The Growing Threat of conflict in the Horn of Africa
Tigray’s elite has become deeply split, with every policy issue – from IDP returns to demobilisation – framed through the lens of factional allegiance.
Daniel Berhane
Journalist and author
Ammunition is seen next to a tank destroyed in a fight between the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) forces in Kasagita town, Afar region, Ethiopia, February 25, 2022.
Tiksa Negeri/Reuters
A tank destroyed in fighting between the Ethiopian federal army and Tigrayan Defence Forces in Kasagita, Afar region, 2022.
ADDIS ABABA
Clashes last month in two Tigrayan districts between the federal army and Tigrayan forces could be the first steps towards a wider war that has been frozen for the past three years by a shaky ceasefire.
Following the skirmishes in Tselemti, in southwestern Tigray, and Wajirat in the southeast, the federal government has moved several army divisions towards the Tigray border. It has also blocked the bank accounts of selected ruling Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) officials.
In anticipation of trouble ahead, people in the regional capital, Mekelle, have been stocking up on groceries, and long queues have formed at banks. Many shop owners, worried about disruptions to online networks, now refuse digital payments, while Ethiopian Airlines has cancelled all flights to the region.
There is a broader international dimension to the tensions. Were war to break out, there are fears it would also drag in neighbouring Sudan, as well as governments in the Gulf and Red Sea region – with even larger humanitarian repercussions.
Who is who?
The current domestic friction reflects a dramatic re-jigging of the political and military alliances of the 2020-22 Tigray war, when federal forces and Eritrean troops – backed by Amhara paramilitaries – marched against the TPLF-led regional administration.
That coalition has since collapsed. Eritrea was critical of the November 2022 Pretoria ceasefire accord, but fell out even more significantly with landlocked Ethiopia over Addis Ababa’s demand for a port – especially when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed identified Eritrea's Red Sea Assab facility as a potential candidate.
Both sides have also been vying for influence in a politically divided Tigray. For much of the past two years, that has played out over control of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA), set up under the ceasefire agreement as a first step towards Tigray’s re-inclusion in the federation.
The jostling for influence is broadly represented by two rival camps led by TPLF chair Debretsion Gebremichael – seen as aligned with Asmara – and his former deputy, Getachew Reda, who is now an adviser to Abiy.
Neither has Amhara escaped the discord. Thousands of the Amhara region’s paramilitary troops refused to accept disarmament demanded by Addis Ababa in 2023 and formed an insurgent group, Fano, that inflicted a string of blows against the federal army. Conversely, in western Tigray, Amhara paramilitaries known as the Tekeze Guard serve as auxiliaries to federal forces.
What’s gone wrong?
The federal government framed the Tigray conflict as a law‑enforcement operation, but its wartime allies used it to seize territory they lay claim to. Under the Pretoria peace deal, Amhara forces were called on to withdraw from western and southern Tigray, and Eritrean troops to vacate the border districts of northern Tigray.
The federal government, however, refused to enforce those stipulations. It instead insisted on directly controlling the disputed areas until a referendum could be held, with Amhara exercising de facto administrative control. Addis Ababa has in effect normalised the new status quo, entrenching the territorial and demographic changes created by the war.
Fearing violence and intimidation, that deadlock has prevented more than a million displaced Tigrayans from returning to their home villages.
A compromise was forged in early 2024, prioritising the return process over the issue of territorial restoration. Under the framework, the federal army was supposed to assume all security responsibilities, dismantle illegal settlements, and disarm armed groups. Local governance would be organised through town hall meetings, with pre‑war police officers and militias reinstated.
After a rocky implementation in the southern districts it was halted. A governmental commission reported that the returnees to Tselemti faced physical assault by pro-Amhara region militia, and their homes or farmlands remained occupied by settlers. In western Tigray, the Tekeze Guard – constituted by perpetrators of the ethnic cleansing during the war – publicly characterises the displaced Tigrayans as fugitives and insists that recognising Amhara’s territorial claim is a prerequisite for a peaceful return.
The Tselemti predicament was presented by the president of TIRA as the reason for last month’s clash between the paramilitary Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) and the Ethiopian army.
Disarmament is another area of concern – symptomatic of a poorly institutionalised peace process. There was optimism in the initial stages in 2023, with state media reporting that the TDF were handing in their heavy equipment, but then began alleging the TDF was retraining some of their forces, and heavy weapons had been hidden.
Meanwhile, a cash-strapped demobilisation process was also badly off-track. Tigrayan officials argued that the peace deal stipulated full demobilisation was to go hand in hand with the removal of all non‑federal forces from western Tigray and the “restoration of Tigray’s constitutional territory and the full return of IDPs".
Divisions within the TPLF
Shortly after the Pretoria ceasefire, the TPLF became ensnared in a power struggle between a faction led by Debretsion and a rival group behind TIRA’s inaugural president, Getachew. At the root of this conflict lies a post-war legitimacy crisis and a fundamental divergence over where ultimate authority resides.
Given the TPLF’s historically centralised governance model, the dispute over control of TIRA is existential. Losing control would undermine its electoral prospects and weaken its bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the federal government.
When Abiy endorsed Getachew as TIRA president, Debretsion’s faction dug in to try and maintain control. To garner domestic support, it framed the dispute as a confrontation with Addis Ababa – the popular villain. In March last year, armed TDF officers took over TIRA offices, and Getachew and his allies fled the region.
