were landing in neighbouring countries around Sudan, but very little was known about how that support actually worked on the ground.

A new investigation co-published last week by Lighthouse Reports, Evident and Sudan War Monitor Inside the Secret Network Fueling Sudan’s War, reporters travelled to eastern Libya to investigate the routes, facilities and infrastructure they say are being used to back the RSF in its nearly four-year conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces, that is leaving what is widely termed the world’s most dire humanitarian crisis in its wake: thousands of Sudanese civilians dead from violence, disease, or starvation, millions of Sudanese displaced, or as refugees in neighbouring countries, and vast swaths of complete destruction.

Following the evidence

“The best example is what we discovered at Camp 17. We travelled to eastern Libya to investigate what was happening around Kufra, near the border triangle with Egypt and Sudan. While we were there, the Libyan National Army was watching us closely, making it difficult to speak to sensitive sources. The environment itself was also challenging, so we had to be extremely careful throughout.

“Later, in Benghazi, we spoke to RSF defectors who told us they had been trained at a camp outside the city. One of them helped us identify its location using Google Earth. We then combined satellite imagery with open-source information and confirmed that the camp existed and was still active. We saw vehicles consistent with those used by both the LNA and the RSF, as well as groups of people appearing to receive military  training. War& Conflict

‘Colombian mercenaries’

“We also confirmed that mobile phones originating from South America were active inside the camp, supporting the defectors’ accounts that Colombian mercenaries were providing training there. That’s an example of how we combined open-source intelligence, satellite imagery, and on-the-ground reporting.”

“The strongest evidence came from people’s testimony. What was unique was our access to RSF defectors, active military sources within the RSF and contacts on the LNA side. They consistently confirmed that these camps exist and remain active today.

“What surprised me most was just how widespread these facilities are and how closely the LNA and the RSF are working together. We identified four previously unknown training camps, but I believe there are many more that we were unable to verify. What we’ve uncovered is really just the tip of the iceberg. War& Conflict

“This is a major hub where the RSF trains fighters, assembles equipment and prepares forces to continue the war in Sudan.”

A message to the international community

“It’s well known that the LNA has longstanding ties with the UAE. The UAE supported Haftar during the war in Libya and is now using those same relationships to continue supporting both the LNA and the RSF. This network has become a crucial part of the RSF’s ability to sustain the conflict in Sudan.

“The first thing I hope comes from this investigation is greater pressure on the UAE to end its support for the RSF. One of the defectors says at the end of our documentary that if the UAE stopped providing support, the RSF would collapse very quickly because it is so heavily dependent on that assistance. War& Conflict

“I also want European governments to recognise the contradiction in their current approach. They are working with eastern Libya and Haftar to reduce migration to Europe while overlooking the role those same authorities are playing in prolonging a war that is creating even more refugees.

“The European Union, the United States and the United Kingdom all have leverage. They should use it to pressure not only the UAE but also other countries supporting Sudan’s warring parties. If they want greater peace and stability in the region, that is one of the most important steps they can take towards bringing this devastating war to an end.”

Explosions Reported Near Macron's Hotel in Damascus, Syria

By Al Mayadeen English

Explosions were reported in Damascus as French President Macron met Syrian President al-Sharaa, with officials saying Macron was unaffected.

Explosions rocked Damascus on Tuesday during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Syria, with blasts heard near the hotel where he is staying, according to Reuters, citing a security source. The cause of the explosions remains unclear.

A witness told Reuters that explosions were heard in the Syrian capital, adding that the reasons behind the blasts were not immediately known. The reports emerged as Macron was visiting Damascus for meetings with Syrian officials, including self-appointed interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa.

According to the security source, a series of explosive devices detonated near the hotel where Macron is staying in Damascus.

Local Syrian sources separately reported an explosion at the headquarters of the Ministry of Tourism in Damascus, adding that injuries had been reported following the incident.

Macron meets al-Sharaa amid Damascus security reports

Meanwhile, Syrian news channel Al-Ikhbariyah reported that al-Sharaa was receiving Macron at the Presidential Palace while reports emerged of explosions heard across Damascus.

However, the Élysée Palace said Macron did not hear any explosions while on his way to meet al-Sharaa.

Details of the visit 

Macron arrived on Monday in the Syrian capital Damascus for a visit scheduled to last until Tuesday, during which he called for a “free and pluralistic” Syria that respects all its components.

Macron said from Damascus that he hopes Syria will play a role in easing regional tensions, stressing the need for a political framework that ensures inclusivity and representation for all segments of society.

Upon arrival at Damascus International Airport, Macron and his accompanying delegation were received by Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani.

According to Syria’s Presidential Media Directorate, the visit aims to discuss ways to strengthen bilateral relations between Syria and France, as well as to address regional and international issues of mutual concern.

