Thursday, August 13, 2026

Congo’s Fastest-growing Ebola Outbreak Reaches a Sixth Province

2:24 PM EDT, August 13, 2026

KINSHASA, Congo (AP) — Congo’s Ebola outbreak has spread to a sixth province after a death was recorded in the previously unaffected Bas-Uele province, the head of Africa’s CDC said Thursday.

The man died in Buta, the capital of Bas-Uele, after traveling there from Isiro in Haut-Uele province, said Jean Kaseya, director general of Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention.

He was a motorcycle-taxi driver who had sought treatment at several hospitals before he died, Jean-Jacques Muyembe, head of Congo’s National Institute for Biomedical Research, said. His colleagues tried to forcibly take his dead body, prompting police intervention and concerns that more people may have been exposed to the virus, Muyembe added.

The outbreak in eastern Congo, considered the fastest-growing one yet, is on track to surpass the deadliest one in history, which erupted over a decade ago and killed over 11,000 people, the World Health Organization said Wednesday. There are no approved vaccines or treatments for the rare Bundibugyo virus responsible for the current outbreak.

It has killed over 2,100 people out of more than 4,500 cases, according to the latest government figures. This death toll has been reached almost three times faster than in the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak in West Africa — the worst in history.

The outbreak is unfolding in some of the most challenging conditions imaginable, with strikes by some unpaid health workers, threats by rebel groups, anger from long-traumatized communities and misinformation asserting that Ebola isn’t real.

Bas-Uele is a vast province in northeastern Congo that borders the Central African Republic, where there is recurring armed violence that has forced thousands to flee and take refuge in the province. Access can be difficult due to bad and poorly connected roads as well as limited communication networks, and there are frequent population movements related to gold mining and displacement from conflict.

As of Thursday, six out of 26 of Congo’s provinces have been impacted. About 90% of all cases and 80% of deaths are concentrated in Ituri province, the WHO said Wednesday.

Mercy Corps, an aid group, warned Thursday that Ebola cases have been reported along a major travel route about 35 kilometers (22 miles) from Congo’s border with South Sudan, expressing concern over the outbreak’s “widening footprint.” No cases have been confirmed in South Sudan so far.

Unpaid health workers’ strikes and low contact tracing hamper response

Meanwhile, health workers at the Nizi Treatment Center in Ituri province, one of the most affected in the area, went on strike Thursday, leading to the temporary closure of the center after they said they have not been paid for three months.

Kaseya on Thursday called on the Congolese government to pay the outstanding salaries.

“We need to pay health workers,” he told reporters. “This is the responsibility of the government, not partners. And they told us that money is available.”

The real scope of the outbreak remains unknown. It was declared on May 15, but the WHO now says sequencing showed it began months earlier, in February.

Health authorities have said between 60% and 70% of new cases are recorded outside contacts being monitored, and that the disease is spreading at an “alarming” rate. Contact tracing helps break chains of transmission by finding exposed people early and reacting quickly if they show symptoms.

“We are chasing the virus; the virus is ahead of us,” the WHO regional director for Africa, Dr. Mohamed Yakub Janabi, said this week.

On Thursday, Kaseya from Africa CDC said “the concept of contact tracing in DRC has become useless.”

Trials for treatments and vaccines are underway

Ebola is rare but highly contagious and can be contracted from bodily fluids such as vomit, blood or semen, and from contaminated surfaces and materials such as bedding and clothing. The disease it causes is severe and often fatal.

Clinical trials of two possible treatments for this type of Ebola began last month in Ituri, the most affected of the five provinces in Congo where cases have been reported.

Two vaccines developed specifically for the Bundibugyo virus are now being tested in people for the first time, the WHO said Wednesday.

WHO also plans to test whether an existing Ebola vaccine could protect people against the virus after studies in animals showed promising results.

Kaseya said on Thursday that the Africa CDC supports the use of Ervebo, a vaccine authorized against the Zaire Ebola strain in provinces impacted by Bundibugyo virus. He said some studies show some cross-protection from the available vaccines.

“We are in a gray area,” he said. “And when you are in a gray area, you have to make strong decisions to stop seeing people dying.”

___

Associated Press reporters Constant Same Bagalwa in Bunia, Congo, Justin Kabumba in Goma, Congo and Jean-Yves Kamale in Kinshasa contributed.

Nigeria and Mozambique Show How Health Systems Can Withstand Funding Cuts

Yagazie Emezi/Acasus

Health workers in Sokoto, Nigeria.

12 August 2026

allAfrica.com

By Melody Chironda

For decades, many health programmes across sub-Saharan Africa have relied on a familiar model: donors fund disease-specific projects, parallel delivery structures are built around them, and services expand or contract with the funding cycle.

That model is now under pressure.

As bilateral aid shrinks, countries that have relied heavily on external financing are confronting the vulnerabilities created by fragmented systems. But experiences in Nigeria and Mozambique suggest that resilience may not always require replacing every dollar lost. In some cases, it may begin with changing how existing resources are organised.

In both countries, local health leaders have been testing approaches that put governments more firmly in control, integrate services and financing, and reduce duplication between programmes and partners.

The results point to a broader lesson: when health systems are designed around government priorities rather than individual funding streams, they may be better equipped to absorb financial shocks.

Moving beyond "siloed" aid

Nigeria's experience is fast becoming a reference point for how countries can strengthen their health systems by taking greater ownership of financing and delivery, even as global donor funding grows less certain.

Folake Oni, Project Director for Nigeria at Acasus, said that the shift is built on two pillars: consolidating fragmented, donor-driven projects into a single government-led architecture, and expanding domestic financing for primary healthcare.

"There are two key things that stand out just from our perspective on what Nigeria has done differently to strengthen its health system," she said. The first is "shifting from where you have siloed disease-specific donor-funded projects towards a single government-owned sort of architecture."

That shift, Oni said, began roughly three years ago when Nigeria's sitting president launched the Health Sector Renewal Investment Initiative (NHSRII) and signed a compact with states, donors, and partners. Under the new approach, projects are implemented through what she called a "sector-wide approach that pulls domestic resources, donor aid, or donor funding under one government-led plan." This replaced the old model of "parallel, siloed, disease-specific donor-funded programs," which left health gains vulnerable whenever a donor pulled out or funding froze.

The second pillar is domestic resourcing.

In Nigeria, this sits under the Basic Healthcare Provision Fund, which Oni described as having "become like the backbone of primary healthcare financing in Nigeria." The government contributes 1% of its consolidated revenue fund toward strengthening primary healthcare, with financing structured to be performance-based - pushing facilities to be more accountable to the communities they serve and more motivated to improve.

Funding cuts expose vulnerabilities

The stakes of this shift became clear in Sokoto State, in northern Nigeria, where donor funding cuts, particularly from USAID, hit malaria programming hard. "Malaria progress stalled," Oni said, "because the system relied a lot on that funding. We saw stockouts of nets, of commodities, of malaria commodities and medicines."

But in that same period, she said, a state-led primary healthcare reform was taking hold. It was built around government ownership, integrated financing through a program called IMPACT, real-time data visibility, and local accountability. The results, according to Oni, were striking: stock-outs of family planning commodities fell from 43% to 22% in just six months between January and June. Maternal delivery infrastructure improved, and the number of women using modern family planning methods rose 24%, from roughly 40,000 to over 50,000.

The difference, Oni said, was government ownership.

"When donor funding freezes, it risks the continuity of those programmes and reverses the hard-won gains." 

"It's not so much just about the funding being cut," she said. "It is also the lesson that we're learning from there," that a government-owned, data-driven system can absorb external shocks without collapsing.

A resilient health system, she said, should be able to absorb reductions in external funding without services collapsing.

"We're not saying donor funding is not important,"  Oni said. "But we're saying when it freezes or when it reduces, it's not fatal to the system. The system is still able to withstand those shocks and is even ready to do more and deliver more impact."

Oni also highlighted the importance of increasing domestic production of medicines and vaccines as countries seek greater control over their health systems.

"You want to make sure that the resources that you need are available from within, because that way you are more resilient," she said. "You're not dependent on any external forces or... external resourcing that you don't have influence or control over."

However, she cautioned that local pharmaceutical and vaccine manufacturing requires strong government leadership, adequate investment and coordination among governments, donors and other partners.

Government ownership of that goal is a prerequisite, she said, along with coalition-building among donors and partners to align on shared metrics for success.

"If you want to do local medicines manufacturing or local vaccine manufacturing, government has to own that goal," she said.

Nigeria has discussed several initiatives aimed at strengthening domestic manufacturing, although Oni said some of these efforts remain at the design, discussion and resourcing stages. She said that partners and donors could still play an important role by aligning behind government priorities rather than creating parallel systems.

Ultimately, she said, implementation will determine whether those ambitions become reality.

