China The Fastest Rising Super Power In History
May 20, 2014 Opinion & Analysis
Daniel M. Kliman
China is rising; but how far, and how fast? After the release of projections based on new World Bank data showing that China will soon overtake the United States as the world’s largest national economy, a debate has quickly ensued, with some China-watchers dismissing the new figures as an “accounting exercise” and others calling the revised data a “wake-up call.”
But the hue and cry obscures a more fundamental question: whether the scale and speed of China’s ascendance is truly unique, or whether it resembles the emergence of earlier powers.
China, it turns out, scores moderately on the first metric, and very highly on the second.
Although new powers have emerged for millennia — think Athens after the Greek victory over Persia in 479 B.C. and Rome in 264 BC at the start of its wars with Carthage — extensive data measuring the scale and speed of a nation’s rise only extend from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. During this period, five states have emerged as global powers:
The United States, circa 1870: Having recovered from a devastating civil war, it entered a period of rapid industrial growth and overseas expansion.
Germany, circa 1870: Otto von Bismarck defeated France and established a unified nation.
The Soviet Union, circa 1945: The USSR grew into a superpower in the aftermath of World War II.
Japan, circa 1960: A high-growth era dawned which took Japan to the commanding heights of the global economy.
China, circa 1982: Its rise began after the ruling Communist Party completed its sixth five-year plan, a document the party still uses to help guide the economy, inaugurating a new era of economic reform and opening to foreign trade.
Of course, no country’s ascent had a single, undisputed starting point. But cutoffs are necessary to gauge a rise or a fall, and the above inflection points are apt candidates.
In sheer scale, China remains near the head of the pack on several measures, but it is not yet a clear frontrunner. After three decades of ascent, China’s economic footprint is comparable to that of the United States in 1900. China currently accounts for 14,6 percent of world output, while the US share of global GDP in 1900 was 15,9 percent. At 14,3 percent, China’s share of global commerce is about a percentage point higher than the United States’ at the same stage of its rise.
Militarily, China resembles Germany before it developed the powerful navy that new wealth afforded.
Thirty years in, China’s share of global military spending — 9,2 percent — is just behind Germany’s share in 1900, at 10.5 percent. Of the comparison group, the Soviet Union’s rise differs most from China’s. The USSR prioritized military strength over economic prosperity, and the numbers show it.
In 1975, the Soviet Union accounted for about a third of international military spending, but only 9,4 percent of global output, and a measly 3,9 percent of world trade, due to its isolation from the global economy.
Speed is where China stands out. In 30 years of ascent, starting from a low base, it has come farther, faster than any of the other rising powers in the comparison group.
China’s share of global trade has exploded faster than any other rising power in the comparison group. In 30 years, China has expanded its share by a staggering multiple of more than 22. At the dawn of its reform period, China accounted for only 0,6 percent of world commerce; by comparison, the United States at year zero of its rise already conducted 9.3 percent of the world’s trade. Germany at the start of its ascent accounted for 10,7 percent of international commerce.
Only the Soviet Union at the close of World War II had less of a presence in global trade than China at the outset of its rise.
A different picture emerges when examining the speed of China’s military ascent. In line with Deng Xiaoping’s belief that China should “hide (its) capacities” and “bide (its) time” — which meant, in part, getting rich first before building up its military — China’s share of world arms spending has advanced slower than its share of global GDP and trade:
China’s proportion of world military spending has expanded at an objectively rapid clip, even if it has not ballooned as fast as its economic footprint. During the 1990s, and then again during the 2000s, China nearly tripled its share of global military outlays. Pentagon data on China’s military spending paints a similar picture, and its 2013 white paper to the US Congress notes China has the “fiscal strength and political will to support defense spending growth at comparable levels” in the future, although given that “China’s published military budget omits several major categories of expenditure” including foreign arms purchases, it’s hard to know for sure.
The Defense Department estimated China’s total military-related expenditures for 2012 fell between $135 billion and $215 billion, though it cautioned that it didn’t know for sure. The next Pentagon white paper is scheduled to be released next week.
Mapped over time, China’s share of global military spending has charted an exponential growth path, unusual by historical standards. The Soviet share spiked after World War II, then plateaued at around one-third of global military spending.
The U.S. share fluctuated around specific events — Germany’s return to peacetime footing after 1870 caused a temporary increase, while the Spanish-American War of 1898 produced a sharp peak leading into a rapid decline. Germany’s share of global military spending expanded and contracted over time, generally remaining between 10 and 15 percent of world spending on arms.
Japan increased its share of global military spending throughout, but at a much slower pace than China.
China has risen faster than other powers, but not farther – yet. Prediction is a risky business.
A decline in China’s working age population, widespread environmental degradation, endemic corruption, and risks associated with staggering income inequality — or some combination of those factors — could slow or derail the country’s rise.
But if China can muddle through, conservative estimates put its share of global GDP at 28 percent by 2030. If this forecast is correct, China’s economic dominance will, on paper, equal that of the United States in 1951, a peak year in which the residual devastation wrought by World War II significantly boosted America’s share of global output.
Yet China will likely punch below its weight even if these forecasts prove accurate.
It took the United States two world wars, a sea change in how the U.S. public viewed the world, and the creation of a new international order backed by a set of military alliances to fully translate its size into global dominance.
China’s economy may become larger than the United States’ this year, but parity on paper will not quickly yield equal influence abroad.
