What M23's Capture of Uvira Means for the DRC, Wider Region, and Peace Talks: Africa File Special Edition
Yale Ford
Key Takeaways:
Uvira Offensive. M23 rebels captured Uvira town in South Kivu province with significant Rwandan army support in the group’s most consequential offensive since March. The Rwandan army reportedly aided M23's advance, violating its commitments under the recently signed Washington Accords peace framework.
The DRC. The fall of Uvira is the defeat of the DRC coalition in South Kivu, which is a strategic setback for the Congolese government that will likely erode its domestic credibility and further weaken its military strategy against M23 in the eastern DRC.
M23. M23’s control of Uvira augments its military and political leverage. M23 could use Uvira to as a launchpad for an offensive toward southern and south-central DRC, although this is unlikely in the short term due to capacity and political constraints.
Burundi and the Wider Region. M23 launched its Uvira offensive after relations with Burundi collapsed, heightening the risks of a regional war. Burundi and Rwanda both view their competition in the eastern DRC as potentially existential, and M23’s capture of Uvira is Burundi’s gravest national security threat in years.
Peace Talks. M23's offensive on Uvira undermines an already-struggling peace effort between rebels and the Congolese government. Progress has been made in the separate US-mediated process between the DRC and Rwanda, but that track does not deal directly with M23 and other proxy forces.
Uvira Offensive
M23 rebels captured Uvira town in South Kivu province with Rwandan army support in the group’s most consequential offensive since March. M23 launched a large-scale offensive on pro-Congolese government forces—the Congolese army (FARDC), Wazalendo militia fighters, and the Burundian army (FDNB)—on the frontlines south of Bukavu, the South Kivu provincial capital, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on December 2.[i] M23 and Rwanda had reportedly mobilized reinforcements and equipment in the days before attacking enemy positions on the RN5 and in the Kaziba chiefdom in southern Walungu district.[ii] M23 had been waging several smaller offensives south of Bukavu in southern Walungu, Mwenga, and Shabunda districts to extend its territorial control and supply lines since late April. The front line on the RN5—the main route from Bukavu to Uvira on the Ruzizi Plain—had largely been frozen between M23-controlled Kamanyola and Katagota towns since March.
Figure 1. Bukavu-Uvira Corridor on the RN5
Source: Yale Ford.
M23 faced initial resistance in its offensive but successfully broke through key enemy positions on the RN5 and in Kaziba, opening lines of advance on Uvira town. Pro-Congolese government forces had counterattacked and deployed thousands of reinforcements to the front line when M23 launched the offensive.[iii] M23 heavily shelled and overpowered pro-Congolese government forces, capturing key positions in Kaziba and the adjacent Bafuliru chiefdom in the highlands, roughly 13 miles west of the frontline on the RN5, between December 4 and 6.[iv] These gains on the high ground allowed M23 to reposition its artillery and support a ground assault on Katagota, Lubarika, Luvungi villages on the RN5—the latter a crucial FDNB-FARDC forward position—on December 5, triggering a sudden FDNB withdrawal from Ruzizi on December 6.[v] FARDC-Wazalendo coordination crumbled as M23 advanced, with FARDC special forces clashing directly with Wazalendos.[vi]
M23 ground forces advanced about 40 miles to Uvira in four days after it took Luvungi. The group captured at least eight main villages on the RN5 with some resistance from lingering FARDC and Wazalendo units as fighting also occurred in the western highlands.[vii] Thousands of FDNB and FARDC soldiers—and even local Wazalendo generals—fled Uvira on December 9.[viii] CTP reported that M23 entered Uvira as early as December 9 and took control of key positions in the city by December 10, possibly waiting for FARDC-Wazalendo elements to withdraw.[ix] The UN reported on December 8 that over 200,000 people had been displaced since the fighting intensified on December 2.[x]
Figure 2. M23 and Allies Activity in South Kivu.
Source: Yale Ford; Liam Karr; Anping Zhu.