Government, donors and implementing partners will need to work as a coalition, agree on measurable outcomes and commit the resources needed to achieve them, she said. "Everyone will commit to delivering those outcomes, to resourcing the delivery of those outcomes and would be accountable to the metrics that are being tracked to ensure success," said Oni.

She also challenged the idea that malaria should continue to be treated as a standalone programme.

In Nigeria, where malaria is endemic, people often assume that fever or headache is malaria without first being tested, Oni said. Rather than describing this as a misconception, she called it a deeply established attitude towards a disease that has been part of everyday life for generations.

The answer, she argued, lies in integrating malaria more firmly into primary healthcare.

"Not thinking of malaria as a standalone program, but building it into the primary healthcare system that is already strengthening," she said.

That means ensuring malaria remains a priority when investments are made in primary healthcare, while integrating services and strengthening accountability at the local level.

"If that is in place and everyone has that understanding, then Nigeria will be strongly positioned to address the malaria gap that we see," she said.

For countries facing shrinking external resources, Nigeria's experience suggests that resilience may depend less on replacing every lost dollar of donor funding and more on building systems that make better use of the resources they control.

The challenge now is to ensure that reforms designed to strengthen country ownership translate into sustained financing, effective implementation, and better health outcomes for communities that remain furthest from care.

Fixing fragmentation, not just funding

Mozambique is showing how better coordination between government and health partners can help protect essential services when international funding comes under pressure. Local leaders proved that severe financial constraints do not have to mean a decline in life-saving care. Rather than accepting reductions in community visits, provincial health authorities restructured how external aid and local resources operate on the ground.

Mauro Cuna, who has spent nearly eight years with Acasus in Mozambique helping the government strengthen its immunization systems, said the 2025 USAID funding cuts hit malaria, HIV, tuberculosis, and immunization programs across the country.

But in Tete Province, government leaders took a different approach: rather than allowing reduced funding to further fragment services, they looked at how existing resources could be used more efficiently.

"The main issue wasn't just the lack of money - it was the fact that we weren't working together. Fragmentation was the core challenge."

The province was already home to multiple partners supporting different health programmes. One organisation might finance immunisation, another nutrition, another malaria, and another family planning. Yet many of them were sending government health workers to the same communities at different times.

Tete's leadership realised that better coordination could allow the province to stretch the resources that remained.

The first step was to create a single plan so that different programmes could reach communities together, rather than making repeated visits.

Cuna said this helped address what is known in public health as "community fatigue" - when communities are repeatedly asked to participate in separate health activities. "If all these programmes go out at the same time, it's much easier," he said. "It avoids the community fatigue."

The fix was a single, shared visit schedule.

The province also began combining resources. Instead of different programmes hiring separate vehicles to reach the same communities, health workers from different programmes could travel together.

The savings could then be redirected towards other needs, including allowances for vaccinators and technicians working in the field and community mobilisation.

The third change involved data. Rather than having different programmes operate separate monitoring systems, the government encouraged partners to use a common system and indicators.

The same principle was applied to meetings. Instead of government officials attending multiple meetings with different partners, Tete's leadership pushed for a single forum where partners could coordinate their activities.

According to Cuna, resolving that fragmentation had an outsized effect: Tete went from reaching 35% of communities to 96% in a single quarter - three times the coverage of the previous period. More children were vaccinated, more women received services, and more children received nutrition products. "Only by unlocking the fragmentation part, having better coordination, was easy to achieve this impact," he said.

While integration may sound straightforward, Cuna said one of the biggest obstacles was uncertainty about what could actually be combined across different funding streams.

Much of the initial barrier, Cuna said, wasn't logistical but a lack of clarity about what was actually allowed. "Everyone around Mozambique was thinking about integration, but no one was actually doing it to show others how to do it."

Tete began by asking practical questions: Could resources from different programmes be pooled? Could a vehicle funded for one programme transport health workers from another? Could partners use the same monitoring system?

Those questions helped uncover opportunities for collaboration.

One reason integration made sense was that different programmes were often targeting the same people. A child receiving a vaccine might also need vitamin A or deworming, for example.

"A child that needs vaccines also needs deworming, needs vitamin A. So, it's the same child," said Cuna.

But he stressed that integration was not driven by partners imposing a new model on government. The provincial leadership remained at the centre, with partners helping facilitate discussions and identify what could be done within existing rules. That distinction, he said, was critical to making the approach work.

Start small, then scale

Cuna believes other African countries facing financial pressures could learn from Mozambique, but he cautioned against spending years designing integration models from the top down.

"Do not start from the top," he said. "I think the best thing we can do is to visit the field to see in practice how it can be done."

Rather than sitting at central level and designing an integration strategy in the abstract, governments should visit communities and see how programmes can work together in practice.

Mozambique started with one province and used its experience to identify the practical "do's and don'ts" of integration.

For other countries, Cuna said the same approach could be applied at an even smaller scale; a single district or local government area could serve as a testing ground.

"Don't spend, like, a year planning how to do integration," he said. "Just do something fast, pick one province. It can be just one district or one LGA in one province and say, 'We will start here.'"

The lesson from Mozambique is therefore not simply about doing more with less. It is about changing how existing resources are organised.

As donor funding becomes less predictable, Cuna argues that governments can strengthen resilience by reducing duplication, coordinating partners and making different health programmes work together around the same communities.

"You learn faster when you do it by learning by doing than when you spend, let's say, a year just planning how to integrate," he said.

From pilot to policy

The global contraction of donor assistance has made one truth undeniable: the era of fragmented, externally funded emergency health programs in Africa is coming to an end. What began as emergency adaptation in provinces like Sokoto in Nigeria and Tete in Mozambique has codified into a permanent, national policy shift.

For Mozambique, what began as a provincial experiment in Tete is now becoming part of a broader national approach.

Cuna said the success of the integrated model has prompted Mozambique's Ministry of Health to recommend integration across provinces, turning what was initially a response to funding constraints into a longer-term strategy for delivering health services.

"Because there were funding cuts, of course, in the past, but this will be the new normal now," he said, pointing to the growing pressure on health funding globally.

Integration is also central to Mozambique's new 2026–2030 health strategy, while the country's agreement with the United States also emphasizes integrated service delivery. For Cuna, that creates an opportunity to build new funding on systems that are already becoming more coordinated.

"What gives me hope is that ... integration, again, is a central piece of that work," he said.

The lesson emerging from Mozambique is not simply that countries can survive funding cuts by doing more with less. It is that the way health programmes are organised can determine how far limited resources go.

For Oni, that lesson extends beyond Mozambique and Nigeria.

She said the disruption to donor funding was forcing countries to confront the risks of relying too heavily on external resources, while also creating greater recognition of the importance of government ownership and sustainable domestic financing.

"The freezing or reduction in the funding donor landscape is helping more and more countries to realise that heavy dependence on donor funding is not sustainable," Oni said.

Both Mozambique and Nigeria, she argued, provide examples of what can happen when governments take ownership, partners align behind a common plan and data is used to identify where resources are most needed.

"In some pockets of countries, like Mozambique, as Mauro has said, in Nigeria, we've started to see what's possible," Oni said.

In Nigeria, even as malaria funding was disrupted, maternal health, family planning and routine immunisation improved in the same geography where broader government-led reforms were underway.

For Oni, the significance lies in what those experiences demonstrate: health systems can continue improving even amid funding shocks when governments have the structures and information needed to coordinate resources effectively.

"What is possible when we have a strong government, when we have one plan under that government, an integrated delivery platform, all partners, all donors aligned behind that platform," he said.

But both experts stressed that agreements and strategies will only matter if they are implemented.

For Oni, government must remain firmly in the driver's seat, bringing partners together around shared goals and ensuring that everyone understands their responsibilities.

"Designs, I don't think Africa has ever lacked great policies and strategy designs," she said. "Implementation is usually where we then need to bring the same creativity that we bring to the design."

That implementation requires strong government leadership, coordinated partnerships, functioning data systems, clear metrics and accountability.

Cuna similarly emphasised the importance of giving provinces and local governments the capacity to turn national commitments into action, arguing that integration must be visible in planning, data-sharing and coordination at the level where services are actually delivered.

For Oni, the ultimate prize goes beyond simply protecting existing programmes.

A stronger, more integrated health system could allow countries to reach more people with scarce resources while creating a foundation for future innovations, including new technologies and artificial intelligence.

"It's only a country or only a health system that is already strong that can even start to think about AI and ... other advanced forms of technology to continue to strengthen the system and deliver health services," she said.

Making MOUs real

The experiences of Mozambique and Nigeria therefore point to a broader shift in how health systems may need to operate in an era of tighter international funding: less fragmentation, stronger government ownership, better coordination and greater visibility of what is happening at the last mile.