The White Helmets Invade Venezuela

Kit Klarenberg

Source: Al Mayadeen English

4 Jul 2026 01:12

White Helmets' deployment to Venezuela is portrayed as a humanitarian mission that also advances Western influence through parallel state-building and regime change.

On June 27th, a plane ferrying a “specialized” team of “highly trained search and rescue specialists” flew into Venezuela from Damascus. Dispatched at putative Syrian leader Ahmad al-Sharaa’s direct order, the 15-strong group is assisting disaster efforts launched by Caracas in response to devastating twin earthquakes. Among them are members of the notorious White Helmets. A bogus humanitarian group constructed by MI6, they played a central role in Britain’s protracted coup of Bashar Assad. Are the White Helmets similarly in Venezuela to assist regime change?

State news agency Sana enthusiastically promoted the White Helmets’ arrival, celebrating “Syria’s first overseas humanitarian search-and-rescue deployment in modern history.” The expedition reportedly represents a “significant step” in the country’s “evolving humanitarian role” globally, underscoring “its growing capacity to contribute to international disaster response efforts.” The deployment is explicitly intended to “position” Damascus “as a contributor to international humanitarian operations,” capable of dispatching “search-and-rescue expertise” overseas to support “other nations in times of crisis.” 

Sana highlighted the “exceptional field experience” of the White Helmets sent to Caracas, who reportedly acquired “advanced expertise in dealing with complex rubble and the extraction of trapped survivors” throughout the West’s dirty war against the now “deposed regime” of Assad. This “accumulated experience” has reportedly “enabled Syrian rescue specialists to participate in international emergency response missions,” with Venezuela being their debut. While Damascus provides “experienced rescue personnel,” key dirty war sponsor Qatar supplies “heavy machinery and specialized equipment required for field operations.”

The White Helmets will “work in close coordination” with international rescue units in shattered Caracas for up to 10 days, “with the possibility of extending the mission depending on operational requirements and developments on the ground.” An “operational requirement” of the rescuers may be assisting in the construction of quasi-state structures in Venezuela, ala Syria, ensuring Western powers have the requisite people, organisations and structures in place locally to take over when the embattled interim government of Delcy Rodríguez finally collapses.

As CNN has reported, “Rodríguez’s Venezuela is in such dire straits she can’t afford to reject aid from either friends or foes.” The White Helmets are a self-evident menace. The group was founded in 2014 by ARK, a shadowy British intelligence cutout founded by MI6 veteran Alistair Harris. Over the subsequent decade, operating in areas controlled by foreign-backed extremists, the White Helmets played a major propaganda role in the dirty conflict against Assad. 

Even more insidiously, the group and other ARK-created quasi-state structures shored up the dominance of Jabhat al-Nusra, which subsequently rebranded as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, before violently taking power in Damascus in December 2024. By providing state-like rescue services in HTS-occupied areas, the extremist faction’s credibility as a governance actor with local Syrians was significantly enhanced, to the extent HTS became “synonymous with opposition to Assad.” Leaked documents show British intelligence well-knew these activities assisted HTS’ “growing influence”, in the years leading up to Assad’s ouster.

Since then, the White Helmets have become Syria’s emergency services under al-Sharaa’s illegitimate rule. Meanwhile, fellow ARK construct the Free Syrian Police, with which the White Helmets worked hand-in-glove, has been anointed the country’s national police force. Separate leaks show this was Britain’s plan all along, with Damascus’ post-war “recovery” providing a beachhead for local MI6 assets to “[expand] into newly liberated territory” before all-out regime change. Responding to Venezuela’s cataclysmic earthquakes likewise represents a golden opportunity to finish the West’s long-running war on Chavismo. 

‘Extremist Groups’

Leaked British documents trace the White Helmets’ inception to a secret program launched July 2013. Once constructed, the so-called Syrian Civil Defence enabled “direct and public linkages between donor funding and support to the Syrian opposition,” while “[enhancing] the legitimacy of local governance actors.” The group had strong links to, and worked in intimate conjunction with, Western-backed extremist groups, and foreign-created anti-Assad civil society and media operations. The White Helmets were a perfect conduit for opaquely funnelling aid and financial assistance to opposition-occupied territory.

Fractured minds of a nation: Mental health and schooling in Lebanon - when learning becomes a battle for survival

Accordingly, the White Helmets were at the forefront of constructing parallel state structures, in advance of the day Assad was finally ousted. A leaked file refers to how in April 2015, ARK mobilised its networks of Syrian opposition actors of every stripe, including the White Helmets, to gather information at the British government’s request on “the situation in Idlib city following its liberation.” This included insights on “humanitarian conditions and service provision, as well as the evolving governance and security space.”