The Rwandan army (RDF) reportedly aided M23’s advance, violating its commitments under the recently signed Washington Accords peace framework. Security sources told French media that Rwanda began deploying reinforcements to support the offensive in late November.[xi] The United States and several European countries condemned Rwandan support for M23’s offensive and called on the RDF to halt offensive operations on December 9.[xii] The UN has reported on the RDF’s deployment of thousands of military troops and long-range artillery, armed drones, and anti-aircraft defense systems to support M23 offensives on multiple occasions since early 2024.[xiii] The group’s latest offensive reportedly involved this kind of advanced weaponry that exceeds M23 capabilities, such as signal jammers, artillery and GPS-guided mortars, multiple rocket launcher systems, suicide and multirole drones, and anti-drone weaponry.[xiv] The international community specifically expressed concern about the increased use of attack and suicide drones in their statements on the offensive.[xv] Rwanda committed to not “engage in, support, or condone any military incursions or other acts” in the eastern DRC as part of the Washington Accords.[xvi]
The DRC
The fall of Uvira is the defeat of the DRC coalition in South Kivu, which is a strategic setback for the Congolese government that will likely erode its domestic credibility and further weaken its military strategy against M23 in the eastern DRC. Uvira was the last major government foothold and FARDC military hub in South Kivu. M23’s control of Uvira cuts off the FARDC’s supply route for troops and military equipment in the region. M23’s advance also severely constrains if not completely cuts Burundian support, which had been the FARDC’s most important ally and main deterrent force against M23 and M23-aligned rebel militias in South Kivu. The FDNB initiated a full withdrawal and extraction of its roughly 18,000 troops from South Kivu and closed its two main border posts with the DRC due to M23’s Uvira assault.[xvii] The Congolese government had used Bujumbura—Burundi’s economic capital about 16 miles to the east of Uvira—and its airport as a rear base for FDNB-FARDC ground and air operations against M23 in South Kivu for months. Bombing runs launched from Bujumbura had aimed to degrade M23’s supply lines on several axes in South Kivu since fighting had escalated in South Kivu in September.
The Congolese government could face political pressure from its domestic base and the political opposition after the fall of Uvira. The DRC had relocated official institutions and the seat of government in South Kivu to Uvira after M23 captured Bukavu in mid-February. CTP assessed in late October that a successful M23 offensive on Uvira could cause a legitimacy crisis for the Congolese president and further expose his inability to roll back M23’s and Rwanda’s gains or resolve the conflict through various military or diplomatic solutions.[xviii]The political opposition had increased calls for Tshisekedi to convene a national dialogue to address the driving causes of armed conflict and underdevelopment across the DRC after M23 staged its early 2025 offensive. CTP has assessed that Tshisekedi is managing the risk of a coup linked to the M23 conflict and likely views any effort to reorganize power structures in the DRC as a threat to his control.[xix]
The Congolese government still does not face an immediate military threat from M23, however. M23 still only controls two remote provinces in the east of the DRC’s 26 provinces. The group would have to travel roughly 500 miles to reach the DRC’s economic engine in the mineral-rich former Katanga region and nearly 1,000 miles to Kinshasa, the Congolese capital, across poor roads to pose an existential threat. CTP assessed that the Congolese government would likely remain in a maximalist negotiating stance in peace talks even if M23 captured Uvira.[xx]
M23
M23’s control of Uvira augments its military and political leverage. M23 will be hard to dislodge from Uvira given the surrounding geography. Uvira is situated on a lakeside plain pinched between the highlands and Lake Tanganyika, with the only viable land routes being through Burundi and south on the RN5. M23 took control of and sealed off the DRC-Burundi border on December 9, and the group and Rwanda will likely deploy air defenses and close the airspace above Uvira to prevent cross-border attacks.[xxi] An FARDC official had told Reuters in mid-September that M23 would be “impossible to dislodge” if it pushed south along the ridgelines and gains control of key positions above Uvira, which are key due to the lack of land corridors.[xxii]
M23 will likely establish a parallel administration in Uvira—a town of 700,000 residents—and use its control of the town and surrounding areas as a bargaining chip in peace talks.[xxiii] Uvira is a major economic and commercial hub for the area, the interior DRC, and Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Zambia, with a port, access to several roads, and a customs post with Burundi. The group could expand its revenue streams by taxing and regulating regional trade, transportation, and commerce in the Lake Tanganyika area. The group said that it would launch a “vast” state-building effort after taking control of the Kalundu port on the south side of Uvira on December 10.[xxiv] CTP continues to assess that M23’s state-building efforts strengthens its leverage in peace efforts, making the group more intractable and able to push for a greater role in any future deal that sees M23 gradually enter a power-sharing system with the Congolese government.
M23 will likely use its control of Uvira to bolster its military strength for future offensives. M23 had demobilized and then trained and redeployed thousands of ex-FARDC and militia fighters to the group’s police and military forces after it captured Goma and Bukavu. The group has been conducting a mass recruitment and forced conscription campaign in urban and rural areas throughout 2025, at least tripling its force deployment since earlier this year.[xxv] CTP estimates that the group has at least 25,000 combatants in its security services. New M23 recruits reportedly participated in the Uvira offensive.[xxvi] M23 reportedly captured weaponry and military equipment and many Burundian and FARDC-Wazalendo fighters during its advance on the RN5.[xxvii]
Figure 3. Rwandan-Backed Rebellion Force Deployments in the Eastern DRC
Note: The estimate for RCD-Goma is from Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (Oxford University Press, 2009). The estimate for M23 in 2025 is based on UN reporting and the group’s recent claims.