For Cuna, Mozambique's experience offers a simple lesson for countries considering the same path: start small, learn from implementation and scale what works. For Oni, the evidence from both countries offers something equally important - proof that resilience is possible.

Cuna described how, even before formal MOUs existed, partnerships were already forming at the sub-national and sub-provincial level, driven largely by planning needs. He said the emerging Mozambique MOU places heavy emphasis on integrated delivery, but stressed that integration also has to be made visible: partners need to share data regularly, for example, linking facility supervision data with mobile outreach data, so that execution of the plan can actually be tracked and improved. His third point was coordination itself: strengthening provincial-level capacity to plan and execute, particularly given Mozambique's decentralized structure of government.

"We've seen what's possible," he said. "It's been done in some geographies, we've seen results, and that is now fueling the motivation and reassuring us that this is possible and it can be done if we all align behind it."

Oni laid out what she sees as the necessary conditions, in sequence. First is ownership: "There has to be an owner; there needs to be a strong owner, and that's always the government," she said, with government "in the driver's seat" responsible for assembling the coalition. Second is partner coordination - government must determine who belongs at the table, who brings the right expertise and shares the same goals, and then actively coordinate that coalition. Third is data and technology: aligned data systems are what make gaps and opportunities visible to both government and its partners, enabling more realistic, resource-aware planning. Fourth, once integration is underway, the coalition needs shared metrics for success, with clear ownership of who tracks and reports on what. And finally, accountability - everyone in the coalition needs to understand what they're accountable for, and hold up their end of it.

"Government being in the driver's seat, government-led reform, government-driven reform, with integration at the center of it", she said, is what ties all of it together.

Tanzania: Govt Reshapes Laws to Attract Tech Investment

Capital FM

Artificial intelligence has moved from the fringes of financial technology into the everyday trading environment.

11 August 2026

Tanzania Daily News (Dar es Salaam)

By Wilson Malima

Dar es Salaam — THE government is reshaping its investment laws around artificial intelligence and the digital economy, seeking to attract technology-driven businesses and strengthen its position as a competitive destination for global investors.

The legal reforms, which will cover legislation governing digital financial transactions, electronic commerce, company operations and public-private partnerships (PPPs), are intended to provide greater regulatory certainty for businesses while improving the investment climate, Constitution and Legal Affairs Minister Juma Homera said.

"As the global economy becomes increasingly digital, Tanzania must ensure that its legal framework evolves accordingly," Homera said in an interview on the sidelines of the Africa50 General Shareholders Meeting in Dar es Salaam. "We are reviewing our laws so they support innovation, investment and the use of emerging technologies, including Artificial Intelligence."

The reforms come as governments across Africa compete to attract technology firms and digital infrastructure investment by updating regulations to accommodate AI, fintech and e-commerce while balancing innovation with consumer protection.

Homera said the review includes the Public-Private Partnership Act, the Companies Act and financial legislation to facilitate digital transactions, support electronic commerce and improve the legal environment for technology-enabled businesses.

Legal certainty has become increasingly important for investors as businesses rely more heavily on digital platforms for payments, trade and service delivery, he said, adding that the government aims to establish regulations that encourage innovation while safeguarding both investors and consumers.

The legal review forms part of Tanzania's broader Vision 2050 strategy, which envisages the private sector implementing more than 78 per cent of the country's long-term development agenda through increased investment and public-private collaboration.

Homera said Tanzania is also studying countries that have successfully integrated digital payment systems into their economies, citing gains in revenue collection, financial inclusion and business efficiency as lessons that could support the country's digital transformation.

Beyond legislative reforms, the government plans to strengthen digital skills and artificial intelligence capabilities to ensure Tanzanians are equipped to participate in an increasingly technology-driven global economy.

Homera said the government has also begun translating laws into Kiswahili to improve public access to justice, while the wider legal overhaul is expected to remove regulatory bottlenecks, improve the ease of doing business and create a more predictable environment for domestic and foreign investors.

The reforms underscore Tanzania's effort to modernise its legal framework as digital technologies reshape investment, commerce and public services across the continent.

Read the original article on Daily News.

Race to Find Ebola Vaccine As DR Congo Outbreak Kills More Than 2,000

Daniel Elombat/WHO

Health workers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

12 August 2026

Radio France Internationale

By RFI

The latest outbreak of Ebola has killed more than 2,000 people in the Democratic Republic of Congo, according to health authorities. Meanwhile, international efforts have been stepped up to test a vaccine for the highly contagious haemorrhagic fever.

According to figures released on Tuesday by Congolese health authorities, 2,011 people have died in the latest outbreak, out of 4,381 confirmed cases of the virus.

The latest toll puts it close behind the DRC's deadliest Ebola outbreak to date in 2018 to 2020, when nearly 2,300 people died out of 3,500 recorded cases.

The DRC's 17th surge of the highly contagious disease, the current outbreak is already considered the largest in the country's history "and could well become the largest outbreak ever", Sania Nishtar, chief executive of the Gavi global vaccine alliance, has said.

Concentrated in the DRC's eastern and northeastern regions, it was declared on 15 May but is thought to have been spreading for several weeks before then.

The surge began in northeastern Ituri province and spread to several other provinces, notably North Kivu, regions subject to years of conflict where health infrastructure and a state presence are largely lacking.

Response criticised

The case fatality rate of the current outbreak is estimated by Congolese health authorities to be 45.9 percent.

"We haven't reached the peak yet," Health Minister Samuel Roger Kamba said in an interview shared on social media by his ministry on Tuesday.

"Within the next three months, we expect to have already brought the spread under control and to start seeing it decline," he added.

Insecurity due to the presence of armed groups and mistrust of the local population have hampered the response to the outbreak in the affected regions.

"We are only seeing 30 percent (of infected people), where 70 percent of people are dying at home. This is why this Ebola is different," Mohamed Yakub Janabi, the World Health Organization's regional director for Africa, told reporters in Ituri's provincial capital, Bunia, on Monday.

Congolese virologist Jean-Jacques Muyembe, who helped discover Ebola in 1976, said in an interview with Tuesday's Le Monde newspaper that the response had been "slow and ineffective".

"There is an internal problem at the level of the national coordination of the response," he said.

"Everyone wanted to show they were doing something, even though nothing had actually been organised."

Vaccine trials underway

On Friday, WHO vaccine experts recommended a full-scale human trial of the only existing approved Ebola vaccine to see if it offered cross-protection against the strain of Ebola currently spreading in the DRC, against which no specific vaccine currently exists.

The Ervebo vaccine has proved safe and efficacious against the more common Zaire strain of Ebola virus and WHO experts said that early data, notably from animal trials, showed it may also give some protection against the rare Bundibugyo strain exploding in the DRC.

The Gavi global vaccine alliance - set up in 2000 to help developing countries acquire affordable vaccines - maintains a stockpile of 500,000 Ervebo doses.

It said doses from the stockpile were to be made available for the trials, with some already in the DRC.

DRC trials experimental treatment for rare Ebola strain as outbreak worsens

Two potential Bundibugyo vaccines are in the early stages of clinical trials on humans, while a third is being worked on to bring it to that stage.

The United States announced last Wednesday that it had allocated more than $242 million (€209 million) in additional funding to combat the worsening outbreak.

The new funding brings direct US financial assistance in response to the outbreak to more than $500 million (€433 million), the State Department said, underlining that the United States remained "the largest financial contributor to the Ebola response".

Ebola is spread by contact with bodily fluids and causes a haemorrhagic fever. It has killed more than 15,000 people in Africa in the last 50 years.

The WHO emergency committee is set to meet to discuss the epidemic next Tuesday.

(with AFP)

Read or Listen to this story on the RFI website.

Federal Army Chief Visits Somalia's Embassy in Ankara

12 August 2026

Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)

Ankara — Somali Army Chief Brigadier General Ibrahim Mohamed and a senior military delegation he led visited Somalia's embassy in Ankara, the Somali government said.

The delegation was received by Somalia's ambassador to Türkiye, Ambassador Fathudin Ali Mohamed, along with diplomats from the embassy.

The visit was part of a series of meetings and activities by the Somali military delegation during its visit to Türkiye. Discussions focused on strengthening cooperation between Somalia and Türkiye, particularly in the areas of security and defence.

The two sides also discussed ways to further deepen bilateral ties and expand cooperation in areas of mutual interest.

Read the original article on Shabelle.

Nigeria's Border Closure Failed to Stop Smuggling. Here's Why

12 August 2026

The Conversation Africa (Johannesburg)

analysis

By Onyekachi E. Nnabuihe

Border closures don't always produce the intended objectives. The idea is usually to control illegal movements and prohibited goods, lessen informal trade, reinforce customs operations, and regain control of national borders. But history shows that in cases as diverse as England, the Asante Kingdom, the US and colonial Nigeria/Benin, stiffer border regulations can instead bring about smuggling and multiply criminal networks.

