African Integration Beyond Trade - When Africans Become Foreigners in Africa
3 June 2026
allAfrica.com
guest column
By Rachel Gyabaah
In my earlier piece in February, Beyond Preferences and Rhetoric: What Africa's 2025 Integration Moment Really Demanded I argued that Africa's long-term competitiveness would not be secured by waiting on external trade preferences, but by taking integration seriously as an economic project. I called for political will, industrial strategy, and a human-centred approach to the continental vision. I did not expect to be writing a follow-up so soon. But the events of April and May 2026 in South Africa have made this necessary.
Because what is unfolding in the streets of Johannesburg, Durban, and Pretoria is a direct assault on Africa's integration agenda and can’t be seen simply as a South Africa’s issue. African Union, the AfCFTA Secretariat, and every head of state who has ever signed a protocol on the free movement of persons must now answer a simple but devastating question: What exactly are we integrating, if not Africans?
The Burning Streets and the Broken Promise
In April and May 2026, a vigilante movement called March and March organised anti-immigration demonstrations across South Africa's major cities, resulting in attacks on foreign-owned businesses, destruction of livelihoods, and at least one death. As reported by Human Rights Watch, a 43-year-old Cameroonian shopkeeper who had spent nearly two decades in Durban watched a group of men break down his doors during protests targeting foreign-owned shops. He had built a life there. He had become, in every meaningful sense, a resident of the country. It did not matter. He was African but the wrong kind.
Human Rights Watch documented the violence and warned of a new wave of xenophobic attacks, noting that police response was insufficient and in some cases absent. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights issued a formal statement of grave concern, situating the 2026 violence within a long and shameful pattern the 1998 killings in Johannesburg, the Cape Town murders of 2000, the nationwide carnage of 2008 in which over 60 people died and 100,000 were displaced, the 2015 military deployment, and the ongoing harassment of migrants throughout the 2020s by groups such as Operation Dudula. This is not an aberration. This is a pattern. And a pattern demands a structural explanation, not a diplomatic one.
The South African government's response has been, at best, inadequate. President Ramaphosa, speaking on Freedom Day April 27, 2026 offered moving words: "We did not walk alone into freedom. We were carried by a tide of solidarity from the nations of Africa." Yet noble sentiments alone do not rebuild the Cameroonian shopkeeper's door. They do not compensate the Ghanaians who were evacuated on May 27, 2026 the first in what may become a steady retreat of African nationals from a country once celebrated as the continent's economic anchor. South Africa's government went further by publicly denying the xenophobic nature of the attacks, describing them as "isolated incidents." African civil society groups and indeed the evidence rejected that denial outright.
A Continent That Signs Protocols by Day and Tolerates Pogroms by Night
Here is the central contradiction that must be stated plainly: African heads of state have, under the architecture of the African Union and the AfCFTA, committed themselves to creating a single continental market one that includes the free movement of persons, not just goods. The AU's Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, adopted in 2018, envisions an Africa where citizens can live and work anywhere on the continent. The AfCFTA, described as a $3.4 trillion economic integration project, cannot function if the people who are supposed to trade across borders are afraid to cross them.
And yet, according to the latest GovDem Survey of the Inclusive Society Institute, 73 percent of South Africans report not trusting African immigrants "at all" or "not very much." South Africa the country that accounts for over 40 percent of all intra-African trade, the continental powerhouse without whose participation AfCFTA loses much of its gravitational force is also the country where intra-African trade is least safe in human terms.
The African Chamber of Content Producers put it with blunt precision: intra-African trade stands at just 14 percent of total African trade, compared to roughly 60 percent in Asia and Europe. Xenophobia is not merely a moral outrage in this context. It is a structural barrier to integration as consequential as any tariff wall or non-tariff barrier. You cannot have free trade without free movement. You cannot have free movement without safety. And you cannot have safety while your government denies that the attacks are even happening.
The Centre for Global Affairs and Responsible Governance in Accra captured this contradiction sharply: "You cannot champion AfCFTA by day and allow mobs to lynch traders by night. Violence against Africans anywhere is violence against Africa."
What If This Were Europe?
It is worth pausing to ask an uncomfortable comparative question. If vigilante groups in Germany had, over three decades, periodically attacked French, Italian, or Polish shopkeepers burning their businesses, looting their goods, and driving them from their homes, with documented fatalities what would the European Union have done?
The answer is not hypothetical. The EU has invoked Article 7 proceedings against member states for rule-of-law violations that were far less physically violent than what has transpired repeatedly in South Africa. The European Commission has financial tools the ability to withhold structural and cohesion funds to compel compliance with the bloc's foundational norms. There are the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and a mature architecture of accountability that moves slowly but does move.
