Why Does Sudan Need an Urgent Political Solution Now?

FFC leaders pose after a reunification meeting on July 10, 2021 (ST photo)

by Khalid Mukhtar Salim

The political process initiated by the United Nations Mission to Sudan (UNitams), and then adopted by the tripartite mechanism of the United Nations, the African Union, and IGAD, is still oscillating in its first consultative square after several months and many complications, most notably the interventions of the African Union and its envoy Mohamed el-Hacen Ould Lebatt, which many in the Sudanese political club view then as counterproductive. However, the need for a political solution to address the crises resulting from the October 25 coup and reverse its course has become more urgent for several reasons:

The first is the economy: the coup d’état of October 25, 2021, had a significant impact hitting the Sudanese economy and disrupting the harvest of the fruits of the difficult economic reforms carried out by Hamdok’s first and second governments. For example, the then-ongoing $760 million World Bank projects were suspended. Immediately after the coup. Moreover, Sudan was expected to receive a grant of $500 million on budget support by the end of December 2012 from the World Bank, in addition to another $500 million to support development projects in the areas of energy, food security, and natural resource management. These grants, which were expected to be included in this year’s (2022) budget, were suspended due to the coup. Sudan was also expected to receive a $2 billion grant from the International Development Agency in February 2022. This was also frozen due to the coup and was completely lost to Sudan by the end of last April. The 700 million dollars in economic support to Sudan, which was approved by the US Congress, after Sudan was removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism was also frozen, and the wheat grant agreed to be provided annually by the US government, which amounted to 350,000 metric tons of wheat, which worth about $125 million (currently increased due to the increase in wheat prices globally), and it covers about one-third of Sudan’s annual wheat needs, was also stopped due to the October 25 coup. Sudan’s debt forgiveness process vis the HIPC initiative, which amounts to about $70 billion, also stopped after the coup, due to the failure to meet the deadlines for evaluating the process in February and April, the lack of a clear economic plan after the coup, and the lack of a civil government recognised by the world to deal with. No one expects the world to forgive a country’s debt or aid it to use its financial resources to buy bullets and tools of repression against its people. The family support program (Thamarat), which provided a considerable reserve of foreign currency to contribute to stabilising the exchange rate after the liberalisation of the currency, as well as providing direct cash support to families was also suspended. All this stopped after the October 25 coup, but the chances of its return depend on a political solution that restores the path of democratic transition in the country.

The current political process is a negotiating tactic in the same context of the peaceful nonviolent revolution adopted by the Sudanese people since December 2018. Its aim is to reach a solution that restores the course of the Sudanese revolution to the path of a true civilian-led democratic transition in Sudan. This solution should not and will not be neutral towards the basic issues of the revolution, foremost of which are justice, freedoms, and achieving a comprehensive and just peace in a way that leads to lasting stability and solid democracy in the Sudan. All other tools of peaceful struggle will remain available in the event that this solution is not reached in a way that satisfies the aspirations and hopes of the street. A political solution means reversing the course of the October 25 coup with minimal losses, stopping its expansion and preventing imposing it as a reality. The continuation of the current situation will consolidate the coup and abort the hopes and aspirations of the December revolution. And it may even lead to what is more dangerous, which is the return of the old regime and the NCPers with new masks and slogans. This already starts to take place as a result of the confusion and foolishness of the putschists. The most dangerous thing that can happen now in Sudan is the return of the former regime and the NCPers to revenge from the Sudanese after the success of the revolution in uprooting the rule of the deposed National Congress Party regime.

On the other hand, the multiplicity of coup centres and the multiplicity of militias, military forces and armed movements in the country threaten to break out a clash between them that may lead to a devastating civil war. It is necessary for any real political solution to address this dilemma and time bomb in a consensual manner so that we conclude it through the creation of one new national army that functions away from politics and is committed to its role in protecting the homeland and democracy.

The country’s political leaders must truly rise up to fulfil their role and assume their tasks. The revolutionaries in the street, the resistance committees, and all the grassroots organisations did not fail and played their part in expressing rejection of the coup and removing any illusion of popular legitimacy from it. They made huge sacrifices and expressed great heroism. Now is the time for politicians to play their part in reducing the cost of this resistance and imposing a political solution that satisfies the aspirations of the street, returning the military to the barracks and returning the democratic transition in Sudan to its right track. The tripartite mechanism should play its role seriously in addressing the problem by determining its true nature between the coup camp and the anti-coup camp instead of the absurd mixing of papers carried out by the African mediator Ould Lebatt in an attempt to blur the nature of what happened on October 25. The situation in Sudan should not be manipulated for purposes other than those related to achieving the true goals of the revolution. Any solution should be based on this clear diagnosis of what happened on October 25 as a military coup and an illegal seizure of power by the putschists in place to gain public acceptance and sustainability.