Where people share ethnic, language and kinship ties across state boundaries, closures disrupt everyday livelihood structures. Where state institutions are weak, corruption disrupts the enforcement processes. The rules become a means of private gain. Closures create artificial scarcity, inflate operational hurdles and drive demand towards underground operators and networks.

Nigeria presents a rich case to explain how border closures work in unstructured, corruption-prone and vulnerable economies.

I'm a peace, conflict, security and development researcher with an interest in border and security politics. In a recently published research article we show that Nigeria's 2019 border closure did not disrupt or destroy smuggling networks. It reorganised them. The policy increased informal interactions at checkpoints, multiplied illegal routes, and heightened unrestricted power of poorly supervised state agents.

The closure intensified what has been described as "checkpoint politics". This refers to the exchanges between state officials and non-state actors or border users over who passes and who does not, what moves and what does not, and at what price. It captures how borders actually operate, and challenges the idea that the closure was a success.

The research emphasises the need to reconsider border control approaches by giving closer attention to the local political economy of borderlands.

Nigeria as a border closure case study

Nigeria is a good setting to study the relationship between border closures and smuggling, for six reasons.

One, Nigeria has vast and vulnerable land borders with neighbours, including Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

Two, these borderlands feature communities that have strong ethnic and cultural affinities across the countries. Such include the Hausa in Nigeria and Niger as well as the Yoruba in Nigeria and Benin. These affinities sustain networks of informal exchanges despite state restrictions.

Three, unregulated and illicit trade has long been woven into the fabric of Nigeria's political and economic systems, giving rise to structural black markets and influential industry spaces.

Four, systemic graft among border and security officials has frequently compromised enforcement outcomes while facilitating black markets.

Five, closure policies potentially conflict with regional integration frameworks.

Six, it has actually happened. Nigeria's 2019 border closure sheds light on the consequences of closure policies for smuggling, inflation, local production, security, state legitimacy and regional relations.

The 2019 border closure

In August 2019, the Nigerian government closed its land borders with neighbouring countries, including Benin Republic, to end rampant smuggling (including small arms).

The policy affected many borderlands, including Seme and Idiroko. These borders are among the busiest trade corridors in west Africa.

Some portrayed the policy as a huge success. They claimed it reduced the influx of foreign goods like rice and poultry products. They also said it protected local farmers and improved national security.

However, underneath this claim lies a more complicated reality, as our research shows.

Our research

Our study drew from interviews, archival material, government documents and newspaper reports. It also drew from academic literature to identify patterns in border practices and policy implementation on the border. The field study lasted between March 2020 and July 2022.

The study shows that the 2019 border closure underestimated "checkpoint politics". It intensified informal practices like bribery and selective enforcement. Personal and community networks, small scale and fragmented trading, and informal brokerage continued.

Alternative smuggling strategies allowed goods and people to continue crossing the border. People used unofficial crossing points and paths, and transferred goods through multiple intermediaries. Modes and timing of transport shifted and people used social rather than commercial means of mobility.

The World Bank estimated that the closure severely disrupted formal cross-border trade.

The study suggests that traders, smugglers, local residents and state officials collaborated to overcome official border governance structures. Some of the people we interviewed alleged that state officials enabled the passage of contraband goods across checkpoints. Transport operators negotiated payments with border officials in exchange for passage.

Border controls were less about formal rules and more about informal negotiations and financial exchanges.

The Nigeria-Benin frontier is extremely porous. There are hundreds of unofficial routes that are difficult to monitor. Besides, logistical weaknesses, poor infrastructure, inadequate manpower and low salaries among border officials contribute to corruption and weak enforcement.

Reality of border governance

Our findings show that border closure fails when it ignores the daily political and economic dynamics operating in the borders. These dynamics include: negotiated enforcement, rent-seeking and informal payments, cross-border livelihood dependence, and transborder social and kinship networks.

Many policy discussions concentrate on non-state actors as the drivers of illicit cross-border activities. But our research highlights the role of state actors themselves. By implication, the state is not merely a victim of illicit cross-border activities but may be complicit in enabling them.

Particularly, the research draws attention to the economic and social consequences of border closures. Apart from disrupting livelihoods dependent on cross-border trade, it contributed to a rise in food prices and other essentials because local production could not meet domestic demand. Security-oriented border policies can have unintended economic and social effects.

The study highlights the weaknesses of border governance strategies in regions that have long-standing transnational networks, informal trade systems and porous boundaries.

Moving forward

To achieve effectiveness and efficiency, border management should shift from total closures to smart governance that separates illegal smuggling from daily community cross border movement. This calls for intelligence-led enforcement against organised smuggling while expanding legal and accessible channels for small-scale cross-border trade. Regional cooperation and modern border management would help achieve this.

Such an approach would tend to reduce incentives around unofficial routes and the discretionary checkpoint negotiations. This would allow enforcement resources to focus on genuinely illicit activities.

Also, efficient collaboration among border agencies is crucial. This is because fragmented responsibilities among border control agencies could lead to overlapping mandates and weak enforcement systems. It is necessary to improve communication and reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies.

Similarly, stronger regional cooperation between Nigeria and its neighbours in joint border patrols, intelligence sharing, and harmonised trade policies could enhance border governance.

Onyekachi E. Nnabuihe, Senior Lecturer, Department of Criminology, Security, Peace and Conflict Studies, Caleb University

This article is republished from The Conversation Africa under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

French Ambassador to CAR Disciplined Over Misconduct Allegations

12 August 2026

Radio France Internationale

By RFI

France's foreign ministry has launched disciplinary proceedings against its ambassador to the Central African Republic, following allegations that he repeatedly brought young women to the official residence in Bangui and had sexual relations with some of them.

The Quai d'Orsay confirmed on Tuesday that an administrative inquiry had been carried out in the Central African capital earlier this year and that its findings had prompted formal proceedings against Ambassador Bruno Foucher.

"At the Ministry's initiative, an administrative inquiry was carried out in Bangui in 2026. Upon receipt of the findings of this inquiry, at the minister's request, the Ministry initiated disciplinary proceedings against the ambassador. These proceedings are ongoing," the ministry told French news agency AFP, without giving further details.

The allegations were reported by French satirical and investigative newspaper Le Canard Enchaîné, which said Foucher had invited around 30 young women to his private apartments at the ambassador's residence between January 2024 and March 2026.

France opens war crimes probe in connection with French drinks company Groupe Castel in CAR

Security concerns

According to the newspaper, the frequency of the visits prompted security officials to raise concerns over a potential security breach.

Once alerted, the Foreign Ministry sent inspectors to Bangui in April, according to Le Canard Enchaîné. Their findings subsequently led to disciplinary proceedings being opened against the ambassador.

The newspaper, which said it had seen the inspection report, reported that Foucher received an average of around 15 visits a month.

It also alleged that the ambassador had instructed staff to allow one of the young women to remain at the residence even when he was not there.

Questioned twice during the inquiry, Foucher acknowledged having had sexual relations with two young women, according to the newspaper.

No criminal allegations have been announced and the foreign ministry has not disclosed which disciplinary measures are being considered.

Under French civil service rules, sanctions could range from a reprimand to compulsory retirement or dismissal, Le Canard Enchaîné reported.

French FM says bilateral relations with CAR back on track

Rebuilding ties

The case is particularly sensitive because of the political and security environment in the Central African Republic (CAR), where France has been seeking to rebuild a relationship that has deteriorated sharply as Russia expands its influence in the country.

Russian personnel, including members of the Wagner paramilitary network, have played a major role in the country in recent years, notably in providing security for President Faustin-Archange Touadéra and supporting government forces.

France and other Western governments have repeatedly accused Russia of using disinformation campaigns, including on social media, to stir anti-French sentiment across parts of Africa.

However, there have been signs of a diplomatic thaw since 2024. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot visited Bangui in March, marking the first high-level visit by a French official to the country since 2018.

During the trip, Barrot welcomed what he described as "the full restoration of relations" between France and the CAR. The disciplinary proceedings against Foucher therefore come at an awkward moment for French diplomacy.

The Foreign Ministry has not said when the disciplinary process is expected to conclude or whether Foucher will remain in his post while it is under way.

Read or Listen to this story on the RFI website.

Zambia Votes With President's Economic Record On the Line

Zambia Reports

Voters in Zambia

13 August 2026

Radio France Internationale

By RFI

Zambia went to the polls Thursday with economic hardship testing President Hakainde Hichilema's record as he seeks a second term to govern the copper-rich nation.

Polling stations in the southern African nation opened at 6:00 am local time and were due to close 12 hours later, with 8.7 million voters registered to cast their ballots.

"Zambians are frustrated and this election is a 50-50, that is why we are all here early to make the change," said voter Mwiche Nalupumbwe, 26, among hundreds who braved the morning chill to queue at polling stations well before they opened.