With British, Japanese and US funding, and in close coordination with the Qatari-created Syrian National Coalition, ARK sought “to galvanise international attention on the issue of protection of civilians,” while “mobilising social media, the international press, global advocacy partners and private entrepreneurs” to promote the White Helmets. In 2014, ARK produced a documentary about the White Helmets, Digging for Life, which racked up hundreds of thousands of views on YouTube and elevated the group to international stardom. 

In leaked files, ARK boasts about the “impact” such propaganda had within and without Syria. One film the intelligence cutout produced “on the indefatigable spirit of a struggling female protestor” prompted “the eruption of anti-regime protests” in Idlib in 2013 - “protestors chanted her name.” The same ARK staffer behind Digging for Life also produced a “documentary profile” of the Free Syrian Police. Like the White Helmets, the FSP was much-venerated by the Western media, and promoted by British intelligence via “posters, booklets and broadcast products.”

As with the White Helmets too, the reality of the FSP was considerably darker than what emerged in major news outlets - at least initially. From 2012 onwards, the force operated in close tandem with violent militant factions, and courts punishing residents of opposition-occupied territory under obscenely strict interpretations of Sharia Law. However, a March 2017 BBC profile of the FSP repeatedly stressed the force “does not co-operate with extremist groups,” while refusing to “carry weapons in order to administer law and order in the country.”

Nine months later, the FSP’s intimate relationships with multiple ultra-violent militant sects, including HTS's forerunner Jabhat al-Nusra, were publicly revealed. This extended to assisting in the execution of women who disobeyed al-Nusra’s theocratic codes. These disclosures led to the suspension of British funding for the FSP, but this was reinstated within mere weeks as the force’s sinister alliance with extremist elements was “already known” to the Foreign Office. Indeed, the FSP’s entire purpose was assisting HTS and affiliated armed cliques in unseating Assad.

‘Service Delivery’

When the FSP’s true nature was publicly exposed, management of the project had been passed to British intelligence cutout Adam Smith International. Leaked ASI files from 2016 refer to the necessity of the FSP and other British ‘humanitarian’ initiatives supplanting “pre-2011” Syrian institutions, as part of a wider “expansion into newly liberated territory.” The White Helmets, FSP et al could “take advantage of systems and structures already in place…[demonstrating] the continuity of service delivery by the opposition rather than the regime,” the documents state.

The FSP formally absorbing Assad-era security infrastructure ensured “consistency between emerging police forces across opposition Syria, facilitating their future integration at the right moment.” More generally, it “[prepared] Syrian institutions for a peace agreement and transition.” The FSP could “inform as well as respond to the political process” - in other words, regime change. Meanwhile, it was forecast that “presenting a functioning yet consistent model in Syria’s liberated areas will strengthen the opposition and be the basis for a new civilian-led and accountable state security architecture”:

“The shifting front lines of the Syrian conflict mean that the FSP…must be ready to respond quickly when new stations are needed within current frontlines or when territory changes hands.”

In January 2019, HTS took power outright in north-west Syria. Almost instantly, the FSP was formally dissolved, its members continuing their activities under the al-Nusra successor’s banner. Leaked documents testify to how HTS was “less likely to attack” British intelligence-created “moderate opposition” entities, including the White Helmets, which “demonstrably [provided] key services” to the local population. After all, residents of HTS-occupied territory increasingly supported the group, precisely due to “receiving services” under the extremist faction’s chaotic rule.

As British intelligence-conceived “moderate” service providers flourished under HTS, British intelligence cutouts produced slick propaganda for national and international dissemination, providing audiences with “compelling narratives and demonstrations of a credible alternative to the [Assad] regime.” A particular target were Syrians who may once have supported regime change in Damascus, but believed the “revolution is dead” in the wake of Assad declaring victory in December 2018, fighting effectively ceasing outright, and HTS- and Kurdish-dominated enclaves being left to their own devices.

Of course, the West’s insurrectionary assault on Syria was far from over. In lieu of kinetic conflict, brutal sanctions ensured what remained of the country’s once independent economy stayed shattered after almost a decade of grinding proxy war, while deliberately preventing reconstruction of its eviscerated industry, infrastructure, once excellent public education and health systems, and much more besides. Conversely, with the help of British intelligence “service provision”, HTS ever-strengthened not merely within territory it occupied, but the country more widely.

Come December 2024, the Syrian state was sufficiently crippled that it could be easily overrun by HTS - with MI6’s constellation of ‘humanitarian’ groups ensuring “continuity of service delivery.” In Venezuela, authorities have been enfeebled and impoverished by decades of US-led economic warfare, leaving them unable to adequately respond to the earthquakes. Collapsing the vestiges of Caracas’ revolutionary system wouldn’t require military action, but an influx of foreign“service providers”. The recently-arrived planeload White Helmets may represent the first shot fired in a new, secret war. 

