Herzog in Ethiopia as Israel Expands Footprint in Divided Horn of Africa

February 25, 2026

Israeli President Isaac Herzog meets Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Addis Ababa amid Israel’s expanding push in the Horn of Africa. (Design: Palestine Chronicle)

By Palestine Chronicle Staff  

Herzog’s Ethiopia visit follows Israel’s Somaliland move, intensifying geopolitical fractures in the Horn of Africa.

Key Developments

Israeli President Isaac Herzog begins a two-day official visit to Ethiopia on February 24-25.

The trip follows Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent visit to Addis Ababa.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025 reshaped Horn of Africa geopolitics.

Ethiopia’s role as African Union host and Nile Basin actor makes it central to Israeli strategy.

Türkiye and African states warn against foreign militarization of the Horn.

Israel seeks to break diplomatic isolation following the Gaza genocide by expanding African ties.

Herzog in Addis

Israeli President Isaac Herzog arrived in Ethiopia for a two-day official visit on February 24-25, meeting President Taye Atske Selassie and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed as part of Israel’s renewed push to expand its footprint in Africa.

The visit comes at a highly sensitive moment. It follows directly after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s state visit to Addis Ababa, highlighting intensifying competition for influence in the Horn of Africa.

Israeli officials have framed the trip as strengthening “historic bonds of friendship” and expanding cooperation with African nations. Herzog’s office emphasized long-standing diplomatic and cultural ties, including the historic migration of Ethiopian Jews to Israel.

But the geopolitical subtext is unmistakable. Ethiopia is not only a regional heavyweight and host of the African Union, but also a key actor in Red Sea and Nile Basin politics. Securing deeper ties with Addis Ababa serves Israel’s broader strategy of projecting influence along critical maritime corridors.

Red Sea Strategy

Herzog’s visit cannot be separated from Israel’s December 2025 decision to formally recognize Somaliland, becoming the first country to do so.

The recognition triggered strong condemnation from Somalia, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and several Arab and African states. Mogadishu described the move as a violation of its sovereignty.

Strategically, Somaliland sits near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, a chokepoint linking the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Control and monitoring of this corridor have become central to Israeli calculations, particularly amid Red Sea tensions connected to the Gaza war.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar previously warned during a visit to Ethiopia that the ‘Iranian-backed Houthis’ – the Ansarallah movement in Yemen – posed a shared threat to Israel and Africa. He linked maritime security concerns to broader regional instability.

The recognition of Somaliland appears to be part of a wider attempt to establish a forward presence near sensitive shipping routes — effectively expanding Israel’s southern perimeter in what analysts describe as a strategy of “encircling the Red Sea.”

Somalia views these moves as destabilizing. Turkish officials have likewise warned that the Horn of Africa should not become a “battlefield of foreign forces,” a pointed critique of Israeli maneuvering.

Diplomatic Balancing

Beyond maritime strategy, Israel’s outreach to Ethiopia intersects with the contentious Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute involving Egypt and Sudan.

Israel has positioned itself as a potential “technical mediator” in water management issues, balancing its ties between Cairo and Addis Ababa. By embedding itself in Nile Basin diplomacy, Israel inserts itself into one of Africa’s most sensitive geopolitical fault lines.

At the same time, Israel has pursued broader re-engagement with African states. This includes reopening embassies, expanding security and technological cooperation, and offering military assistance to select governments.

The campaign comes amid efforts to counter growing African criticism of the Israeli genocide in Gaza. South Africa, in particular, has emerged as a leading critic, drawing parallels between apartheid-era policies and Israel’s war against Palestinians.

By strengthening bilateral ties with countries such as Ethiopia, Zambia, South Sudan, and Nigeria, Israel appears to be attempting to fracture African consensus and dilute diplomatic pressure.

Competition in the Horn

Israel’s diplomatic return to Africa unfolds within a crowded strategic landscape.

Türkiye is now one of Ethiopia’s largest investors and maintains deep security ties with Somalia. China remains the dominant economic force across much of the continent, including Ethiopia.

According to Ethiopian diplomatic sources cited by regional media, Ankara holds significant leverage that could influence Addis Ababa’s calculus regarding Somaliland and broader regional alignments.

Israel, meanwhile, has explored intelligence and maritime cooperation with Kenya to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.

The Horn of Africa has thus become a nexus where Chinese economic weight, Turkish military engagement, Egyptian security concerns, and Israeli strategic ambitions converge.

Our Strategic Assessment

Herzog’s visit to Ethiopia reflects more than routine diplomacy. It is part of a calculated effort to expand Israel’s strategic depth in Africa at a time when its regional position has been deeply shaken by the Gaza war.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland signaled a willingness to disrupt long-standing African consensus around territorial integrity in pursuit of maritime leverage. The move effectively inserted Israel into the heart of Horn of Africa geopolitics, aligning itself against Somalia’s sovereignty and triggering regional backlash.

The Red Sea corridor has become inseparable from the genocide in Gaza. As tensions involving Ansarallah have disrupted Israeli-linked shipping, securing alternative surveillance and logistical footholds near Bab al-Mandeb appears central to Israeli planning.

At the same time, Israel seeks to exploit regional rivalries — positioning itself between Ethiopia and Egypt, between Somalia and Somaliland, and within broader Turkish-Chinese competition. This reflects a strategy of embedding Israeli influence in contested spaces where leverage can be maximized.

Yet the approach carries risks. Recognition of Somaliland has already provoked condemnation and could invite asymmetric responses from regional actors, including armed groups.

Crucially, Israel’s African outreach is also an attempt to mitigate diplomatic isolation stemming from its genocidal war on Gaza. Strengthening bilateral ties may soften votes in international forums and reduce coordinated African opposition.

The Horn of Africa is no longer peripheral to Middle East politics. It has become an extension of it. And as Gaza reshapes alignments across the Red Sea, Israel’s African gambit will increasingly be tested against both regional resistance and shifting global power dynamics.

(PC, AJA, Israeli Media)