"It hasn't been the easiest five years," the development sector worker told French press agency AFP at Kabulonga, about eight kilometres (five miles) east of Lusaka.

Hichilema, 64, won a first five-year term in 2021 on his sixth run for the post, and is betting on job creation and an ambitious infrastructure drive to secure re-election.

While inflation fell to 6.8 percent in April and the kwacha currency has strengthened, many still face high food and energy costs.

The country is long regarded as one of Africa's more stable democracies but has come under scrutiny over concerns that Hichilema's government has narrowed the space for dissent, even as it promises stronger economic recovery.

The president's main challenger in a field of 13 other hopefuls is Brian Mundubile, a 55-year-old former minister in the Patriotic Front (PF) government that ruled from 2011 to 2021.

Backed by an alliance of opposition parties, Mundubile is running under the newly formed NRPUP party which draws much of its political base from the PF.

He entered the race in May, injecting uncertainty into a contest that had long appeared to be Hichilema's to lose.

'Hand-to-mouth'

Describing Zambia as deeply divided, the 55-year-old Mundubile told AFP on Wednesday that the government had tightened restrictions on his party's campaign and the run-up to the vote could not be considered free and fair.

"It's like a burden has been lifted off my shoulder after voting," said Akapelwa Akapelwa, a 62-year-old businessman who was among the first to cast his ballot.

Countdown to the ballot: Zambia gears up for August elections

"Right now the economy has been stabilised ... The platform has been set and it's a strong foundation," he told AFP.

Africa's second-largest copper producer, Zambia defaulted on its sovereign debt in 2020.

Since then, the government has secured a debt restructuring, completed an IMF-supported programme and set an ambitious 2031 target to triple production of copper, crucial to the green-energy transition.

But more than 70 percent of Zambia's 22 million people live on less than three dollars a day, according to World Bank data.

"It's only those who are connected to politicians that are saying the economy is doing well," 32-year-old bus driver Ceshas Tembo told AFP.

"For many of us, it is still hand-to-mouth and even then it's never enough."

Police tightened security for the vote as the government announced Wednesday the arrests of several people, including three former senior government officials, over an alleged plot to interfere with the electoral system.

'Predictable leader'

Voting in Zambia has traditionally followed regional lines, with Hichilema's party strongest in the south and west, and the PF retaining pockets of support in the north and Copperbelt.

Voters were likely to stick with the stability of the incumbent, said Patience Mususa, senior researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute.

The year ahead for African democracy: who is going to the polls in 2026?

"Despite criticism of his slow progress in addressing government inefficiencies and corruption, and concerns about his prioritisation of corporate interests, he is seen as a more predictable leader," she said.

Results of the presidential vote are expected by August 17. The winner needs more than 50 percent to avoid a runoff.

Voters are also electing 226 parliament seats, up from the previous 156.

(with newswires)

Read or Listen to this story on the RFI website.

Wednesday, August 12, 2026

Ghannouchi Begins Hunger, Meds Strike to Protest Isolation

By Al Mayadeen English

Source: Agencies

10 Aug 2026 14:26

Tunisia's Ennahda leader initiates a hunger and medication strike to protest his isolation while hospitalized, his defense team says.

The defense team for Rached Ghannouchi, the leader of Tunisia's Ennahda movement, announced on Monday that the 85-year-old has begun a hunger and medication strike to protest his "complete isolation" while hospitalized.

According to a statement published on Ghannouchi's official Facebook page, the defense team reported that the former parliament speaker was transferred to a hospital on July 29.

"Since then, he has been placed in complete isolation, with his lawyers and family prevented from visiting and communicating with him," the defense team said in the statement.

Information about his health condition has also been withheld, "despite repeated requests submitted to all concerned authorities." 

Ghannouchi launches strike despite health condition

"In light of this total blackout on information, the defense team learned that Ghannouchi began a hunger and medication strike on Aug. 6 to protest his isolation and deprivation of his most basic rights, as a last resort to defend these rights," the statement added.

The defense team said the treatment of Ghannouchi, who is in a "delicate health condition," amounts to "inhuman abuse" and "a serious violation of his basic rights and physical safety."

The team held Tunisian authorities "fully responsible for these violations and for any serious complications that may threaten" his life, demanding that "his lawyers and family be allowed to visit him and check on his health condition."

Tunis sentences Ghannouchi, Ennahda leaders to life

A Tunisian court sentenced several leaders of the Ennahda movement, including party leader and former parliament speaker Rached Ghannouchi, to life imprisonment in the case known as the "Secret Apparatus of the Ennahda Movement."

The rulings were issued by the criminal chamber specializing in terrorism-related cases at the Court of First Instance in Tunis, according to the Tunisian News Agency.

The case involved dozens of defendants, including senior Ennahda figures and former security officials. Among those sentenced was former Prime Minister and Ennahda deputy leader Ali Larayedh, who received a 42-year prison sentence.

Authorities allege Ennahda infiltrated Tunisian institutions

The proceedings stem from allegations that a clandestine apparatus linked to the movement infiltrated state institutions and was involved in activities deemed threatening to national security.

The case was reopened in early 2022 following complaints submitted by the Public Prosecutor's Office and the legal team representing the families of Tunisian politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi.

Ennahda has consistently denied the accusations, describing them as politically motivated and rejecting claims that its leadership operated or supervised a secret organization.

US Eyes Expanded Puntland Military Presence as Red Sea Tensions Mount

By Al Mayadeen English

Source: Responsible Statecraft

11 Aug 2026 12:27

Escalating Red Sea tensions increase Washington’s strategic focus on the Horn of Africa and raise concerns over Somalia’s sovereignty.

The United States is moving to deepen its military presence in Puntland, a semi-autonomous region of northeastern Somalia, as Washington seeks greater operational flexibility near the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden amid widening regional tensions, Responsible Statecraft reported.

According to the outlet, the top US special operations commander for Africa reached an agreement in early August with Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni to expand an American military installation in the port city of Bosaso.

The arrangement has so far been disclosed only by Puntland authorities, while neither US Africa Command nor officials in Washington have publicly confirmed the deal or released its terms.

“Under the agreement, the United States will expand its military base in Bosaso to improve operations against terrorism and to help protect maritime security,” the Puntland Government of Somalia said in a statement. “The Puntland state remains committed to fighting terrorism and any threat that could harm the security, stability, and development of Puntland, Somalia, and the Horn of Africa.”

The reported agreement comes as Washington reassesses its military posture around the Red Sea, where the consequences of the war on Iran and escalating maritime tensions have increased the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa.

Bosaso offers Washington greater operational freedom

US forces have previously used Puntland as a staging point for operations in Somalia, including through an Emirati-operated facility in Bosaso.

Cameron Hudson, a former director for African affairs at the US National Security Council, said the latest development may indicate that Washington wants a more permanent and directly controlled presence.

“The United States probably now sees a longer term need to have a kind of wholly owned, wholly operated U.S. base in the region,” Hudson told Responsible Statecraft.

Such a facility could support an increase in US strikes inside Somalia, but analysts cited by the outlet said its location also makes it particularly valuable for operations linked to the Gulf of Aden, Yemen, and the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Increased focus on the Red Sea?

Michael Woldemariam, an associate professor at the University of Maryland, said the development is difficult to separate from the broader regional conflict.

“It's really only understandable in terms of the Red Sea question,” he said. “I find it hard to understand what the logic would be independent of increased focus on the Red Sea, Gulf and maritime security questions.”

The shift comes after Sanaa announced on July 20 that it would impose a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea in response to renewed Saudi attacks, adding further pressure to shipping routes already affected by the wider war.

Bosaso lies on the Gulf of Aden, close to the Bab al-Mandab, a critical maritime chokepoint linking the Red Sea with the Arabian Sea.

Djibouti restrictions increase Puntland's strategic value

Washington already operates Camp Lemonnier in neighboring Djibouti, its largest permanent military base in Africa.

However, Samar Al-Bulushi, an associate professor at the University of California, Irvine, told Responsible Statecraft that Djibouti's government has imposed limits on how the United States can use the facility during the regional conflict.

According to Al-Bulushi, Djibouti told Washington that attacks on Yemen could not be launched from its territory because authorities feared being drawn into the confrontation.

A larger US presence in Puntland could therefore provide AFRICOM with fewer political restrictions when conducting operations around Yemen and the Red Sea.

“The Trump administration might be reconsidering its engagement in Somalia,” Ahmed Ibrahim, a socio-cultural anthropologist specializing in the Horn of Africa, told the outlet.

The shift would follow a period in which Washington relied heavily on air power rather than expanding its ground presence. Trump carried out a record 124 strikes in Somalia last year, according to the report, with another 78 conducted so far in 2026.