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect Al Mayadeen’s editorial stance.

Namibia President in Guangzhou, China, On First Day of Official Visit

6 July 2026

The Namibian (Windhoek)

President Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah met with the leadership of the Guangdong province on Monday as the first official meeting of her trip to China.

The delegation met Guangdong province party secretary Huang Kunming, who also sits on the political bureau of the Chinese Communist Party central committee.

"[Huang] expressed confidence that the visit would elevate China-Namibia cooperation to new heights, further deepen bilateral relations and strengthen the longstanding friendship between the two countries," the Office of the Presidency says on social media in a post on Monday.

Guangzhou is the capital city of the southern province of Guangdong. The city is a global trading hub and is one of the four most important megacities in China.

"[The president said] she had deliberately chosen Guangzhou as her point of entry into China because of its significant economic profile and expressed confidence that the visit would create valuable opportunities for the Namibian delegation and accompanying business community," the Presidency says.

Nandi-Ndaitwah arrived in China on Sunday for a state visit at the invitation of Chinese president Xi Jinping. She will visit the Chinese cities of Shenzhen, Chengdu and Beijing. The visit is scheduled to end on Saturday.

Read the original article on Namibian.

Namibia VIP Protection Chief Removed After State House Security Breach

Namibia's President-Elect Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah thanking Namibians during "a memorable" Swapo victory celebration (file photo).

6 July 2026

The Namibian (Windhoek)

The head of the police's VIP protection unit, commissioner Michael Abraham, has been removed from his position following a security breach at State House involving an unauthorised intruder.

The unit is an elite division responsible for safeguarding the president, vice president, former presidents, ministers and key state installations.

Police sources over the weekend confirmed that Abraham has since been transferred to the police headquarters, where he has assumed a different role.

His removal follows an incident on 30 April in which Giano Seibeb (29) allegedly gained unauthorised access to State House.

Seibeb was reportedly found naked near the president's private residence.

Two senior police sources say deputy commissioner Sebastian Kandunda replaced Abraham as the head of the VIP protection unit.

"He has now been removed from the VIP and was replaced by deputy commissioner Kandunda. Abraham is currently reporting at national police headquarters," one of the sources says.

Acting police inspector general Anne-Marie Nainda yesterday also confirmed that Abraham is no longer attached to the VIP protection unit.

"Abraham is in the Office of the Inspector General, according to the structure.

He is an adviser in the office of the inspector general. He is not at VIP," she said.

Nainda said commissioner Andreas Nelumbu, who has transferred to the Kavango West region on 1 May, is still on leave.

The Namibian has been informed that Nelumbu may have resigned from the police following his removal from president Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah's protection detail in April.

Responding to questions about internal deployments, Nainda questioned the public interest in such matters.

"I don't know what interest people have in internal arrangements and running to the media.

What is the public going to benefit from who is on leave and who is where?" she asked.

She said Nelumbu is expected to resume duty at his designated post after his leave period ends.

Abraham yesterday declined to comment on his removal.

"I can only discuss that when you come to me, because there are so many strange things and talking to a stranger like that is not really advisable," he said.

Nelumbu was not reachable for comment yesterday.

"The owner of the phone is not available. Maybe you can call in 10 minutes," the person answering Nelumbu's phone said.

However, when The Namibian called again the call was not answered.

Windhoek Observer reported in May that Nelumbu had resigned from the police.

National police spokesperson deputy commissioner Kauna Shikwambi in mid-May, however, said Nelumbu was still an active member of the police.

Faye Moves to Launch New Party as Split with Sonko Deepens

By Dominic Wabwireh with AP

Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye is preparing to launch his own political party, signaling a decisive break with former Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko as the country's leadership rift widens ahead of key local elections and constitutional reforms.

Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye has begun preparations to establish his own political party, according to a coalition supporting the president.

The coalition said in a statement issued late on Friday that Faye had instructed senior adviser Aminata Touré to lead a task force responsible for creating the new political movement.

The move marks the clearest sign yet of a lasting split between Faye and his former ally, Ousmane Sonko.

Break with Pastef

Faye has remained a member of the ruling Pastef party since taking office, but relations with Sonko deteriorated over several months before the president dismissed him as prime minister in May.

Sonko has since become Speaker of the National Assembly, where he is championing constitutional reforms aimed at reshaping Senegal's political landscape.

Among the proposed changes is a provision preventing a sitting president from serving simultaneously as leader of a political party.

Reforms head to referendum

Lawmakers approved the constitutional amendments last week, but President Faye has opted to submit them to a national referendum instead of signing them into law.

Authorities have not yet announced a date for the vote.

The referendum is expected to become a key test of political support for both Faye and Sonko as their rivalry intensifies.

