Sabotage to Spying: How Israel-IAEA Nexus Sought to Derail Iran’s Nuclear Program
Monday, 16 June 2025 5:32 AM
By Alireza Akbari
On June 8, Behrouz Kamalvandi, deputy head and spokesman for Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI), in a TV interview, pointed to a “high likelihood” of sabotage behind the presence of uranium particles at two locations near Tehran — Varamin and Turquzabad.
Kamalvandi was responding to recent accusations leveled by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concerning uranium traces found at the two locations.
Referring to a long history of hostile measures targeting Iran’s nuclear program, including cyber attacks, industrial sabotage, and the assassinations of nuclear scientists, he said: “From our point of view, this was very likely.”
He also stressed that the type of contamination found was neither rare nor enriched.
“The contamination observed during these inspections by the Agency’s inspectors can be found anywhere, and according to the Agency’s own report, the material was not enriched,” the official stressed.
Kamalvandi’s comments came in direct response to a nine-page IAEA report issued on 26 February 2025, titled “NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran” (document code GOV/2025/10).
The report, divided into five sections, addressed a range of compliance issues, with Section C focusing on what the UN nuclear agency described as “outstanding safeguards issues” — namely, Iran’s alleged "failure to declare nuclear activities" at the Varamin and Turquzabad sites.
The IAEA report described Varamin as an “undeclared pilot-scale plant used between 1999 and 2003 for the processing and milling of uranium ore and conversion into uranium oxide and, at laboratory scale, into UF4 and UF6.”
Turquzabad, meanwhile, was characterized as a site “involved in the storage of nuclear material and/or equipment.”
In its own June 2023 response, Iran rejected the basis of these claims, stating that it had “exhausted all its efforts to discover the origin of such particles,” and maintained that “there has not been any nuclear activity or storage in these locations.”
Kamalvandi reiterated this position during his televised remarks, pointing to the country’s security services uncovering leads that strongly suggest Israeli sabotage.
“After speaking with Iran’s security officials, leads were discovered suggesting the possibility of sabotage at the two locations near Tehran,” he said.
According to Kamalvandi, it was following this internal assessment that Massimo Aparo, Deputy Director General and Head of the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards, was formally invited to Iran.
Aparo arrived in Tehran on April 27, 2023, at the head of a delegation and held a series of discussions with Kamalvandi focused on technical and safeguards-related matters, as confirmed by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’s public relations office in late April 2025.
Kamalvandi stated that nearly seven to eight hours were spent presenting Aparo with detailed information supporting the sabotage, including video footage.
Aparo, he said, acknowledged the coherence of the evidence.
“Yes, these pieces of information are consistent, but I can’t set aside my previous assessments based on them… I cannot bring the likelihood of the matter under question.
Kamalvandi also stated that even quantities “less than a gram” could be enough to produce detectable traces.
Speaking about the IAEA inspectors’ visit to the two locations near Tehran, Kamalvandi raised pointed concerns about how the inspections were conducted.
“When they came to Turquzabad, something seemed very odd to us. We saw them point a laser at one wall, then at another, and then go directly to one particular spot and take samples. Well, naturally, whoever contaminated the area also gave them the coordinates and said: go check that spot. We brought this up — but of course, they always come up with different excuses.”
In another part of his remarks, Kamalvandi referred to the IAEA’s February report, stating, “This report is a compilation of the same claims that have been raised in recent years. It tries to create the impression that Iran is not cooperating with the Agency.”
Massimo Aparo, Deputy Director General and Head of the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards (C)
He also criticized the way the IAEA obtains its information, saying the agency is being "steered with fabricated intelligence — a form of false allegations that are clearly designed to serve political objectives.”
According to Kamalvandi, the IAEA receives information through three channels: first, information directly provided by Iran; second, the agency’s own data; and third, information from open sources and third parties.”
It is this third category that Kamalvandi called into question.
“This third-party channel is still not entirely acceptable. A third party could be a spying source providing information that isn’t necessarily accurate.”
Kamalvandi’s remarks came shortly after Iran submitted a formal protest to the IAEA in early June, responding to the UN nuclear agency’s February report on the presence of nuclear particles at what it described as Iran’s “undeclared nuclear sites.”
In a 19-page legal memorandum, Tehran rejected the IAEA’s claims as “false, repetitive, and slanderous.”
The document, prepared by Iranian diplomats and dated June 3, criticized IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi for presenting inaccurate and recycled claims regarding Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities.
Contrary to the UN agency’s claims that Iran had not fully cooperated, the legal note stated that Iran continues to engage with the IAEA under the framework of its safeguards obligations.
Iran emphasized that the IAEA is routinely conducting comprehensive verification activities across the country in full alignment with the declared scope of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle.