Deal raises questions over Somalia's sovereignty

The reported agreement is also politically sensitive because it was apparently negotiated directly with Puntland without the participation of Somalia's internationally recognized federal government in Mogadishu.

Puntland has been locked in a prolonged dispute with the central government and does not currently recognize Mogadishu's authority.

“The informality is really important,” Al-Bulushi said. “If the U.S. wants to be able to stand by its claim — that seems to be a claim only — that it respects the sovereignty of the Somali government, then, in theory, it wouldn't be negotiating formal agreements with these semi-autonomous regions.”

Washington has long maintained relations both with Somalia's federal authorities and with regional governments such as Puntland and Somaliland, but analysts say direct security dealings with those entities could further strengthen them at Mogadishu's expense.

AFRICOM officials also met with leaders in Jubaland shortly before the Puntland agreement was announced. Jubaland, like Puntland, is embroiled in a dispute with the central government.

Putting Sudan between a rock and a hard place

Hudson warned that strengthening regional authorities while criticizing the weakness of Somalia's federal government could ultimately worsen the fragmentation Washington says it wants to overcome.

“We create this self-fulfilling prophecy,” he said. “If we complain about the weakness and division and then we suspend our support [for the central government] and we strengthen the peripheral states, then we are going to accelerate the thing about which we are complaining the most.”

Woldemariam, however, claimed that Somalia was already facing serious political instability before the agreement emerged.

"I'm not sure security cooperation with Puntland or Somaliland really makes it any worse. I think we're already at a pretty alarming stage,” he said.

Still, he suggested that Bosaso may represent only one element of a broader expansion of the US military presence along the Horn of Africa's Red Sea coastline.

"There's a lot of smoke here," Woldemariam said. "I think we're headed in the direction of a scaled-up U.S. presence across the Horn's Red Sea littoral. Ultimately the form it takes remains to be seen.”

'Sudan Is Losing Another Generation' to War, Mohammed Warns

UNICEF/UNI935560/Jamal

The intensifying fighting in and around Al Obeid and across North Kordofan adds serious concern for the protection of conflict-affected children in Sudan, already dramatically impacted by three years of violent conflict across the country.

7 August 2026

UN News Service

More than 1,000 days of war in Sudan have left millions of children out of school, displaced or exposed to grave violations, the UN Deputy Secretary-General said on Friday, calling for renewed action to end the conflict.

Amina Mohammed was speaking to Security Council members during an informal meeting on safeguarding education in Sudan, organised under a framework known as the Arria formula.

"Among everything this war is taking, one of the most significant is the future of Sudan depriving the education of its children," she said.

Education under fire

At least eight million school-aged children remain outside the classroom, she said, "with a disproportionate impact on millions of displaced children," especially those who have fled to other countries.

In battle-scarred Darfur alone, nearly three quarters of schools have been damaged, destroyed or otherwise rendered non-functional since fighting erupted in April 2023.

"Five children in every six are out of school, and parents will tell you they would rather keep their children at home than send them to a classroom, because home for them is the only place left where they can keep them safe," she said.

She noted that since 2024, the UN has verified more than 67 attacks on schools across Sudan, while over 154 instances of military use of schools have been reported, though the true scale is undoubtedly greater.

A 'frontal assault' on child safety and dignity

Ms. Mohammed described attacks against schools as "frontal assaults on children's safety and their dignity" because they lose protective spaces, opportunities for social development alongside peers, and access to essential services such as school feeding programmes, healthcare, and mental health support.

At the same time, more than half of all teachers in Sudan have gone unpaid, yet many continue teaching "against all odds," she added.

"I could read numbers to you for the whole of my five minutes and still fall short of what is being done to Sudan's children, especially its girls," she said Ms. Mohammed.

"Sudan has already lost a generation to its earlier wars, and it is losing another one now."

Paying the price

The Deputy Secretary-General said that this year, the UN and partners have brought more than a million Sudanese children back into some form of learning, but it is simply not enough.

"This is a war that men started," she continued. "But it is being paid for on the backs of women, and on the backs of children who had no say in any of it but suffer most."

She said it is time to silence the guns and to pull Sudan back from the brink of losing another generation of its children.

Children cannot wait

She called for Security Council members to do their utmost to bring the conflict to an end, create the conditions for peace, and the enabling environment to get Sudan's children back to learning.

"I urge you to do everything within your power to do so, for the young Sudanese living through this war today, and for future generations who will inherit whatever is left of their country.

Ms. Mohammed upheld education as being both lifesaving and life-changing because it protects children today and lays the foundations for peace, recovery and stability tomorrow.

"Sudan's children have waited 1,210 days for the war to end," she said. "They should not have to wait any longer."

Read the original article on UN News.

Africa Health Agencies Urge Faster Ebola Response in DRC As Cases Rise

11 August 2026

The Independent (Kampala)

The Democratic Republic of Congo needs to urgently expand its community-led response to Ebola as new infections and deaths continue to outpace efforts to contain the outbreak, the World Health Organization and Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention said.

The DRC had reported 3,973 confirmed cases, 1,801 deaths and 776 recoveries across 51 health zones in five provinces as of Aug. 4, according to the agencies.

The country recorded 99 new confirmed cases and 52 deaths in the latest 24-hour reporting period, while 674 patients were receiving care.

Contact tracing, a key measure for breaking chains of transmission, stood at 75%, below the operational target of at least 95%, according to the agencies. Treatment centres in North Kivu were operating at 139% occupancy, putting additional pressure on health workers and available beds.

The figures emerged after a joint high-level mission by WHO and Africa CDC to Uganda and the DRC on Aug. 4 and 5. The delegation was led by WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Africa CDC Director-General Jean Kaseya and WHO Regional Director for Africa Mohamed Janabi.

The agencies called for earlier detection, faster contact follow-up and expanded access to testing, referral, isolation and treatment in affected communities.

They also urged governments and partners to provide more supplies, laboratory and ambulance capacity, safe and dignified burial services and timely support for frontline health workers.

Uganda offers a contrasting example

The mission began in Kampala, where officials reviewed Uganda's response after the country declared its Ebola outbreak over on July 28.

Uganda recorded 20 confirmed cases and two deaths. All identified contacts completed follow-up. WHO and Africa CDC said Uganda demonstrated the importance of early detection, rapid contact tracing, coordinated government action, community engagement and cross-border surveillance.

But they warned that continued transmission in the DRC means Uganda and other neighbouring countries remain at risk.

The agencies called for sustained surveillance, laboratory readiness and coordination along borders despite Uganda ending its outbreak.

Communities face the biggest pressure

In Bunia, the capital of Ituri province and the centre of the DRC outbreak, the delegation visited an Ebola treatment centre and met health workers, provincial officials and community representatives.

The mission found that insecurity, population movement, poor roads, misinformation and pressure on health services were complicating the response.

Ituri accounts for almost 90% of confirmed Ebola cases in the DRC, with Bunia, Rwampara and Mongbwalu among the most affected health zones.

The agencies said the response must move closer to communities, with trusted local, religious, women and youth leaders involved in surveillance, referrals, treatment and public-health messaging.

"Ebola is outpacing our response" in some parts of eastern DRC, Tedros said, calling for greater resources, safer access for responders and stronger international support.

Kaseya said communities would ultimately determine whether transmission can be stopped.

"When people have information they trust, can report symptoms early and seek care without fear, we can break every chain of transmission," he said.

Financing and access remain critical

The agencies also urged donors to ensure pledged financing reaches frontline operations quickly and called for better access to areas affected by insecurity.

They said health facilities must continue providing essential services while Ebola operations are expanded.

WHO and Africa CDC advised countries against unnecessary restrictions on travel and trade, instead urging governments to strengthen surveillance, laboratory capacity, preparedness and cross-border coordination.

The mission ended in Kinshasa with meetings with President Félix Tshisekedi and members of government, where the delegation presented findings from Uganda and Bunia.

Both agencies reaffirmed support for a government-led response, while calling for national authorities, health workers, communities and international partners to work under a single coordinated effort.

The experience of Uganda, they said, shows that Ebola can be contained. The challenge in the DRC is making the response move faster than the virus.

Read the original article on Independent (Kampala).

WHO Recommends a Clinical Trial of Ebola Vaccine Against Bundibugyo Virus

Josua Mulala Raymond/ WHO

A health worker carries a stretcher into an Ebola treatment centre in the DR Congo.

9 August 2026

Premium Times (Abuja)

By Fortune Eromonsele

The recommendation followed preliminary animal study data suggesting that the vaccine may provide some cross-protection against the disease, particularly in reducing deaths.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) has recommended that a vaccine called Ervebo be prioritised for a randomised clinical trial against Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The recommendation followed preliminary animal study data suggesting that the vaccine may provide some cross-protection against the disease, particularly in reducing deaths.