Political rivalry amid economic challenges

The growing political divide comes as Senegal grapples with an economic crisis triggered by revelations that the previous administration misreported public debt levels.

The dispute also unfolds ahead of 2027 local elections, which are expected to provide the first major indication of the electoral strength of both camps.

The planned creation of a new presidential party could significantly reshape Senegal's political landscape and redefine alliances within the country's ruling establishment.

Sahel Bloc Backs Burkina Faso as Rift with France Deepens

By Al Mayadeen English

1 Jul 2026 08:22

The Confederation of Sahel States backed Burkina Faso after it cut diplomatic ties with France, framing the dispute as part of a wider struggle against French and European interference in the Sahel.

The Confederation of Sahel States has thrown its weight behind Burkina Faso after Ouagadougou severed diplomatic relations with France, marking a new escalation in the wider confrontation between Sahel states and their former colonial power.

According to the Burkinabe news portal leFaso, the presidents of the parliaments of the Confederation of Sahel States, which groups Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, adopted a resolution on Tuesday condemning a European Parliament text issued earlier in June over the human rights situation in Burkina Faso.

AES condemns European Parliament resolution

"The presidents of the parliaments of the Confederation of Sahel States strongly condemn the resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 18 June 2026, which erroneously portrays the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Burkina Faso; they express their full support, solidarity, and fraternity with the Burkinabe authorities and people", the resolution read on Tuesday.

The statement was issued after parliamentary leaders from the three Sahel countries met in Ouagadougou on June 29 and 30, in talks aimed at strengthening parliamentary cooperation and advancing the operationalization of confederal parliamentary sessions within the AES.

The meeting reflected the bloc’s attempt to move beyond security coordination and build a more structured political framework, including harmonized legislation, stronger political consultation, and coordinated governance among its member states.

Sahel states push for a confederal framework

The AES parliamentary leaders also praised Burkina Faso’s efforts in the fight against terrorism and called for international cooperation based on respect for state sovereignty, a position that directly challenges the European Parliament’s criticism of Ouagadougou.

The European Parliament adopted its resolution on June 18 by 476 votes in favor, 11 against, and 75 abstentions. The text accused the Burkinabe authorities of restricting civil society, press freedoms, freedom of assembly, and freedom of expression. It also called for investigations into alleged rights violations and voiced concern over Russia’s growing influence in Burkina Faso following the expulsion of European forces.

Ouagadougou rejected the resolution as a distorted and hostile portrayal of the country’s internal situation, arguing that such criticism ignores the security challenges facing Burkina Faso as it battles armed groups and seeks to assert full sovereignty over its national decisions.

Burkina Faso cuts ties with France

The text was authored by French European Parliament member Christophe Gomart, a point that further fueled Burkinabe accusations that France continues to use European institutions to pressure its former colonies.

On June 26, Burkina Faso announced that it was severing diplomatic relations with France, accusing Paris of seeking to "dominate and subjugate the country to its will".

The French Foreign Ministry later said Paris was considering retaliatory measures, while rejecting Ouagadougou’s accusations.

Relations between Burkina Faso and France have steadily deteriorated since Captain Ibrahim Traoré came to power in 2022. Ouagadougou has since ended French military operations on its territory, expelled French diplomatic personnel, and moved closer to Mali and Niger through the Confederation of Sahel States.

Extremists Attack Five Malian Towns in Coordinated Dawn Attack

By Al Mayadeen English

4 Jul 2026 15:53

Al-Qaeda affiliates struck five Malian towns before dawn Saturday, with the FLA claiming gains in Anefis, two months after attacks killed the defense minister.

Mali's army announced on Saturday that insurgents launched attacks before dawn against its positions in Aguelhok, Anefis, Gao, Sévaré, and Kenieroba, spanning the country's north and center. Fighting in the different locations began around 5 am local time.

The army says the assaults were attempted strikes on its positions, according to a statement carried on state television.

In Gao, a local official told Reuters that gunfire and rocket fire had targeted a military camp since before dawn. Explosions were also reported in Sévaré, with aircraft later spotted flying over the area, a security source told AFP.

In Kenieroba, roughly 74 kilometers from Bamako, a major prison complex holding extremist prisoners came under attack. There were no immediate reports of casualties.

FLA claims gains in Anefis

The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a Tuareg-led separatist movement, confirmed it carried out the assault on Anefis, in the northeastern Kidal region.

For his part, spokesperson Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane told Reuters that several army positions in the town had fallen and that clashes were ongoing inside it.

A resident reached by AFP said armed fighters had entered the town but that the army camp had not yet fallen, and government forces were still resisting.

JNIM, the al-Qaeda-linked coalition that has also operated alongside the FLA, had not issued a claim as of Saturday.