Source: Yale Ford.
M23 will likely focus on securing and consolidating control over Uvira in the short-to-medium term. The UN and Burundi said that more than 30,000 Congolese civilians fled Uvira to Burundi in the past week.[xxviii] Civilians have also fled on the RN5 toward Baraka town in Fizi district.[xxix] The absence of urban combat in Uvira means that many civilians will likely return to the M23-controlled city, similar to what occurred in Bukavu in mid-February. M23 began asking civilians to return to their homes and resume their normal activities on December 10.[xxx]
The group could face challenges securing the town. M23 had progressively strengthened its grip on Goma but had to deal with urban insecurity fomented by defeated FARDC-Wazalendo militants who embedded themselves in the town in early 2025. Uvira had been a Wazalendo stronghold with more than 80 distinct militia groups claiming the town as its base.[xxxi] Wazalendo militias operating in the highlands above Uvira had sporadically clashed with FARDC throughout 2025. Many Wazalendo generals retreated from Uvira in the face of the group’s advance, but some “leaderless” Wazalendo and FARDC troops reportedly remained in the city and the surrounding highlands.[xxxii] M23 called on Wazalendo elements to submit to M23 authorities after it had effectively taken control of the city on December 10.[xxxiii] M23 claimed that some FDNB troops did not withdraw and “entrenched themselves” in the highlands on December 11.[xxxiv]
M23 could use Uvira to as a launchpad for an offensive toward southern and south-central DRC, although this is unlikely in the short term due to capacity and political constraints. The Burundian foreign minister accused M23 on December 8 of intending to march on Fizi district in South Kivu and reach Kalemie town—the Tanganyika provincial capital about 285 miles further south on the RN5—before December 25.[xxxv] Uvira was the last major defensive FARDC position before Kalemie, which is a key logistic hub that connects the eastern DRC to the former Katanga region in the south. Some pro-Congolese government forces in Uvira reportedly fled south on the RN5 to Fizi district while others redeployed to Kalemie, where Burundian troops are also stationed.[xxxvi] The group could use its control of Uvira and Lake Tanganyika as a staging area for a Kalemie offensive and would likely face little resistance aside from Wazalendo counterattacks if it advanced on the RN5.
Figure 4. M23 Expands from the Kivu Provinces
Source: Yale Ford.
M23’s control of Uvira could also strengthen its ability to conduct an offensive toward south-central DRC. The group could use Uvira as a logistic hub to support ongoing offensives in Mwenga and Shabunda districts on the RN5. M23’s advance in these areas could enable it to degrade FARDC air capabilities, which has been a major vulnerability for the group. Kindu in Maniema province lies roughly 135 miles west of M23’s current position on the RP503 via Shabunda town. Kindu is the administrative and commercial capital of Maniema province and an important FARDC command center that houses FARDC air assets and the FARDC’s 31st Rapid Intervention Brigade.[xxxvii] Kindu is one of the two main airports and staging grounds in central DRC for the FARDC’s air and ground operations against M23 in the east. M23 regularly accuses the Congolese government of using Kindu to deploy foreign mercenaries in the conflict and conduct drone strikes on its positions and civilians. Burundi will reportedly extract its forces deployed in Shabunda soon.[xxxviii]
M23 faces political and capacity constraints, however, especially in the immediate term. The group is still trying to fully secure Uvira and protect areas under its control in the eastern DRC from FARDC-backed Wazalendo insurgents. Further advance would also stretch M23’s supply lines hundreds of miles and extend them further from its rear support zones along the Rwandan border. The group and Rwanda are also facing international backlash, which has previously contributed to de-escalation and deterred M23 from advancing further, as happened when Rwanda directed M23’s withdrawal from Walikale town in North Kivu in early April. The United States reportedly has a sanctions package prepared on Congolese and Rwandan officials.[xxxix]
Burundi and the Wider Region
M23 launched its Uvira offensive after relations with Burundi collapsed, heightening the risks of a regional war. Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye had received an M23 delegation to discuss a non-aggression pact in early October.[xl] CTP had assessed that the meeting signaled that the two sides were open to deconflict as M23 was setting conditions to attack Uvira.[xli] M23 had halted their first southward advance along the Burundian border in South Kivu in February, which CTP assessed was the result of Burundi and Rwanda likely reaching a deal to deconflict in the eastern DRC.[xlii] These efforts decreased the risk of a wider regional war between the two countries in the short term, as Burundi scaled back its force deployment in the eastern DRC in the immediate aftermath.[xliii] Burundi appeared to reject a second détente during the October meeting, however, and continued its military support for Congolese forces in South Kivu, including air attacks on M23 positions across South Kivu.