The African Union, by contrast, is convening its Eighth Mid-Year Coordination Meeting in Cairo on June 24-27, 2026, partly at Ghana's formal request that South Africa's xenophobic attacks be placed on the agenda. That Ghana needed to petition for the matter to be discussed at all rather than it being treated as an automatic breach of continental obligations reveals a profound gap in the AU's enforcement architecture. The AU's aspiration for integration is real. Its mechanisms for holding member states accountable to that aspiration remain, in too many cases, aspirational themselves.
This is not an argument for supranational punishment. It is about ensuring that the commitments we make as a continent are reflected in practice. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has expressed concern, the UN Secretary-General raised his voice, civil society across the continent has demanded action. What has been missing is a commensurate, structural institutional response one that makes clear that a member state's domestic policy of tolerance toward anti-foreigner violence is incompatible with its continental commitments.
The petition filed in Accra on May 31, 2026, calling for the AU to review the continued suitability of the AfCFTA Secretary-General a South African national for his position is a symptom of this frustration. Whether or not one agrees with the petition's remedy, its logic is instructive: when a country's conduct fundamentally contradicts the values of a continental institution, the institution cannot appear indifferent. Indifference is its own statement.
The Ubuntu Paradox and the Path Forward
There is a word that South Africa gave to the world: ubuntu the philosophy that a person is a person through other people, that humanity is constituted through relationship and mutual recognition. President Ramaphosa himself invoked it in his Freedom Day address. The paradox is almost too painful to articulate: a nation that exported ubuntu to the world has struggled, across three decades of democracy, to extend basic dignity to African migrants within its own borders.nBut this is not ultimately a South African problem to solve alone. It is a continental governance failure that requires a continental governance response.
The 2025 African Integration Report was clear: Africa's integration is stalled not by lack of vision but by competing national interests, limited political accountability, and the absence of effective mechanisms to address asymmetries between member states. Xenophobia is the most violent expression of those competing national interests the zero-sum logic that says African solidarity ends at the border. If the AU and AfCFTA cannot name that logic and challenge it, then the integration project is building on sand.
What is required is not more declarations. It is architecture. The AU must develop a binding monitoring and sanctions framework for xenophobic violence not as a punitive tool, but as a deterrent and accountability mechanism, the way the EU's rule-of-law conditionality functions. AfCFTA's implementation roadmap must explicitly address the free movement of persons as a trade-enabling condition, not a long-term aspiration starting by making the ratification of the AU Free Movement Protocol, which has been gathering dust since 2018, a prerequisite for full AfCFTA participation. And South Africa as the continent's largest economy, as a country whose liberation was bankrolled by African solidarity, as a signatory to every relevant continental framework must be held, with respect and firmness, to its obligations.
Ghana's Foreign Affairs Minister Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa was right to take the matter to the AU. But the question now is whether Cairo will produce accountability or choreography. Because Africans watching from Lagos, Nairobi, Accra, and Dakar are drawing their own conclusions. And the conclusion they are drawing is that the integrated Africa of Agenda 2063 is not yet a place where an African from Cameroon can build a shop, serve a community, and feel safe.
That is the gap between our protocols and our reality. Until we close it, AfCFTA will remain what too much of Africa's integration has been: a magnificent aspiration undermined by the failure of political will and in this case, the failure of basic human solidarity.
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Rachel Gyabaah is a Development Practitioner.
This article is a follow-up to "Beyond Preferences and Rhetoric: What Africa's 2025 Integration Moment Really Demanded and Beyond," published in The Business & Financial Times, February 2026. https://thebftonline.com/2026/02/18/beyond-preferences-and-rhetorics-what-africas-2025-integration-moment-really-demanded-and-beyond/
References: Human Rights Watch (May 2026) https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/05/20/south-africa-new-waves-of-xenophobic-attacks
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (April 2026) https://achpr.au.int/en/news/press-releases/2026-04-27/xenophobic-attacks-and-vigilante-conduct-perpetrated-nationals-other
GovDem Survey, Inclusive Society Institute (2025) https://www.inclusivesociety.org.za/post/rising-distrust-govdem-survey-shows-sharp-increase-in-anti-immigration-sentiment-in-south-africa
African Chamber of Content Producers statement (May 2026) https://www.spotlightinafrica.com/post/intra-african-trade-to-boost-the-continent-s-economy-by-450billion
Centre for Global Affairs and Responsible Governance, Accra (April 2026) https://www.myjoyonline.com/xenophobia-centre-for-global-affairs-and-responsible-governance-urges-au-intervention-in-south-africa/
South African DIRCO statement (May 2026)
African Integration Report 2025, African Union
AfricanVibes (April 2026).