Anefis and Aguelhok are the only locations in the Kidal region where Malian troops have maintained a presence since the collapse of government control there in late April, when FLA and JNIM fighters seized the city of Kidal itself.

Russian forces, deployed to Anefis after that offensive, are also stationed in the area, making it a focal point for both Bamako and Moscow's regional military presence.

Part of a broader pattern since April

Saturday's attacks come just over two months after JNIM and the FLA carried out a coordinated wave of strikes on military and administrative targets across Mali, including in Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sévaré, and Kidal.

That offensive killed Defense Minister Sadio Camara, whose responsibilities were temporarily transferred to President Assimi Goïta, and led to the withdrawal of Malian and Russian forces from Kidal and other northern towns.

Russia's Defense Ministry described the April events as a foiled coup attempt involving roughly 12,000 fighters, it said were trained with Western support.

Uganda Coffee Exports Hit by Weaker Prices

By Dominic Wabwireh with AP

Uganda's coffee export earnings dropped sharply in May as falling global prices and lower export volumes weighed on the country's top agricultural export. The decline highlights the vulnerability of Africa's largest coffee exporter to swings in international commodity markets.

Uganda earned US$151.7 million from coffee exports in May, a decline of about 38 percent from the US$244 million recorded in the same month last year, according to an Agriculture Ministry report released on Friday.

Export volumes also fell significantly, with the country shipping 617,491 60-kilogram bags compared with 793,445 bags in May 2025, a drop of more than 22 percent.

The ministry did not explain the decline in export volumes.

Global prices weaken

The fall in earnings was driven not only by reduced shipments but also by lower international coffee prices after months of elevated levels.

According to the ministry, prices eased in May as expectations grew for a larger harvest in Brazil, the world's biggest coffee producer, easing concerns over tight global supplies that had previously pushed prices to multi-year highs.

Coffee remains economic lifeline

Coffee remains Uganda's largest agricultural export and its leading source of foreign exchange, supporting millions of smallholder farmers across the country.

Uganda is Africa's biggest coffee exporter and has expanded production in recent years through government programmes promoting improved seedlings and higher farm productivity.

The country mainly exports robusta coffee, while arabica production has also grown steadily.

Value addition remains a priority

The government continues to encourage local roasting and processing to increase export earnings and reduce reliance on raw bean exports.

Officials say expanding domestic value addition will strengthen Uganda's position in international markets while generating higher returns for the economy.

Market outlook remains uncertain

Analysts say global coffee prices will continue to depend on weather conditions in major producing countries such as Brazil and Vietnam, as well as shipping costs, currency movements and global demand.

Despite the weaker performance in May, Uganda's coffee sector remains one of the country's strongest export industries, although the latest figures underscore how vulnerable export earnings remain to fluctuations in international commodity markets.

OPEC+ Boosts Oil Production as Gulf Exports Recover

FILE - The logo of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is displayed outside of OPEC's headquarters in Vienna, Austria, Thursday, March 3, 2022.

By Dominic Wabwireh with other agencies

Seven OPEC+ producers have agreed to increase oil production from August, signalling confidence that Gulf exports are recovering after months of disruption caused by the Middle East conflict. The move comes as shipping through the Strait of Hormuz gradually returns to normal.

Seven key OPEC+ members agreed on Sunday to raise oil production quotas by 188,000 barrels per day, with the increase taking effect in August 2026.

The decision was reached during a virtual meeting involving Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria and Oman, as the alliance seeks to restore supplies following months of reduced output linked to the conflict in the Gulf.

Recovery follows Hormuz disruption

The production increase comes after Gulf producers were forced to scale back exports when shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was severely disrupted during the Middle East war.

According to OPEC data, combined oil production by Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait fell by around six million barrels per day between the first quarter of 2026 and May.

A memorandum of understanding signed by Iran and the United States on June 17 has since helped restore maritime traffic through the strategic waterway, allowing exports to gradually recover.

Output still below target

Despite improving shipping conditions, analysts say production has yet to return to pre-conflict levels.

UBS commodity analyst Giovanni Staunovo said current output remains below OPEC+ targets, while Ole Hansen of Saxo Bank noted that restarting oil fields shut during the conflict is a gradual process that could take several weeks.

As a result, July is expected to show modest gains, with a stronger recovery anticipated in August.

Price risks remain

While rebuilding depleted inventories could initially absorb the additional supply, analysts warn that oil markets may face a surplus in 2027, increasing downward pressure on prices.

The challenge comes at a sensitive time for OPEC+, which is adjusting to the departure of the United Arab Emirates from the group and preparing for a review of members' production baselines later this year.

Quota debate looms

Iraq has already called for higher production quotas to offset losses suffered during the Gulf conflict.