They have since formed a new opposition party backed by Addis Ababa. An armed group, the Tigray Peace Force (TPF), has also emerged with the objective of unseating the TPLF, and operates across Tigray’s southeastern border in the Afar region. Last October, when the TDF advanced towards the TPF’s base, they were countered by drone strikes from the federal army.
Both Tigray factions have preyed on the public’s pain and post-war aspirations, squandering the momentum of the peace process. Tigray’s elite has become deeply split, with most policy issues – from IDP returns to demobilisation – framed through the lens of factional allegiance.
Alignment and re-alignment
The shift in the strategic landscape is nowhere better illustrated than a letter the Ethiopian government sent in June 2025 to the UN secretary-general alleging an imminent joint attack by the TDF, the Eritrean army, and Fano on western Tigray.
In a follow-up letter in October, Addis Ababa alleged that TDF commanders had participated in an offensive by Fano to capture Woldiya, a major town in northeastern Amhara. In the past few weeks, Ethiopia has also claimed to have intercepted weapons shipments from Tigray to Fano, and issued an ultimatum to Eritrea.
My enemy’s enemy seems to be the organising principle. Fano regards Abiy’s government as an existential threat to the Amhara people, justifying an alliance with any actor, including the TPLF – its opponent during the last war.
Eritrea now gets a pass from the TPLF, despite the Eritrean army’s war atrocities and continued occupation of Tigrayan districts. If conflict is to come with Addis Ababa, an alliance with Asmara enables the TPLF to escape the encirclement it fears.
By late 2025, these new relationships were reportedly formalised with trilateral meetings held inside Sudan, within territory controlled by the government of President Abdel Farrah al-Burhan.
The externalisation of the dispute is an increasingly dangerous element. Al-Burhan receives military and diplomatic support from Eritrea and Egypt as he battles his rival, General “Hemedti” Dagalo, who heads the Rapid Support Forces. Dagalo in turn is backed by the United Arab Emirates, with recent reports alleging an Emirati-financed training camp for Sudanese rebels in Ethiopia’s western region.
Addis Ababa, meanwhile, has antagonised Somalia by inching towards recognising breakaway Somaliland in return for a lease on the port of Berbera and a military base. Israel’s recent recognition of Somaliland has exacerbated those regional tensions, drawing rebukes – and unease – from Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.
What happens next?
With no sign yet of a diplomatic off-ramp, and as military preparedness by Ethiopian federal forces, the TDF, and Eritrea gathers pace, here are four potential scenarios to consider.
Scenario 1: Addis Ababa seeks to eliminate TPLF
The federal army’s troop build-up along Tigray’s borders could be an intensification of Addis Ababa’s existing pressure tactics, seeking to trigger mass protests or a palace coup within Tigray’s leadership by restricting fuel supplies, suspending budget finance transfers, and supporting dissenters.
The capitulation of the TPLF would fracture the current three-way alliance, in which Tigray serves as the geographic land bridge.
However, this gradual approach doesn’t justify the scale of the current military mobilisation, especially as it’s drawing forces away from other critical areas such as Amhara, where Fano operates.
Scenario 2: Assab is the goal
Addis Ababa’s objective in Tigray could include its goal to possess Assab. However, a military offensive on the port would be difficult. Getting to Assab, which borders the Afar region, would involve navigating rugged terrain and the Eritrean military is well dug in.
Hence, a parallel operation closer to Eritrea’s heartland – accessible only through Tigray – to compel Eritrean forces to relinquish their trenches and extensive military presence around Assab would be necessary.
This scenario puts the federal army in a simultaneous collision with both Eritrean and Tigrayan forces. Yet, Addis Ababa might deem that unavoidable if it believes the two are in a concrete military alliance.
Scenario 3: Eritrea/TDF take the initiative
Ethiopia’s build-up could be anticipatory. Addis Ababa has long claimed that Eritrean and TDF forces were entering the final stages of planning for a joint offensive. Statements by Eritrean and TPLF officials suggest at least tacit coordination, if not military cooperation.
Such an offensive would likely target the federal army bases in the Gondar-western Tigray corridor or the Afar region. However, pushing farther south would stretch supply lines, making Eritrea-TDF forces vulnerable to choke points and counter-offensives.
This scenario assumes the federal government is at its weakest and ripe for overthrow. When the TPLF made a similar assessment in late 2021, Abiy’s government proved resilient, mobilising massive new recruits and deploying armed drones effectively.
Scenario 4: Diplomatic breakthrough, but multiple spoilers
The final scenario is a diplomatic breakthrough that cools tensions. However, Addis Ababa has raised the political stakes through its national security rhetoric, allusion to port annexation, and sustained military mobilisation – de-escalation now could be seen as retreat.
Reaching acceptable terms would be difficult. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki prioritises strategic depth rather than diplomatic assurances. A détente would diminish the influence inside Ethiopia that Eritrea’s current alliances provide.
The TPLF leadership is unlikely to trust mediators over its current alliances and submit to disarmament, given heightened threats to its survival. Disarmament, particularly, without restoration of western Tigray, would undermine its resistance narrative and strain its internal cohesion.
None of these probable scenarios offer a clear path to victory for any actor.
What is clear is that a return to the post-ceasefire calm is now highly improbable. However the situation unfolds, the peace process will be further complicated with new grievances and alignments that could prove hard to disentangle.
Edited by Obi Anyadike.