Iran also stressed the need for objective and reliable reporting, urging the IAEA to base its assessments exclusively on credible and authenticated sources.
“It is a well-established expectation that the agency’s assessments be based solely on verified, credible, and undisputed sources. Reliance on unverified information from open sources or information provided by third parties known to the Secretariat is inconsistent with the principles of objectivity, impartiality, and professionalism that underpin the Agency’s mandate.”
The note reiterated that “all of the country’s nuclear materials and activities have been fully declared to the IAEA and verified by it,” and noted that Iran had undertaken efforts to determine the source of the particles in question.
Following the release of Iran’s explanatory note, Reza Najafi, Iran’s representative to the Vienna-based organizations, publicly addressed Grossi’s latest claims.
Reza Najafi, Iran’s representative to the IAEA,
He challenged the basis of the accusations, stating, “The mere presence of uranium particles does not indicate nuclear activity.”
Najafi added that Iran’s security services had obtained intelligence pointing to espionage operations at specific sites and had shared this information with the IAEA.
“It’s likely that some of the uranium traces are the result of acts of sabotage,” he said.
Najafi further maintained that “all accusations about Iran’s nuclear program are politically motivated” and warned, “We will respond to every political move made by the agency.”
These remarks were quickly followed by a notable escalation in the diplomatic back-and-forth. On June 9, during a press conference at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Grossi responded to Iran’s recent protest against the Agency’s February report — a report Iran had sharply criticized as relying on “false and repetitive information” about its nuclear activities.
Speaking after the opening day of the IAEA’s quarterly Board of Governors meeting, Grossi publicly accused Iran of obtaining highly confidential documents belonging to the Agency.
“Here, unfortunately, and this dates to a few years ago ... we could determine with all clarity that documents that belong to the Agency were in the hands of Iranian authorities, which is bad,” Grossi said.
“We believe that an action like this is not compatible with the spirit of cooperation.”
Asked whether the documents in question were originally Iranian materials that had been seized by Israel and later shared with the IAEA, Grossi said, “No. We received documents from member states, and we also have our own assessments on documents, on equipment, etc.”
Grossi’s remarks came just one day after Iranian Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib revealed that the Islamic Republic had obtained a vast trove of secret Israeli documents, including nuclear files.
According to Khatib, the documents pertain to the military and nuclear infrastructure of the Israeli regime as well as its relations with the United States and European countries.
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi holds a news conference after the first day of the agency's quarterly Board of Governors meeting at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, June 9, 2025.
With the announcement of Tehran’s intelligence coup, new doubts were raised about whether the IAEA’s “politically motivated stance” toward Iran might be influenced by its ties with the Israeli regime.
These suspicions deepened on Friday, when the IAEA’s 35-member Board of Governors passed a resolution accusing Iran of “non-compliance” with its nuclear obligations.
The four-page resolution — drafted by the United States, Britain, France, and Germany — passed with 19 votes in favour, three against, and 11 abstentions. Russia, China, and Burkina Faso opposed the measure.
In a swift response, Iran released documents that prove Grossi has been operating in full coordination with Israel.
The documents show that the IAEA Director General has not only not acted independently, but rather followed directives issued by the Israeli regime.
According to these documents, Merav Zafary-Odiz, Israel’s Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), formally requested a meeting with Grossi, then Chairman of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), to discuss Israel’s standing within the Group.
“In the context of previous engagement between Israel and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), I would like to request a meeting with you as soon as possible, in your capacity as Chairman of the NSG, in order to discuss Israel's relations with the Group in light of recent developments,” she wrote in a letter dated May 10, 2016.
In a separate leaked email thread from October 6, 2020, political scientist Elai Rettig corresponded with Zafary-Odiz about an upcoming lecture at Washington University.
The documents show that Grossi has followed directives issued by the Israeli officials.
He referenced a point attributed to Grossi, stating that “Israel’s approach to the Iranian issue presents a good example of how smaller states can influence international regimes (NPT, CTBT, etc.), especially when the larger states are divided.”
Rettig continued, “The example he (Grossi) gave was the influence of Israel’s policy on Iran in shaping the global agenda regarding nuclear verification (he said that even the fact that inspectors from the IAEA enter Iranian facilities is largely due to Israeli pressure).”
Zafary-Odiz firmly rejected that characterization. “I do not agree with the framing that Israel has shaped the agenda of the international regimes through manipulation or power,” she responded.
“I would frame it differently — Israel identifies the risks of the Iranian issue, and even if others don’t agree with it, it brings them to the table with strong reasoning and convincing argumentation.”
She further noted the need to find an academic framing for the discussion.
“From my side, it’s natural to talk about the Iranian issue from the perspective of international treaties and agreements Israel is party to.”