Although analysts believe an immediate increase is unlikely, the request is expected to feature prominently during OPEC+'s 2027 capacity review, when the alliance reassesses production limits based on each member's output potential.

Why Some African Nations are Turning Down Trump Aid Money

Barbara Plett Usher

Africa correspondent

A nurse with a Ghana flag looks on during independence day celebrations at the Jubilee House on 6 March 2025 in Accra.

Ghana rejected a proposed $109m health deal with the US in April over data protection concerns

After dismantling the main US body for delivering foreign assistance last year, the Trump administration is again offering hundreds of millions of dollars to African countries to support their healthcare structures and help fight disease.

But the new deals come with conditions attached and as a result, face resistance from some governments.

When the initial agreement was signed by Kenya's President William Ruto in Washington last December, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said he hoped it would be the first of many.

"We hope to sign, I don't know, 30, 40, how many? Fifty? Well, this is number one. We'll always remember this one… and we think we've picked the perfect partner," Rubio declared.

But even this landmark deal with Kenya, worth $2.5bn (£1.9bn), has been delayed by activists who went to court to block it, although cabinet ministers did finally approve it last month.

Shortly after taking office, President Donald Trump ordered the closure of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) amid accusations of wastefulness, in the process decimating health programmes in some African countries that relied on American funding.

The State Department's new global health strategy requires recipient governments to share responsibility by increasing their own health spending, with the goal of building durable systems that can eventually be self-reliant. It is, for example, contributing $1.6bn to the overall deal with Kenya - with the East African nation pledging $850m over five years.

The Trump administration hopes that partnering with national leaderships will improve on traditional donor-NGO relationships which it says created dependency, led to parallel delivery arrangements and sucked up aid dollars in overhead costs.

"Our aid to those countries will not just be dollars distributed to an NGO who then will go into the country and impose programmes," Rubio told a congressional committee last month.

"Not only are we treating the acute situations on the ground of people that are sick, we are helping them build the capacity and the capability to do this for themselves."

But the result is a shift away from a model of global cooperation anchored in the World Health Organization (WHO), to direct agreements with individual governments that are tied to US strategic and commercial interests.

The US withdrew from the WHO early this year saying it was unfair that Washington provided so much more funding than other countries and alleging that the organisation mismanaged the Covid-19 crisis, lacked transparency, and was susceptible to political influence.

Controversially, the American bilateral deals come with an explicit promise to prioritise US pharmaceuticals and medical firms to develop and deliver treatments.

"Our global health foreign assistance programme is not just aid - it is a strategic mechanism to further our bilateral interests around the world," says the policy document.

Thirty-two countries had accepted the health Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) by mid-May, in Latin America, the Caribbean and at least 20 in Africa. But some - such as Ghana, Zimbabwe and Zambia - have resisted signing up, citing different reasons.

In Zambia, Foreign Minister Mulambo Haimbe criticised what he described as an American effort to link health funding to US economic interests by connecting the deal to a separate agreement giving Washington access to critical minerals.

"Our [US] colleagues looked at it from the perspective that [the two deals] must be taken as a package to be negotiated and concluded at one particular time," he told the BBC, saying the Zambian government wanted to discuss them separately on their own merits.

"The US felt that there is need for there to be a preferential treatment in the use of critical minerals. And the framework was to reflect that," he added.

The State Department stopped short of explicitly linking the two when questioned by the BBC but offered a robust "America First" response.

"The Trump administration has made clear, US foreign assistance is not charity - rather it is strategic capital to be wisely invested to advance US interests - and we expect all of our allies and recipient nations to take seriously American strategic and commercial priorities," a department spokesperson said.

Last month provided further evidence of this readiness to tie health financing to American priorities - with the announcement that the US would withdraw completely from funding HIV/Aids programmes in South Africa.

An administration official connected the move to Pretoria's "failure to make demonstrable progress on policy requests", including apparently the treatment of the white-minority Afrikaner community. US claims that a "white genocide" is taking place in South Africa have been widely discredited.

For some African countries who were negotiating the bilateral MOUs, it was concerns over US access to health data which set alarm bells ringing. This included patients' information as well as biological resources known as pathogens - organisms that cause disease such as viruses, bacteria and parasites.

A Kenyan court initially suspended the country's deal after legal challenges demanding protection of patient privacy.

Arnold Kavaarpuo, executive director of Ghana's Data Protection Commission, told the BBC the government in Accra had objected to the deal it was offered for similar reasons.

"We had concerns around the scope and breadth of data that was being required," he said.

"It was us generating data and passing it on to the US authorities, and there were no real reciprocal measures when it comes to the protection of Ghanaian data and Ghanaian sovereignty.

"And so from our perspective," he added, "once the data left the Ghanaian borders, we had no control over what becomes of it."