— Foreign Policy.
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| Zimbabwe-China cooperation. |
Daniel M. Kliman
China is rising; but how far, and how fast? After the release of projections based on new World Bank data showing that China will soon overtake the United States as the world’s largest national economy, a debate has quickly ensued, with some China-watchers dismissing the new figures as an “accounting exercise” and others calling the revised data a “wake-up call.”
But the hue and cry obscures a more fundamental question: whether the scale and speed of China’s ascendance is truly unique, or whether it resembles the emergence of earlier powers.
China, it turns out, scores moderately on the first metric, and very highly on the second.
Although new powers have emerged for millennia — think Athens after the Greek victory over Persia in 479 B.C. and Rome in 264 BC at the start of its wars with Carthage — extensive data measuring the scale and speed of a nation’s rise only extend from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. During this period, five states have emerged as global powers:
The United States, circa 1870: Having recovered from a devastating civil war, it entered a period of rapid industrial growth and overseas expansion.
Germany, circa 1870: Otto von Bismarck defeated France and established a unified nation.
The Soviet Union, circa 1945: The USSR grew into a superpower in the aftermath of World War II.
Japan, circa 1960: A high-growth era dawned which took Japan to the commanding heights of the global economy.
China, circa 1982: Its rise began after the ruling Communist Party completed its sixth five-year plan, a document the party still uses to help guide the economy, inaugurating a new era of economic reform and opening to foreign trade.
Of course, no country’s ascent had a single, undisputed starting point. But cutoffs are necessary to gauge a rise or a fall, and the above inflection points are apt candidates.
In sheer scale, China remains near the head of the pack on several measures, but it is not yet a clear frontrunner. After three decades of ascent, China’s economic footprint is comparable to that of the United States in 1900. China currently accounts for 14,6 percent of world output, while the US share of global GDP in 1900 was 15,9 percent. At 14,3 percent, China’s share of global commerce is about a percentage point higher than the United States’ at the same stage of its rise.
Militarily, China resembles Germany before it developed the powerful navy that new wealth afforded.
Thirty years in, China’s share of global military spending — 9,2 percent — is just behind Germany’s share in 1900, at 10.5 percent. Of the comparison group, the Soviet Union’s rise differs most from China’s. The USSR prioritized military strength over economic prosperity, and the numbers show it.
In 1975, the Soviet Union accounted for about a third of international military spending, but only 9,4 percent of global output, and a measly 3,9 percent of world trade, due to its isolation from the global economy.
Speed is where China stands out. In 30 years of ascent, starting from a low base, it has come farther, faster than any of the other rising powers in the comparison group.
China’s share of global trade has exploded faster than any other rising power in the comparison group. In 30 years, China has expanded its share by a staggering multiple of more than 22. At the dawn of its reform period, China accounted for only 0,6 percent of world commerce; by comparison, the United States at year zero of its rise already conducted 9.3 percent of the world’s trade. Germany at the start of its ascent accounted for 10,7 percent of international commerce.
Only the Soviet Union at the close of World War II had less of a presence in global trade than China at the outset of its rise.
A different picture emerges when examining the speed of China’s military ascent. In line with Deng Xiaoping’s belief that China should “hide (its) capacities” and “bide (its) time” — which meant, in part, getting rich first before building up its military — China’s share of world arms spending has advanced slower than its share of global GDP and trade:
China’s proportion of world military spending has expanded at an objectively rapid clip, even if it has not ballooned as fast as its economic footprint. During the 1990s, and then again during the 2000s, China nearly tripled its share of global military outlays. Pentagon data on China’s military spending paints a similar picture, and its 2013 white paper to the US Congress notes China has the “fiscal strength and political will to support defense spending growth at comparable levels” in the future, although given that “China’s published military budget omits several major categories of expenditure” including foreign arms purchases, it’s hard to know for sure.
The Defense Department estimated China’s total military-related expenditures for 2012 fell between $135 billion and $215 billion, though it cautioned that it didn’t know for sure. The next Pentagon white paper is scheduled to be released next week.
Mapped over time, China’s share of global military spending has charted an exponential growth path, unusual by historical standards. The Soviet share spiked after World War II, then plateaued at around one-third of global military spending.
The U.S. share fluctuated around specific events — Germany’s return to peacetime footing after 1870 caused a temporary increase, while the Spanish-American War of 1898 produced a sharp peak leading into a rapid decline. Germany’s share of global military spending expanded and contracted over time, generally remaining between 10 and 15 percent of world spending on arms.
Japan increased its share of global military spending throughout, but at a much slower pace than China.
China has risen faster than other powers, but not farther – yet. Prediction is a risky business.
A decline in China’s working age population, widespread environmental degradation, endemic corruption, and risks associated with staggering income inequality — or some combination of those factors — could slow or derail the country’s rise.
But if China can muddle through, conservative estimates put its share of global GDP at 28 percent by 2030. If this forecast is correct, China’s economic dominance will, on paper, equal that of the United States in 1951, a peak year in which the residual devastation wrought by World War II significantly boosted America’s share of global output.
Yet China will likely punch below its weight even if these forecasts prove accurate.
It took the United States two world wars, a sea change in how the U.S. public viewed the world, and the creation of a new international order backed by a set of military alliances to fully translate its size into global dominance.
China’s economy may become larger than the United States’ this year, but parity on paper will not quickly yield equal influence abroad.
— Foreign Policy.
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