WHO's Technical Advisory Group on Candidate Vaccine Prioritisation made the recommendation at its third meeting on 31 July, after reviewing available evidence on the vaccine's safety, efficacy, availability and feasibility.

The development comes as the DRC continues to respond to an outbreak of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, which was declared on 15 May 2026.

As of 30 July, WHO had recorded 3,605 confirmed cases and 1,587 deaths from the outbreak in the DRC.

Why Ervebo is being considered

The advisory group's recommendation is significant because Ervebo was developed specifically against Ebola virus disease caused by the Ebola Zaire virus, rather than the Bundibugyo virus.

According to WHO, the group initially advised against using Ervebo outside carefully designed research settings because its effectiveness against Bundibugyo virus disease remained uncertain.

However, preliminary animal study data indicate that Ervebo may confer some cross-protection against Bundibugyo virus disease, particularly by reducing mortality.

The latest evidence prompted the advisory group to recommend that Ervebo be prioritised for a randomised clinical trial to determine its effectiveness against the disease.

What is the Bundibugyo virus?

The Bundibugyo virus causes Ebola disease. It is distinct from the Ebola virus that Ervebo was specifically developed to protect against.

The Bundibugyo virus disease outbreak in the DRC is the first of its kind in the country. WHO says there is currently no licensed vaccine or specific treatment for Bundibugyo virus disease.

The disease is a severe infection, and previous Bundibugyo virus disease outbreaks have recorded case fatality rates ranging from 30 to 50 per cent, according to WHO.

Safety concerns

According to WHO, the advisory group found no identified safety concerns with the use of Ervebo among contacts of confirmed cases during a Bundibugyo virus disease outbreak.

However, the experts stressed that the vaccine's effectiveness against Bundibugyo virus disease and its ability to prevent transmission have not been established.

They therefore recommended that these questions be evaluated through clinical research.

WHO said a vaccine specifically developed against the Bundibugyo virus would remain the preferred option, although preliminary data on such candidates are currently unavailable.

The advisory group also emphasised the need to facilitate large-scale vaccine production and access if future evidence demonstrates sufficient efficacy to protect affected populations.

Read the original article on Premium Times.

Congo-Kinshasa: Ebola Is Killing People Before They Ever Reach a Doctor

10 August 2026

UN News Service

More than 1,900 people have died in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's Ebola outbreak - and most of them never made it to a treatment centre. Between 60 and 70 per cent of deaths are happening in communities far from care, a gap that is now central to the World Health Organization's response.

"The Bundibugyo virus continues to outpace us," said Dr. Mohamed Janabi, WHO Regional Director for Africa, speaking from Bunia, the epicentre of the outbreak in eastern DRC - referring to a particularly lethal Ebola strain for which there is still no approved vaccine.

"The Bundibugyo virus continues to outpace us," Dr. Mohamed Janabi, WHO Regional Director for Africa, said at a press conference, referring to the particularly lethal species of Ebola for which no approved vaccine currently exists.

Three months into the outbreak, the UN health agency intends - along with Congolese authorities and their partners - to "urgently intensify" the response because behind the heavy human toll lies a problem that has become central: too many patients are receiving treatment too late.

Understanding the numbers

Dr. Janabi recently spent three days in Bunia, capital of Ituri province - his fifth visit since the epidemic was declared there on 15 May.

Alongside Dr. Steve Ahuka, one of the Congolese leaders of the response, he visited several treatment centres and met community members to understand why the death toll remains so high.

Discussions with representatives of the local transport association highlighted shortcomings in the patient transport system. According to WHO, half of the deaths observed among transported individuals are linked to the conditions of their care.

"We asked ourselves why people are dying in Bunia? But talking to these leaders, we understood two things," said Dr. Janabi.

"Village centres outside of Bunia, they don't have these services. As a result, everyone comes to Bunia. Unfortunately, they come late."

Distances and deaths

The concentration of healthcare capacity in the city thus transforms distance into a factor in mortality.

As patients lack suitable facilities near their homes, they must travel long distances before receiving care, and sometimes when their health is already severely compromised.

The journey itself can also fuel the epidemic. Patients taken to Bunia are not always sent directly to an Ebola treatment centre. Some are first taken home. When they die, their bodies may be taken back to their villages, thus multiplying contacts and the risk of further infections.

WHO wants to break this chain by bringing healthcare facilities closer to communities, better informing the public and transport providers, and promptly referring suspected cases to appropriate centres.

"Three months after the start of the epidemic, if we are seeing only 30 per cent, can we sit down and review our approach?" asked the agency's head for Africa.

Aru shows the way

The town of Aru, also in Ituri province, provides an example of what this shift in strategy could achieve. No new cases have been recorded there for two weeks, representing a real "success story".

Dr. Janabi said that after a case was detected, teams identified 159 contacts, including 121 people who were considered suspected cases. However, response was not limited to monitoring these individuals and was extended to surrounding communities, from which many patients originate.

Moreover, healthcare facilities are being established - and awareness campaigns conducted - so that residents no longer have to travel to Bunia for treatment. The objective is twofold: to treat patients earlier and to prevent the provincial capital from becoming a hub for both patients and increased risk of transmission.

Centred on community

"We have to protect Bunia now," said Dr. Janabi, adding that WHO will meet with the Congolese health authorities "and see how we can build centres now outside Bunia so that we can content those people where they are."

WHO also plans to add 400 beds dedicated to Ebola patients and another 100 for various health services, but the UN agency also insists on the need to broaden the response beyond the healthcare system alone.

For example, vendors in markets could install handwashing stations themselves, he said, stressing that the fight against Ebola must be a collective effort.

"I don't expect the central Government to do everything. I don't expect our agencies to do everything. But if we raise awareness among market vendors, they can themselves donate a bucket or two for handwashing," he said.

After three months of the epidemic, WHO is therefore counting on a change of scale but above all, of method: less concentration of the response in Bunia and earlier intervention closer to transmission hotspots.

Dr. Janabi believes that this approach could produce results in the next two or three months.

The top WHO official said he was leaving Bunia "very optimistic", but the figures demonstrate the current urgency because if the majority of Ebola deaths continue to occur in communities rather than in healthcare facilities, the virus will maintain its advantage.

Read the original article on UN News.

South Africa Feels the Economic Cost of Anti-Migrant Xenophobia

Ihsaan Haffejee/GroundUp

A march against immigration in Benoni on the East Rand of the Gauteng province in South Africa. (file photo).

5 August 2026

The New Humanitarian (Geneva)

By Obi Anyadike and Oscar Nkala

Johannesburg — "Intellectually, xenophobia is not being contested, instead people are looking for scapegoats."

South Africa's Afrophobic anti-migrant protest movement has vowed to keep marching until every undocumented migrant has left the country, despite the campaign's impact on the economy and the country's standing across the continent.

The March and March movement set 30 June as the deadline for all undocumented migrants to leave. In practice, however, it was predominantly working class African nationals - regardless of their status - who were targeted by violent vigilante groups.

In response, more than 160,000 people were helped home by their governments, according to a tally of official repatriation numbers. Yet more returned privately, sent back just wives and children, or relocated to safer parts of the country.

March and March, which describes itself as a civic organisation, is planning to increase the tempo of agitation in the run-up to local government elections on 4 November. That could be a watershed moment given the weakness of the ruling ANC, with the movement seeking to make migration the key campaign issue.

"We will be making our presence felt," spokesperson Sandile Dube told The New Humanitarian. "We are fixing the country, and we can only stop when every South African job is occupied by a South African."

Yet that sentiment overlooks how integral South Africa's roughly three million migrants - officially under 4% of the population - are to the country's economy (there is no consensus on the number of undocumented).

Maggie Mpharana lives in the Diepkloof area of Soweto. She rented out her garage a decade ago to Harun Gebrelasse, a Somali trader, who turned it into a small convenience store, known locally as a spaza shop.

He paid a monthly rental equivalent to $180, and employed her teenage son when he wasn't in school. But in June, anti-migrant vigilantes beat up Gebrelasse and looted his shop - despite the fact he held a valid visa and business permits. Two days later, they came back and - during an altercation - torched the store. "I don't understand how that is fixing the country," said Mpharana.

Migrants making it in South Africa

Spaza shops are interwoven into the fabric of urban neighbourhoods in South Africa. They are on every street corner, stay open all hours, sell household items in affordable micro-quantities and, crucially, provide credit to regular customers. It's a slice of the economy that's entirely Black-owned, distinct from the commercial malls and formal retail spaces located a long bus-ride away from most urban precincts.

It is estimated that the country's 150,000-200,000 spaza shops generate nearly three million jobs and contribute just over 5% to South Africa's GDP. They also circulate money through the local economy as part of a value chain that links manufacturers, wholesalers, and transporters.