Zimbabwe also cited concerns about requests for medical data, presumably to be shared with US pharmaceutical companies, as the reason it rejected a deal.

There were no guarantees that drugs or vaccines developed from the pathogens would be available to its people, a government spokesman said, pointing out that the WHO already had a system for members to share data and benefit from any treatments in future pandemics.

African countries have previously passed on medical information through existing schemes including USAID and Pepfar, America's main programme to tackle HIV and Aids.

The US insists the sharing of data and specimens is key to continuing scientific development and mutual co-operation.

And a State Department spokesperson said the material requested was the same aggregated and de-identified data which has been used for years in the fight against infectious diseases.

What has changed is the context, says Nelson Aghogho Evaborhene, a PhD fellow in global health governance at Roskilde University in Denmark.

"It was an unequal relationship, but it was quite tolerable politically," he says, "because you could sell it to the domestic population as an altruistic need to improve health service.

"But now it has changed significantly, because it's more about very transactional leverage."

Many African nations have also drawn lessons from Covid, as the race to find a vaccine proved the value of pathogen data but left the continent struggling to get doses for its people.

"I think one of our biggest opportunities as Africa," says Aggrey Aluso, the executive director of Resilience Action Network Africa (Rana), "is the fact that we have important information that can help build the global health security ecosystem."

Rana joined more than 50 civil society groups in signing an open letter warning African leaders that US terms were not guided by African national or regional interests, a view shared by South Africa.

"Frankly speaking, no nation on Earth that respects itself should accede to [two requests]," South Africa's Health Minister Dr Aaron Motsoaledi told the BBC.

"That [the US] will get their pathogen if there's any pandemic or epidemic in their area.

"And they'll also provide them with a genome for life. But the US is going to give them money for five years."

The debate over health diplomacy has been thrown into sharper relief in recent weeks following the spread of a new outbreak of Ebola in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

DR Congo was one of the first countries to accept the new American health deals - and the US says the agreement is helping co-ordinate Kinshasa's response to the crisis.

But, according to humanitarian workers and former US health officials, sweeping US aid cuts to DR Congo and to the WHO seriously weakened the front-line response.

Amadou Bocoum, the DR Congo country director for the international humanitarian organisation Care, says he had to lay off 36 workers - a third of his staff - after USAID cuts, including those responsible for community mobilisation, health education and Ebola prevention.

"When this new Ebola came, the staffing was not there, and the emergency stock that we also used to have was also not there," he says.

"With proper funding, we would have had prepositioned stock and begun distributing critical supplies like PPE from day one, but instead, we started with nothing and lost 10 days."

Critics describe the dismantling of the USAID as a blow to the speed of detecting the Ebola outbreak and the scale of response, emphasising that the humanitarian agency was crucial to organising logistics, supplies and local outreach.

"I just cannot imagine that if you still had the full slate of health partners that the US government was funding in Congo up until [the cuts] shut most of that down, that no-one would have seen that an unidentified viral haemorrhagic fever was spreading," adds Jeremy Konyndyk, who led the USAID response to the 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa.

The US denies its cuts have harmed efforts this time, arguing that they are more "aligned and effective" under the new arrangement and pointing to the $270m it has donated to tackle the epidemic.

Underpinning the US deals is the administration's desire to encourage national governments to spend more of their own money on their health services - observers say there is a poor record of this in Africa, despite a continental commitment to do so in 2001.

Reuters Congolese medical workers in blue personal protective equipment (PPE) sanitise pink and blue rubber gloves in buckets at Ebola treatment centre in Bunia. Gloves already washed dry upright on sticks spoked into the grass.Reuters

The US has donated $270m to tackle the current outbreak of Ebola

But others warn that the Ebola outbreak has highlighted the risks of a bilateral approach to global health.

"Bilateral relationships ignore collective challenges," says Dr Kevin DeCock, a former director at the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) who worked for many years at the forefront of battling infectious disease.

"Global health, by definition, is transnational, crosses borders, does not concern just one country. Global health problems require global approaches, and no country can go it alone."

Some health and foreign policy analysts have made a case for giving the administration's new strategy a chance.

In an article for conservative think-tank the American Enterprise Institute, Brett Schaefer and Roger Bate acknowledge the risk of stepping away from the multilateral system, especially the withdrawal from the WHO.

But this "is not the end of American leadership in global health", they write. "It is the start of a test - of whether influence is better exercised through conditional engagement, parallel institutions and results-driven partnerships than through deference to an organisation that has struggled to learn from failure."

Evidence so far is that months on from Rubio's excited signing of the first MOU, adoption of the bilateral agreements in Africa remains patchy and controversial.

Tanzania has just signed up to the partnership, yet with several African nations saying thanks but no thanks, it remains to be seen how far the reshaping of America's global health strategy will go.