M23 likely launched the offensive in part to protect ethnic Banyamulenge populations and allied militias from an FDNB-Wazalendo siege. The UN reported on November 24 that “armed actors”—FDNB troops and Wazalendo militia fighters—have denied humanitarian access and enforced a blockade around Minembwe town in Fizi district, where many ethnic Banyamulenge civilians live, since May.[xliv] The report said that close to 172,000 were trapped in the Minembwe area with no access to basic goods and humanitarian assistance in October.[xlv] M23 and Rwanda have allied with and provided support to Banyamulenge militia groups in the area, such as the Twirwaneho, and M23 has repeatedly said for at least three months that it would “eradicate the treat” on the Banyamulenge from Uvira and Bujumbura. The Belgian media outlet La Libre Afrique reported that M23 launched its offensive shortly after a senior M23 leader met with Ndayishimiye in a failed “last-ditch effort” to ask that he withdraw Burundian troops from the DRC and open a humanitarian corridor around Minembwe town in late November.[xlvi]
M23’s capture of Uvira is Burundi’s gravest national security threat in years. Burundi and Rwanda are rivals in the eastern DRC, and both view their competition as potentially existential. The Burundian foreign ministry denounced attacks on Burundian territory during the fighting and Rwanda’s “belligerent attitude” on December 8.[xlvii] Rwanda has accused Burundi of “sabotaging the peace process” and condemned it for the “systematic bombing” of villages on the Rwandan side of the border.[xlviii] Senior M23 officials said that the group does not have territorial claims on Burundi on December 9.[xlix] The Burundian foreign minister still said that “what threatens Uvira also threatens Bujumbura” and that “all options are on the table” for a response on December 10.[l]
M23’s control of Uvira and key areas along the Burundi-DRC border cuts off Burundi from DRC territory and poses a major security and economic risk to the Burundian government without a détente.[li] The closure of the border and the eviction of its forces from South Kivu will likely significantly hinder Burundi’s ability to fend off cross-border attacks on its western provinces from Burundian rebel groups who have bases in the highlands—the original stated goal for its intervention in the DRC. M23’s control of the border also has dire economic implications for Burundi, as it relies heavily on the Bujumbura–Uvira corridor to transport the 90 percent of its total exports to the DRC.[lii] The spillover and refugee influx from the large-scale fighting will additionally further strain the struggling Burundi economy, which has slid even further in 2025 due to chronic fuel shortages and the war in the eastern DRC.[liii]
Peace Talks
M23's offensive undermines an already-struggling peace effort between the rebels and the Congolese government. Peace efforts had halted large-scale M23 advances since late March. The US and Qatar brokered M23’s withdrawal from Walikale under Rwanda’s command in early April, and the Congolese government conceded to direct talks with M23, resulting in a commitment to a truce and their first joint statement in late April. RDF activity along the frontlines decreased, and M23 turned inward and began consolidating control over territory in the following months as peace talks progressed and direct clashes between M23 and FARDC forces declined, despite the continuation of fighting with Wazalendo groups.
Figure 5. Peace Processes Multiply in the African Great Lakes Region
Source: Yale Ford
Mutual distrust widened and security conditions deteriorated on the ground despite progress in peace efforts, however. M23 and the Congolese government reportedly began reinforcing their ranks and positions across the frontlines and traded accusations that each side was planning an imminent offensive in early July.[liv] The two sides signed a declaration of principles agreement in late July, followed by a ceasefire-verification mechanism in mid-October and roadmap framework agreement on November 15. CTP assessed that the roadmap agreement was nonbinding and left several key areas unaddressed.[lv] The ceasefire mechanism was not solidified, and tensions have simmered since September, when the FARDC escalated an air interdiction campaign in violation of the ceasefire and trust between the two sides eroded as they used belligerent rhetoric to accuse each other of ceasefire violations and bad-faith negotiations. Qatar has reportedly sent invitations to the two sides for a new round of talks.[lvi]
Progress was made in the separate DRC-Rwanda process, but that track does not deal directly with M23 and other proxy forces. The DRC and Rwanda finalized and ratified the US-brokered peace framework in November and December. The US-mediated peace track focuses on the nation-to-nation issues but is closely coordinated with the Doha process. M23 has said repeatedly, however, that that it has nothing to do with the DRC-Rwanda agreement of which it is not a participant. The Congolese government has called for sanctions on Rwanda and said that it has violated its commitments under the US accord.[lvii] Rwanda has traded mutual accusations and accused the Congolese government of not honoring an airstrike moratorium that was agreed to in US-led talks in November.[lviii]
Africa File Data Cutoff: December 11, 2025, at 10 a.m.
The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.