Their owners are overwhelmingly Somali or Ethiopian - like Bayene, who came to South Africa from southern Ethiopia overland in 2011 along an arduous and dangerous migration route to claim asylum.

He worked in the spaza shop of a relative who had sponsored his journey until he was able to open his own store in Soweto in 2015 - a typical first-generation migrant story of hard work and sacrifice that can be found the world over. But now he's not sure whether to quit.

Along with other shop-owners, Bayene has been negotiating with private security companies for protection. Many traders, however, have chosen to close down - or say they have been forced to. He alleged that March and March's latest tactic is to threaten landlords that their property will be torched unless they evict their foreign tenants.

"My landlord doesn't want to kick me out, he's protecting me," Bayene told The New Humanitarian. "But some landlords, to save themselves, [have complied]."

Dube said that although March and March does not condone violence, "South Africans have now been educated to know that to rent out a backroom or a house to an illegal foreigner is a crime".

Shuab (who gave only his first name) is a Somali national who runs a wholesale business - one of five in Soweto supplying hundreds of spaza shops in the area. "For the last three months, business has been down; right now it's much worse," he said. "I'm even keeping the stock of some of the shop-owners that ran away.

Shuab arrived in South Africa in 2010 as a refugee. With the support of the close-knit Somali community, he was able to open his first shop in 2018 - which was then torched and looted during political unrest in 2021.

Two years later, he managed to open his wholesale business - a 2,000-square metre warehouse stocked full of fast-selling household items. Out of his 10 employees, six are South African, whom he says worry they could lose their jobs if he was forced to close.

Shuab regards March and March as different from previous bouts of Afrophobic violence. "This is organised, but we don't know who is behind it," he said.

Previously, protesters would loot, then things would quickly return to normal. "But with these people, you can't negotiate," he added. "Whether you are legal or illegal, so long as you are not South African, they will tell you to close."

March and March reflects a false narrative commonly repeated in South Africa. It's plastered over social media, expressed in radio call-in programmes, news broadcasts, and conversations on taxi buses: fellow African citizens bring crime, dirt, decay, don't pay taxes, and exhaust social services. It doesn't seem to matter how evidence-free those claims are.

"This is about restoring order"

Last month, the City of Johannesburg - whose inner-city has long been a byword for neglect - demolished container shops at Marble Towers, a hub for informal traders selling Chinese fast fashion and beauty products. The aim was to enforce municipal safety bylaws. "This is about restoring order," said Mayor Dada Morero. "We remain committed to reclaiming the city one precinct at a time."

Yet the area around Rahima Moosa Street, commonly known as Jeppe, attracts cross-border resale traders from throughout southern Africa. They spend close to $600 million a year - twice the turnover of Sandton, the richest mall in Africa - but March and March has had a chilling effect on that business. One Zambian bus operator said passengers were down by at least 30%.

Tanya Zack - who has researched the Jeppe Street economy for years - describes the city's enforcement action as the legitimisation of exclusion.

"The city is destroying irregular stalls, but that's not matched with a vision for what it wants," she told The New Humanitarian. "It's never recognised the value of a migrant-led economy. There's no word on regularisation, no planning; it's purely law enforcement. It's a terrible loss for the central role Jo'burg can play in the region."

That's an argument that struggles for impact among many South Africans. Journalist and commentator Mondli Makhanya sees clear parallels between South Africa's nativist wave, and the rightward lurch in many other parts of the world.

"Let's accept: reason, logic and facts are the losers in this debate," he wrote recently. "The voices of the populists are the ones being heard."

Abel (who gave only his first name) is one who would be hard to convince over the merits of migration. He lives close to Shuab's warehouse but views the businessman's apparent success through the prism of his own perceived disadvantage.

"These spaza shops are in the wrong hands," he said. "They are going to foreigners who are not paying taxes, and using our resources. But if I were to try and open one, the government would drown me in paperwork. The government is our father but is not looking after its children - instead it's looking after the children of its neighbours."

Community diversity

But proximity also builds understanding. In the communities The New Humanitarian visited around Soweto, people tended to say that March and March did not reflect their views - that any agitation came from a rent-a-mob typically recruited from the hostels that house young men from KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), the movement's birthplace.

"Yes, if you are here illegally, it's wrong," said Happiness Tuso, as she chatted with neighbours on a quiet street in Naledi. "But I don't believe what [March and March] is doing is right. In this street, we have a lady from Mozambique who braids hair, that man is from Lesotho, and he washes cars. We know them, and the ones we know, we trust."

Her friend, Ntombi, was more scathing. "People from outside [South Africa] came with nothing but have managed to build something. We don't really have an excuse - this is our home," she said. "We put too much blame on the government, but it's not right for us to be dependent on government. You can open a business in your own house - I have my own little [hustle]."

Both women had an additional gripe. Because Tuso has a dark complexion, and Ntombi wears a hijab, they are both stopped in the city-centre by vigilantes who assume they are not South African. "It's embarrassing, especially when you're with your children," said Tuso. "You have to prove yourself by speaking [in vernacular], but my children speak bad Zulu (the urban lingua franca)."

South Africa's structural problems

South Africa's xenophobia has been nurtured by the country's deep structural problems and decades of policy failures, said William Gumede, founder of the non-profit Institute for Social Dialogue. "If all non-South Africans are kicked out, it's not going to deliver jobs, employment, and services," he told The New Humanitarian.

South Africa has been burdened for decades by a crippling unemployment rate. In the first quarter of 2026, just over 60% of young people aged 15 to 24 were unemployed, and it's around 41% for those aged 25 to 34.

That's partly a reflection of a deeply flawed schooling system. Just over 80% of 9 and 10-year-olds cannot read for meaning, constraining future work and education opportunities. Benchmarked against international peers, South African learners consistently come last in maths and science surveys, with hundreds of public schools not teaching the subjects at all.

"Education cannot solve unemployment alone, but weak education almost guarantees that unemployment becomes hereditary," notes Linda du Plessis, senior deputy vice chancellor of the University of the North West.

Critics of South African business accuse employers of deliberately hiring exploitable foreign nationals who do not know - or cannot demand - their rights under the country's labour laws, and accept less than the minimum wage.

The counter-claim by employers is that they struggle to find South African candidates with the right skillsets - which schools in neighbouring countries do seem able to produce - and as a result have called on the Department of Home Affairs to issue waivers to allow them to hire foreign citizens legally.

"We employ people based on training, capabilities"

Jassat Esat runs a textile factory with a workforce dominated by locals, but with machinist and technical staff positions generally filled by people from the region. "I fully understand the demand for us to employ locals," he told The New Humanitarian. "But we employ people based on training, capabilities, and their work ethic."

He fears that the textile industry, facing stiff competition from cheap second-hand clothing, will be further damaged as staff leave as a result of a now-entrenched xenophobia, backed by immigration raids.

Agriculture is especially dependent on labour from the region. In KZN's sugar belt, one farmer reported he had lost up to 80% of his cane-cutting workforce virtually overnight. The same concerns are aired in the horticulture, fruit, and vegetable sectors, which already face narrowing profit margins and climate uncertainty.

The structure of the agriculture labour market has historically been skewed to workers from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Lesotho. Employers say they have struggled to retain South Africans for what is seasonal, back-breaking work, typically on remote farms. Growing mechanisation - and the demand for greater skills - will reduce demand still further.

Gumede believes that South Africa's xenophobia has done potentially irreparable harm. Not only has the country become diplomatically isolated across much of the continent, but it threatens trade links worth $42 billion annually.

"Around 30% of our exports go to the rest of Africa. If you add informal trade, it could be 35%," he said. "We're fighting the rest of Africa, while we're also destroying our economy."

Foreigners as scapegoats

Dube of March and March is confident that employers are beginning to respond to the demand to hire locally - backed by the fear of legal sanctions - but he also acknowledges the economic disruption his movement has caused.

"There is no way you can't be worried about the shake-up of the economy, but I'm also worried about crime," he said. "You can't say because of economic benefits you leave a crime - you cannot leave the drug pushers and human traffickers."

Blaming foreigners for South Africa's stagnation is low-hanging fruit for politicians. It's a sentiment increasingly shared by a middle class that fears job losses and competition in an economy growing by barely 1%.

The political fragility of the ANC, after 30 years in power, has allowed populist parties to fill the vacuum - and they are expected to make significant gains in November's local government elections.

"Intellectually, xenophobia is not being contested," said Gumede. "Instead, people are looking for scapegoats. It's a tragedy."

Edited by Andrew Gully.

Obi Anyadike, Senior editor, Africa

Oscar Nkala, Investigative journalist who works across Africa on issues of migration, environment, climate change, and the impact on people and livelihoods

Read this report on The New Humanitarian. The New Humanitarian puts quality, independent journalism at the service of the millions of people affected by humanitarian crises around the world.